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Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)

The Role of Global Nuclear Detection Architecture in the Defense of the Homeland. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). May 11, 2012. Baltimore-Washington Health Physics Society Annual Meeting Kevin G. Hart Lieutenant Colonel, US Army Deputy Assistant Director, Analysis Division.

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Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)

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  1. The Role of Global Nuclear Detection Architecture in the Defense of the Homeland Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) May 11, 2012 Baltimore-Washington Health Physics Society Annual Meeting Kevin G. Hart Lieutenant Colonel, US Army Deputy Assistant Director, Analysis Division

  2. The Department of Homeland Security • In response to the attacks of September 11, the Department of Homeland security was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. • DHS was established to coordinate the implementation of a national strategy to protect the U.S homeland from terrorist attacks, and to consolidate all the executive branch elements related to homeland security under one agency. • DHS is responsible for: • Guarding Against Terrorism • Security of US Borders • Enforcing US Immigration Laws • Improving America’s Readiness for, Response to and Recovery from Disasters 2 2

  3. DNDO as Part of DHS SECRETARY DEPUTY SECRETARY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CHIEF OF STAFF MILITARY ADVISOR UNDER SECRETARY, MANAGEMENT UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY UNDER SECRETARY, NATIONAL PROTECTION & PROGRAMS UNDER SECRETARY, POLICY GENERAL COUNSEL ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS ASSISTANT SECRETARY, PUBLIC AFFAIRS INSPECTOR GENERAL CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER ASSISTANT SECRETARY, HEALTH AFFAIRS DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS COORDINATION & PLANNING UNDER SECRETARY, INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS OFFICER, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER DIRECTOR, COUNTER-NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES OMBUDSMAN ASSISTANT SCRETARY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES DIRECTOR, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET SERVICE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD 3 3

  4. The Nuclear and Radiological Threat “…it is increasingly clear that the danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global security, to our collective security.” – President Obama (Nuclear Security Summit, April 13, 2010) • Types of threats: • Nuclear Weapon • Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) • Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) – (also referred to as “Dirty Bomb”) • Radiation Exposure Device (RED) HEU intercepted by Republic of Georgia in smuggling sting Crude sketch of nuclear device found in Afghanistan RDD response exercise in New York Jose Padilla – convicted of plotting dirty bomb attack 4 4

  5. DNDO’s Mission and Objectives DNDO was established on April 15, 2005 with the signing of NSPD 43 / HSPD 14 for the purpose of improving the Nation’s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time. Develop the global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA) Develop, acquire, and support the domestic nuclear detection and reporting system Detect – Employ instruments and improve training in order to increase detection probability and establish operational protocols to ensure detection leads to effective response Coordinate – Ensure that stakeholders with GNDA functions minimize gaps and overlaps in roles and responsibilities and facilitate situational awareness through information sharing and analysis Conduct a transformational research and development program Provide centralized planning, integration, and advancement of USG nuclear forensics programs 5

  6. DNDO: An Interagency Office • DNDO is an interagency office composed of detailees and liaisons from the departments of Energy, Defense, Justice, State, the FBI and NRC • Other DHS components such as the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and Transportation Security Administration provide detailees to DNDO. • DNDO relies upon the national laboratories, academia, and private industry to conduct research that directly supports its mission. • DNDO maintains strong relationships with Federal, State, Tribal and local entities to facilitate capabilities development. 6 6

  7. DNDO Directorate Structure Office of the Director Red Team &Net Assessments Chief of Staff Product Acquisition & Deployment Transformational & Applied Research Systems Engineering& Evaluation Operations Support Architecture & Plans Directorate National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center 7 7

  8. Global Nuclear Detection Architecture In order to strengthen the Nation’s layered defense, DNDO analyzes the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, and then formulates recommendations and plans to strengthen the architecture with stakeholder collaboration and cooperation. The GNDA is a worldwide network of sensors, telecommunications, and personnel, with the supporting information exchanges, programs, and protocols that serve to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials that are out of regulatory control. The term “out of regulatory control” refers to materials that are being imported, possessed, stored, transported, developed, or used without authorization by the appropriate regulatory authority, either inadvertently or deliberately. Substantial risk reduction is the aim 8

  9. Key Architecture and Plans Directorate Functions • Stakeholder Coordination of the GNDA • Comprehensive Capability Based Assessment of GNDA • Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Risk Analysis • GNDA Strategic Plan and Annual Review • Increase Detection Capabilities in Key Mission Areas -Maritime - Aviation -Land Border - Interior • Develop Integrated Capability Developmental Plans and Solutions - Solution Development Process (SDP) • APD focuses on Stage 0 through Stage 2a and ensures stakeholder requirements are met 9

