DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism Friday August 16, 2002 Fina

1. DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism Friday August 16, 2002 Final Outbrief [Excerpt] For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

2. Sponsors Special Operations & Joint Forces in Support of Countering TerrorismDr. Ted GoldMr. Don Latham USD(AT&L)/Commander JFCOM Prior CT InsightsMG Bob ScalesDr. Wick Murray Future Force CapabilitiesGEN Bill HartzogVADM Dave Frost Advanced CT Technologies & SystemsDr. Mim JohnDr. Ron Kerber We drew on past DSB studies Intel PanelDr. Joe MarkowitzADM Bill Studeman Enduring Freedom Psyops Unconventional Use of Nuclear Weapons Against U.S.Dr. Rich WagnerDr. Bill Graham Managed Information Dissemination We leveraged current DSB Studies Precision Targeting Defensive Information Operations Biological WarfareDr. Anna SkalkaMr. Larry Lynn Discriminant Use of ForceDr. Ted GoldDr. Josh Lederberg Others 2

3. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): A Real War, A New Type of Adversary • Requires new strategies, postures, and organization • Committed,resourceful, globally dispersed adversary with strategic reach • A long, at times violent, and borderless war This study only scratches the surface of what will eventually be needed For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

4. Elements of a National Strategy: Orchestrate All Instruments of National Power in a Global Campaign • Preemption/proaction/interdiction/disruption/quick-response capabilities • Be proactive in securing partners and help from allies, friends, and others • Hold states/sub-state actors accountable • Foster information sharing • Fight forward • Focus particular attention on WMD • Sophisticated, aggressive public diplomacy All the above in parallel with consequence management and protecting the homeland and DoD’s missions and forces For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

5. Guidance From Our Terms of Reference • Focus is overseas military operations • Military instrument is only part of the necessary capabilities • Examined the role of intelligence in some detail • Did not address homeland defense explicitly • But difficult to segment theaters in this war • We did consider threats to US military force projection from the US For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

6. The Toughest Challenge: Identify and Find Terrorist Networks • Very small “signals” hidden in massive clutter and noise • Some similarities with Cold War anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts • Extensive differences as well For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

7. Conducting Military Campaigns in States Harboring Terrorists • OEF demonstrated substantial progress toward desired force capabilities • From • Air, land, sea, space • To • Robust connectivity • Horizontally integrated, pervasive ISR • Agile ground forces able to operate dispersed • Effective remote fires • Adaptive joint command and control • Assured access and supply (expeditionary mindset) These emerging capabilities will be critical for an effective military role in GWOT For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

8. Characteristics of Afghan Campaign That Will Persist • A more central role for SOF and specialized capabilities • Joint integration at very low levels • Discriminant use of force • Interagency partners play major roles • Creative operational arrangements with coalition partners For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

9. Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT • Expanded Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) and Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) initiatives • Interagency – Link analysis • Operational net assessment (ONA) capabilities at Combatant Commands • JFCOM – CENTCOM – NORTHCOM • New Campaign Support Group at Ft. Bragg • Multi-agency – Joint – Global perspective – New analysis tools – Multi-option analysis • Joint Program Office – Special Technology Countermeasures: Mission Assurance Analysis • Counter-terrorism Technology Support Office – Technical Support Working Group • Physical Security Equipment Action Group • Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center • J8 Chem/Bio Warfare Requirements Section • DoD Support to DEA Special Intelligence • JFCOM Initiatives • Standing Joint Force Headquarters – Joint Interagency Coordination Group • Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System - Near Term • Enhanced C4ISR Homeland Operations Center – Joint National Training Capability • USN Deep Blue (Navy Operations Group) • USN/USMC Expeditionary Strike Group Proof of Concept • USMC/SOCOM Integration Initiatives For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

10. Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT • DARPA projects, e.g.: • Genoa • Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery • Translingual Information Detection, Extraction, and Summarization • Babylon • Human Identification at a Distance • Modern Internetted Unattended Ground Sensors • Foliage Penetration Radar (SAR and GMT I) • Standoff Precision Identification from 3D Data • Digital Radio Frequency Tags • Advanced ISR Management • ACTDs: • High-Altitude Airship • Pathfinder • Active Denial System • Thermobaric • Adaptive Joint C4ISR Mode • Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness • Language and Speech Exploitation Resources • Cave and Urban Assault • Urban Reconnaissance • Hyperspectral Collection and Analysis System (HyCAS) For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

