1 / 11

British Gas Egypt Incident Investigation – 7 th August 2013

British Gas Egypt Incident Investigation – 7 th August 2013. MPO Flow diagram Tap Root Investigations BG 7 th August 2013 NSD Equipment. 5-1/8” 10k Valve N1 failed during operations Casual Factors Identified, Proposed Recommendations & Verification Needs Improvement Support Data .

almira
Télécharger la présentation

British Gas Egypt Incident Investigation – 7 th August 2013

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. British Gas Egypt Incident Investigation – 7th August 2013 • MPO Flow diagram Tap Root Investigations BG 7th August 2013 • NSD Equipment. 5-1/8” 10k Valve N1 failed during operations • Casual Factors Identified, Proposed Recommendations & Verification • Needs Improvement • Support Data

  2. TapRoot Investigations – 7th August 2013 Onsite Supervisor informs DSV of problems Review Process Incident Reports etc., Received Client Visit & Review A Presentation of corrective action plan Onsite Supervisor informs MPO Management Consolidate Data / Fact Find • Ops Team & QHSE, commence reviewing reports. Implementation Initiate internal review with crews NI

  3. NSD 5-1/8” 10k Valve failure 7th August 2013 TapRoot Investigation 10th August 2013 9th August 2013 7th August 2013, 11:15hrs 7th August 2013, 11:20hrs NSD Operators observed pressure build up during connection behind N1 NSD Supervisor communicates problem to MPD supervisor Pressure tested against N1 to 3600psi to test integrity of N1 • Commenced stripping down of N1Valve on NSD RAM and inspect internals ? B N1 valve passing during NSD connection A On completion of the strip down of N1 It was found that the gate and seal Seats had excessive washing Decision made to isolate NSD RAM Due to two barriers required For maintenance to the NSD RAM Tested against N1 to 3600 psi , it was Observed that mud was seen at Trip tank and that the pressure was not Stable, indicating that N1 was washed out, continue To POOH Pumping at 550gpm pressure built up to 1500psi And then bled off to make sure no damage was made To the IBOP NI Mud weight 16.3ppg Mud solids content not known Valve internals were all replaced with New parts & the valve was rebuilt with Spares from onboard the Rig Equipment has been in service for more than 1 year and is currently working under an exemption Left N4 open to complete connection, and by pass to investigate the problem NI

  4. NSD 5-1/8” 10k Valve failure 7th August 2013 TapRoot Investigation 11th August, 2013 N1 valve passing during NSD connection Pressure test NSD RAM & check integrity of N1 valve B N1 Valve & RAM was Pressure tested to 300psi For 10 mins and witnessed By Blade Rep The test pressure was Then increased to 6500psi For 15 mins, which resulted in a good test. NI

  5. NSD Casual Factors Identified & Proposed RecommendationsTapRoot Investigation – 7th August 2013

  6. Needs Improvement Factors Identified & Proposed RecommendationsTapRoot Investigation – 7th August 2013

  7. Support Data – Report of Washout findings by S.Mohammad Support Data

  8. Corrective Actions and Recommendations • This is the first well of this type which has been drilled with BG and there are many lessons to be learned and improvement to be made based on experience. HTHP, heavy weight mud and a harsh operating environment is going to be difficult on all the rig circulation systems. • The original HAZOP and FMECA covered the potential for a failure of this type and gate valves can have a failure mode where they wash out. MPO would like to limit the time between failures and try to catch any of this type of incident through an improved preventative maintenance schedule. • MPO has been disappointed with the performance of the Valves supplied by T3-NOV and will recommend a fleet replacement. This may take some time as the orders for WOM have a long lead time. In the meantime MPO will increase the inspection frequency of this product and carry additional spares. • WOM Replacements have already been mobilized to the rig and at the first convenient opportunity the T3 valves will be replaced.

  9. Feedback QUESTIONS??

More Related