  10. GNDA Operational View-1 10 10

  11. Developmentof an Adaptable Architecture The Solution is the development of a flexible and adaptable architecture • Balanced Approach • Leveraging the existing static architecture to develop new capabilities with the capacity to surge based on intelligence • Technology • Uses advanced technologies on mobile platforms in order to increase the probability of encounter • Capabilities that conduct primary and secondary screening concurrently are critical • Focus on high risk nodes • Much of the emphasis on the creation of a static architecture has been on commercial/high traffic nodes. Re-locatable assets can be deployed in non-commercial high risk nodes based on intelligence, or used randomly to deter potential adversaries. Problems associated with a static architecture • Cost • It is cost prohibitive to deploy enough detection capability across all nodes of the GNDA to a sufficient level to ensure a high probability of success • Technology • Limited in detection range due to physics, therefore with a static architecture threats must pass very close to assets • 100% static architecture would have a negative impact on commerce • Fixed Assets • Much of the emphasis has been on the creation of a static architecture, and fixed assets cannot be redeployed in support of intelligence driven events 11

  12. DNDOCommercial First Initiative The rapid development of technology and innovation, along with constrained budgets and market forces has shifted DNDO focus from government development of material solutions to a “Commercial First” approach. Intent of the approach will focus on determining best value solutions by utilizing modeling tools and verification and validation (V&V) of data and performance. Approach does not eliminate need for government oversight and partnership. Facilitates continuous feedback during the entire acquisition process between industry and user’s/stakeholders to refine requirements. There is a potential that DHS may procure systems from vendors who successfully demonstrate that their systems/products meet the requirements. DHS may establish Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA). 12

  13. Maritime Mission Area • Program Elements • Develop and deploy radiation detection equipment to the Nation’s seaports to scan arriving cargo • Develop and deploy radiation detection equipment to the U.S. Coast Guard to support boarding team inspections • Work with State and local partners to enhance radiation detection capabilities of current maritime law enforcement operations • Partners: • USCG, CBP, TSA, state and local, DOE, DoD • Example Activities: • West Coast Maritime Pilot • USCG Joint Acquisition Strategy • Small Vessel Stand-off Detection 13 13

  14. Aviation Mission Area • Program Elements • Deploy radiation detection equipment to scan all arriving private international general aviation flights • Pilot radiation detection solutions to scan passengers and baggage • Characterize airport-of-entry operations and enhance air cargo scanning • Partners • TSA, CBP, state and local • Example Activities • International General Aviation • Computed Tomography/Advanced Technology Scanning Evaluation • Air Port-of-Entry Deployments 14

  15. Land Border Mission Area • Program Elements • Deploy radiation detection equipment to the Nation’s ports of entry to scan arriving cargo containers and vehicles • Develop and deploy radiation detection solutions between ports of entry along our borders • Partners • CBP, state and local • Example Activities • Study to Identify Potential Improvements in Maintaining Portal Monitors • International Rail • Study to Improve Probability of Encounter 15 15

  16. Domestic Interior Mission Area • Program Elements • Work with federal, state, and local law enforcement and emergency responders to expand domestic preventive radiation/nuclear detection capabilities • Provide operational support such as training, exercises, and technical reach-back • Partners • States and locals, TSA, FEMA, DOE, DoD, FBI, NRC • Example Activities • NIMS Resource Typing • Long Range Radiation Detection • Training and Exercise Support to Stakeholders 16 16

  17. Next and Future Generation Technology 17 17

  18. DNDO Transformational R&D Program Aggressive and expedited R&D programs that seek to develop break-through technologies that will have a dramatic positive impact on capabilities to detect nuclear threats. • Exploratory Research Program • Investigate promising concepts to show feasibility through laboratory Proof-of-Concept demonstrations • Advanced Technology Demonstration • Characterize Performance Test Units in a simulated operational environment to assess technology transition potential • Academic Research Initiative • Create next generation of scientists and engineers • Small Business Innovative Research • Strengthen the role of innovative small business concerns with federally-funded research and development Cs2LiYCl6 (CLYC) Scintillator TlBr Semiconductor SORDS Detector and Truck SNAR Test Unit 18 18 18

  19. DNDO R&D Program Progression Technology ReadinessLevel (TRL) Progression Nuclear Detection Architecture Challenges N/A Feasibility Evaluation TRL 1-3 Exploratory Research Project Proof of Concept (POC) TRL 3-4 Advanced Technology Demonstration TRL 5-6 Performance Test Unit (PTU) TRL 7 Prototype TRL 7 Engineering Development Model (EDM) Limited Rate Initial Production (LRIP) TRL 8 Full Rate Production (FRP) TRL 9 19 19 19

