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NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will

NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will. Professor Janne Haaland Matlary, Department of Political Science, Univ. of Oslo and the Norwegian Defence University SAIS, April 3rd, 2013. Burden-Sharing - US pays 77% in NATO. Risk-Willing, Relevant Military Capability

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NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will

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  1. NATO’s European Allies:Military Capability and Political Will Professor Janne Haaland Matlary, Department of Political Science, Univ. of Oslo and the Norwegian Defence University SAIS, April 3rd, 2013

  2. Burden-Sharing - US pays 77% in NATO • Risk-Willing, Relevant Military Capability • Political Willingness to use Force, both as coercion and in war-fighting • Budgets and not threats determine military capability • «Deep Peace» and lack of strategic thinking • Yet multipolarity and increased use of force…Turkey-Syria as one example!

  3. Whatdetermines European contributions? • «alliance dependence» – when the US beckons • Prestige – if UK goes with US, so does France • National interests, which differ • Domestic politics against the use of force • ISAF: unjust burden-sharing and much free-riding • Libya: only few in combat roles, coalition • Mali – French leadership, coalition

  4. If the US does not beckon? • Will Europeans follow the UK? France? • Will Europeans keep the US interested? • Will Europeans rise to the challenge of leading with hard power? • Unless one deters, one invites pressures, even attacks – • Strategic logic is essential, yet missing in European politics

  5. The Chapters • M. Petersson: Europeans have historically used force for political ends, even in modern times (Suez 1956, Falklands 1982, Bosnia, 1994, etc,) But France and UK are exceptions. • Chr. Coker: Cultural problem in Europe with the use of force, Europe has dispensed with war and is unprepared for using force. Therefore it is unable to think strategically, threathen credibly, and deter.

  6. Con’t. • Gen. S. Diesen: ever increased cost of military capabilities with ever diminishing budgets, critical mass level reached already for many states, integration of capabilities a must. Budgets drive defence. • Østerud and Toje: No common vision in NATO, a coalition platform, much free riding. Can it continue as a viable alliance? Without US lead, it may unravel.

  7. Con’t. • S. Kay: The US is serious about cuts and strategic turn to Asia. Europe cannot continue as before, must assume leadership for smaller wars in and around Europe. • P. Porter: Britain has political will and the FPP, wants to underpin world player status, but mismatch between will and ability. Must integrate further with France, severe cuts to army’s size. Economic reality cannot sustain great power status much longer.

  8. Con’t. • Y. Boyer: France can and will use force, the FPP works, wants to speed up European defence policy and cooperate more with the US. Yet Ideology (socialism) marks change from Sarkozy. • B. Schreer: Germany is a «reluctant ally» and will increasingly be so, as G. becomes more powerful in Europe. It does not want to lead in NATO and puts less emphasis on military force. German abstention on Libyan resolution.

  9. Con’t. • D. Coletta/Garcia: Like Germany, Spain has a pasifistic culture. Public opinion matters much. Negative view of military as legacy of Franco. Big change from Aznar to Zapatero. Reluctant ally. • Pietras: Poland is both willing and able, yet motivated by alliance dependence. More able than willing, no to Libya, interested in «old» art 5. But has military ambitions and wants to count as great power in Europe.

  10. Cont’d. • T. Magyarics: Hungary is politically willing but economically unable. Alliance dependence is the motive, for geo-political reasons. Absent the US, then what? • M. Vedby-Rasmussen: Denmark is both able and willing, alliance dependence explains this. But capability small. • Matlary: Norway is able and almost always willing. Domestic factors influenced contributions to ISAF, but N. played key combat role in Libya.

  11. Findings • Military/Strategic Culture: France, UK, DK, Norway? Germany lacks it – • Political ideology: Mattered in Norway, Spain, not in France, UK • When culture is strong, one way or the other, ideology does not decide • Alliance dependence highly important, how will Europe react when it does not obtain? • Modernisation uneven, budget cuts

  12. «Events, my dear boy, events»…? • Strategic thinking and deterrence a must (again) • Deterrence today: to avert being put under pressure • Europe must be able to deter in its region, which includes Maghreb, Middle East, Caucausus • Deterrence through will to coerce when needed and act when coercion does not work • This requires leadership in Europe – French/British

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