11. Major Concerns • DoD should take the terrorist threat as seriously as it takes the likelihood and consequences of major theater war • DoD still struggling to get joint C4 right • Pentagon processes overly focused on materiel • Defense and Intelligence processes and cultures remain input- rather than product-oriented For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

12. Understanding adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets Adaptive and responsive national-level decision making Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

13. Understanding adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets Adaptive and responsive national-level decision making Not the focus of our study Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

14. 1 Understanding adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors 2 “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets A much more responsive, flexible, and effective military capability Adaptive and responsive national-level decision making 3 Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations 4 Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

15. Discussion Outline • Organization, context, and themes • Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence • “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities • Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations • Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities • Recap For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

16. A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability • Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking the terrorists and their networks • “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities • Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations • Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

17. - Key Initiatives – Transformation of HUMINT (and human-technical) operations Aggressive, proactive, preemptive, operations Intelligence surge/unsurge capability Expanded analytical capabilities and throughput against asymmetrical adversaries Understand adversaries as complex adaptive systems Understanding New Adversaries and Providing “Actionable” Intelligence: Deep Penetration - Understanding, Finding, and Tracking the Terrorists and Their Networks For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

18. Transformation of HUMINT Operations • SecDef (working with DCI) expand overall Directorate of HUMINT Services (DHS)/Service roles and explore SOF opportunities • Increase HUMINT forward/operational presence • Work with DCI to deploy new DoD clandestine technical capabilities • NSA/Combatant Commanders/Services pay more attention to support of DoD HUMINT in the field • SOF continue to work Advance Force Operations (AFO) • Define HUMINT role in “Proactive” Ops; ensure Covert Action (CA) and IW/IO connections • Explore development of USAF/Navy HUMINT capabilities (beyond current compartmented programs) • A major covert HUMINT program needs to be made joint • Explore new and more varied HUMINT modes – described on next chart For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

19. Transformation of HUMINT Operations Classified HUMINT Chart

20. Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG) CLASSIFIED For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

21. Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations • Creation of a Proactive Preemptive Operating Group (P2OG) of creative subject matter operational experts such as: • IW/IO – Covert Action – Diplomacy – Cover & Deception • Intelligence Operations – PSYOPS – HUMINT – SIGINT – SOF • Improves information collection by stimulating reactions • Enhance operational preparation of the battlespace to support preemptive options and actions • Signal to harboring states that their sovereignty will be at risk • Vest responsibility and accountability for the P2OG to a “Special Operations Executive” in the NSC* who shall: • Define the national strategy • Coordinate action • Enunciate policy • Execute to a plan coordinated with the SecDef and DCI and others as appropriate * The position exists in the NSC and is called: “National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism”, NSPD-8, Oct. 24, 2001 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

22. Intelligence Surge/Unsurge Capability • Maintain a robust global cadre of retirees, reservists, and others who are trained and qualified to serve on short notice, including expatriates • Make investments now • Exercise and engage (through gaming) at least annually • Maintain a database of individuals and skills • Focus on Tier 4 countries where CT operations may be necessary • Contracted roles for industry, universities, and think tanks • Focus on analytic expertise and capabilities, CA/SOF issues, scientists and engineers, linguists/area experts, and personnel recovery skills • Work with DoD and Congress on “unsurge” issues, particularly related to callups • Develop innovative “data surge” capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

23. Improving Analytical Capabilities and Throughput • Create a new and larger analytic workforce with skills and innovative tools focused on counterterrorism (CT) • Focus on “actionable intelligence,” improved situational awareness, targeting and reachback support and “connecting the dots” using JWAC-like analysis approaches • Full-time collaborative connections between all the critical centers working CT intelligence and support • Analysis components of national intelligence organizations physically or virtually collocated to improve all-source multi-INT “analysis” collaboration and production • Support for intelligence collection-related “target development” • Develop new security/sanitization concepts to aid analysts in protecting new sources and methods • Identify roles for analysts in operational net assessment process/joint experimentation, vulnerability analysis/Red Teaming, and CT-related gaming and simulation For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