  20. Product Acquisition & Deployment Engineering development, production, developmental logistics, procurement, and deployment of current and next generation nuclear detection systems. Radiation Portal Monitor Program • Joint Analysis Center Collaborative Information System Ortec Microdevice: Human-Portable Radiation Detection Systems* On Dock Rail Radseeker: Human-Portable Radiation Detection Systems* • International Rail (IRail) • Human Portable Tripwire (HPT) • Neutron Detection Replacement Program Programs not pictured: 20 * PADD also procures a variety of Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) systems deployed by users

  21. Systems Engineering & Evaluation • Operational Analysis and Systems Engineering Support • Work with federal, state, and local stakeholders to evaluate the feasibility and performance of new or emerging capabilities in an operational environment • Provide systems engineering support for DNDO Solution Development Process throughout the systems engineering life cycle • Lead development, in coordination National Institute of Standards and Technology, of Technical Capability Standards for radiological/nuclear detection equipment. 21 21

  22. Recent and On-Going Test Campaigns and Pilots On-Dock Rail Program (Straddle Portal Prototype) Dolphin Test Campaign (Boat Mounted Systems) Eland Test Campaign (Mobile Systems) Alternative Neutron Detection Systems On-Dock Rail Program (Radiation Detection Straddle Carrier) Gryphon Test Campaign (Aerial Mounted Systems) ITRAP+10 22

  23. Systems Engineering & Evaluation • Test and Evaluation Support • Conduct test & evaluation campaigns. • Establish and maintain T&E infrastructure of facilities, equipment, processes and personnel. • Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex, located at the Nevada National Security Site. • Rail Test Center located at the Port of Tacoma, Washington • GRaDER®Program 23 23

  24. Operations Support Securing the Cities Training, Exercise and Assistance Federal Capabilities Integration State and Local Capabilities Integration Training and Exercise Assistance Joint Analysis Center GNDA Situational Awareness Information Sharing and Analysis Coordinate the implementation of the domestic portion of the GNDA 24

  25. Securing the Cities New York City Region is first to participate Future Urban Area Security Initiative Tier 1 regions to be selected Training, Exercise & Assistance Federal programs TSA Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams Mobile Detection Deployment Program State and Local Programs Program Assistance State and Local Stakeholders Working Group and Executive Steering Council Radiological/Nuclear Challenge Training and Exercise Training course development and quality assurance Exercise design, development, and standards JAC GNDA situational awareness Information analysis and information sharing Operations Support 25 25

  26. Red Team and Net Assessments (RTNA) Independently assess the operational performance of planned and deployed capabilities. • Conduct adversarial-based assessments from an outside perspective without "inside" information of current or planned capabilities • Use overt and covert tests to intentionally introduce radioactive sources against known defenses to assess the performance of fielded technology, training, and protocols. • Assess the effectiveness of concepts of operation, protocols, training, technologies, communications, and technical support for nuclear detection programs and capabilities • Build models that integrate lessons learned from operations intelligence estimates, expert elicitation, and workshops to determine the effect of implemented capabilities on adversary decision making. 26 26

  27. National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center NTNFC has three primary mission areas Operational Readiness: • Provide centralized planning and integration of USG nuclear forensics programs and activities through interagency working groups, joint exercises, assessments, and foundational document development. • Technology Advancement: • Advance the Nation’s capability to rapidly, accurately, and credibly identify the origin and history of interdicted radioactive/nuclear materials. Interagency Stewardship and Coordination Pre-Det Materials Capability Development Operational Readiness Technology Advancement Restoration and maintenance of scientific expertise Expertise Development • Expertise Development: • Provide scholarships, fellowships, internships, post-graduate, and university awards for studies and research in specialties relevant to nuclear forensics.

  28. Summary DNDO is supporting the development and deployment a global nuclear detection and nuclear forensics capabilities to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism • DNDO has coordinated USG identification of critical vulnerabilities in the existing architecture • Maintains an aggressive research development and system acquisition process to address these vulnerabilities • Has conducted several test series as well as red teaming operations to evaluate the effectiveness of nuclear detection technologies and deployed systems. • Provides on-going operational support to Federal, State, Tribal, and local mission partners • Provides centralized planning, stewardship, and integration of USG R/N forensics activities • Developing advanced pre-detonation R/N forensics capability and recreating an enduring technical nuclear forensics workforce 28 28

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