24. Greatly Improving Customer Access to Intelligence Counterterrorism Information • SecDef/DCI establish a group to define a future path to achieve a truly joint interoperable CT Common Operating Picture (COP) • Improve chat windows and secure collaborative means/directories for direct access to relevant analysts and related data environments • Converge large e-gov programs currently underway in SIGINT and IMINT for improved customer access to intelligence data/collaboration • Pursue an integrated family of “small terminal programs” for field/small unit access to intelligence data (data, imagery, etc.)—smart push and pull • DCI/SecDef provide portals, tools and pointers for access to unclassified open sources data bases, commercial sources etc. • Develop advanced visualization concepts for conveying intelligence and situational information For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

25. Understanding Adversaries as Complex Adaptive Systems • Further expand and enhance Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)-like capabilities • Expand the number of countries/actors as well as the factors considered • Address non-physical as well as physical dimensions • Address money flow, cronies, family, intra-military, other • The capabilities must be coupled closer to campaign planning and execution (effects-based operations): • To influence as well as respond • Support information/influence ops in peace/crisis/war as well as more traditional maneuver/fires • These capabilities are also needed to: • Focus information collection efforts • Provide context to better understand collected data For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

26. Recommendation Develop an entirely new capability to proactively, preemptively evoke responses from adversary/terrorist groups Form a new elite Counter-terrorism Proactive Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG) at the NSC level Highly specialized people with unique technical and intelligence skills such as information operations, PSYOP, network attack, covert activities, SIGINT, HUMINT, SOF, influence warfare/deception operations Reports to NSC principal level Lead Responsibility NSC lead with DCI, SecDef, State, Justice participation Recommendation: Proactive Operations • “Cost” • 100 “new” people • $100M/yr for operations and support For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

27. Recommendation Develop new capabilities, sources, and methods to enable deep penetration of adversaries DO/DHS develop new modes and methods for covert operations – See classified chart on HUMINT Increase emphasis on CT CA to gain close target access Develop new clandestine technical capabilities Create a surge capability in intelligence to preempt and deal with rapidly emerging crises in the GWOT Maintain a robust cadre of retirees reservists and specialists, qualified to serve on short notice Contract roles for industry universities and think tanks Lead Responsibility DCI Lead SecDef/CJCS ASD(C3I) and DCI Community Management Staff (CMS) DCI/DoD co-shared lead Recommendation: Improve Intelligence • “Cost” • $1.7 Billion/FY beginning in FY-04 and continuing • $100M/yr for exercises, engagement in the form of gaming, and real operations Supports CIA DO/DDS&T initiatives For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

28. Recommendation Expand counter terrorism and asymmetric adversary analytical capabilities and throughput Increase Service and intelligence agency analytic specialties, unique to CT challenges, by 500 people over the next 18 months to add depth of expertise Focus on understanding effects of globalization, radicalism, cultures, religions, economics, etc., to better characterize potential adversaries More virtual collaboration architecture for analyst support and customers interaction Lead Responsibility CMS shared lead with ASD(C3I) Recommendation: Improve Intelligence (cont.) • “Cost” • $800M/yr for technical capabilities development and 500 new staff For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

29. Recommendation Establish additional “centers” of excellence to handle the greatly increased work load and to augment JWAC to support “targeting” (in the broadest sense) of terrorist organizations and their supporting infrastructure—these activities will draw upon intelligence feeds, Red Teaming, and a great variety of subject matter experts (regional, cultural, psychological, soft and hard sensors) Pursue and expand JFCOM’s operational net assessment activity employed in millennium challenge Lead Responsibility JFCOM Recommendation: Gain Deeper Understanding of Terrorist Organizations and Their Supporters as Complex Adaptive Systems • “Cost” • Add to existing initiatives up to $100M per FY as appropriate • $100M initiative at JFCOM, CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, and DARPA For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

30. [remainder of briefing deleted here]