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Temporal Logic

Temporal Logic. Shmuel Katz The Technion. Formal Specifications CS236368 Spring 2004. Liveness. Need to specify that the system actually progresses, without using real time Methods so far say what is a legal transition, but not that they must be taken

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Temporal Logic

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  1. Temporal Logic Shmuel Katz The Technion Formal Specifications CS236368 Spring 2004

  2. Liveness • Need to specify that the system actually progresses, without using real time • Methods so far say what is a legal transition, but not that they must be taken • Will use “temporal logic” to express which states must appear in an execution sequence (trace) of states • Widely used in spec. and verification

  3. A Logic Over Sequences • For an individual state, use first order predicate calculus over the variables and other parts of the state • Temporal modalities = special symbols used to quantify over the states in a sequence. • (r, i ) |= P “P is true in the suffix of sequence r that starts in the i-th state” • If P has no modalities, it holds in that state

  4. Defining |= • (r, i) |= P , no modalities in P, iff P(ri) is true • (r, i) |= ~P iff (r, i) |=/= P • (r, i) |= P v Q iff (r, i) |= P or (r, i) |= Q • (r, i) |= []P iff forall j. i £ j £ |r| .(r, j) |= P • “box P”, “from now on P”, “forever P”

  5. More on Box • []P by itself is interpreted as (r, 0) |= []P • P holds from every state in r • If P has no modalities, []P means P is an invariant of the computation r • [] (x > 0 ) • [] ( ~ ( in( crit1 ) /\ in( crit2 ) ) ) mutual exclusion-- a safety property

  6. Diamond • (r, i) |= <> P iff $ j. i £ j £ |r|. (r, j) |= P • “eventually”, “some time” • (r, 0) |= <> P holds in the initial state, if there is a later state where P holds • <> (x > 0 ) • <> ( at(halt1) /\ at(halt2) ) • liveness properties

  7. Connections • Box and Diamond are dual <> P == ~ [] ~ P [] P == ~ <> ~ P ~ <> P == [] ~ P • Sometimes see G for [] F for <>

  8. The future fragment • So far, the original future fragment of T.L., introduced to CS by Amir Pnueli • <> [] P eventually, always P starts being true • [] <> P always, eventually P is true (What does this mean?) • [] ( P => <> Q ) “always, P leads to Q”

  9. P Until Q • Can we express “ P is true until Q holds” ? • (r, i ) |= P u Q iff $ k. i £ k £ |r|.( (r, k)|= Q /\" j.i £ j < k. (r, j)|= P) • Also have Weak version uw defined as P uw Q iff []P v ( P u Q) • [] ( “one-active” u “answer-received” )

  10. Next • There is also a Next operator: (r, i) |= O P iff (r, i+1) |= P • Also written as XP • Adds to expressive power, but can make a specification less abstract and general. • Without “next” repeating states can’t be distinguished...called “eliminating stuttering” by Lamport

  11. The Anchored Version • If we just write a temporal logic assertion, when does it have to be true of a sequence? • Anchored: in the initial state • Drifting: in any state (like regular logic) • Anchored seems preferred for specs. : [] anchored == drifting

  12. Is the Future Enough? • Lamport: Yes Pnueli: maybe not • Past operators: • <-> ‘once’ • [-] ‘until now’, ‘so far’ • s ‘since’ (reflection of ‘until’) (r, i) |= P s Q iff $ k. 0£ k £ i .( (r, k)|= Q /\" j.k < j £ i . (r, j)|= P)

  13. Connections • Have equalities similar to the future: ~ <-> ~ P == [-] P • The past and the future are connected: ( [] P v [] Q ) == [] ( [-] P v [-] Q ) ( <> P /\ <> Q ) == <> ( <-> P /\ <-> Q ) These are just changes in the point of view!

  14. Previous • As before, can have a ‘previous’ modality similar to ‘next’ • (r, i ) |= O P iff (r, i - 1 ) |= P • Problem: the past differs from the future in having an initial state. • What is (r, 0 ) |= O P ? Usual assumption: it is always false. • This allows expressing ‘start’ state. (How?)

  15. Do we need the past? • Claim: for an entire sequence, we can always ‘translate’ an assertion with past modalities to an equivalent claim without them (if we have enough future modalities) • Systematically change the point of view... <> [ ( T /\ P s Q ) /\ <-> R ]

  16. The Past Helps Expressiveness • [] ( Q => <-> P ) Q is preceded by P • How does this relate to [] ( P => <> Q ) ?

  17. Proof Modularity • How can we prove mutual exclusion? • spec.: [] ( ~ ( in(Crit0) /\ in( Crit1) )) • Usual way: it follows from an invariant P0:: repeat{so: a() ; Crit0 ; e0: b() } P1:: repeat{s1: a() ; e1: b() ; Crit1 } a() and b() are joint actions, only when P0 and P1 are both ready to do them

  18. Proving mutual exclusion (cont.) • An invariant of the system: ( at(s0) = (at(s1) v in(Crit1) ) ) /\ ( at(e1) = (in(Crit0) v at(e0) ) ) • Can be shown by induction on the computation • Also have at(s0) => ~in(Crit0) • Together: in(Crit1) => at (s0) => ~in(Crit0) • Problem: Global view of system....

  19. A Modular proof • Predicate “A” means an a() has just occurred locally, similarly for “B” and b() • In P0: [](in(Crit0) => ( ~B s (A /\ ~B))) • In P1: [](in(Crit1) => ( ~A s (B /\ ~A) ) ) • Both of these follow from local reasoning • Claim: if in(Crit0) /\ in(Crit1) were true in any state, the above force a contradiction! (Both RHS’s can’t be true together)

  20. Classes of Properties • Past modalities allow identifying syntactic classes of properties • Each class has its own proof techniques and gives ‘similar’ properties • In all classes, are based on any predicate P that only has PAST modalities (or none) • A Safety property can be written as []P (for P any past formula).

  21. Hierarchy Reactivity []<>P v <>[]Q * Recurrence Persistence []<>P <>[]P Obligation []P v <>Q * Safety Guarantee []P <>P

  22. Safety • Any formula equivalent to one of the form [] P where P is any PAST formula • Invariants are safety properties • []( Q => <-> P ) “Q is preceded by P” is a safety property • Claim: so is P => [] ( at(halt) => Q ) • Can be shown by induction on the traces

  23. Finite Refutation • All safety properties have a “Finite Refutation”: For a sequence that does NOT satisfy a safety property P, there is a finite prefix where P is violated, and it is also violated in all continuations from that point. • For other classes of properties, this may not be so (example: reaching halt )

  24. Guarantee Properties • Equivalent to <>P • A state will be reached (once) • termination: <> at(halt) • claim: total correctness is a guarantee prop. first /\ P => <> ( at ( halt ) /\ Q ) (rewrite as <>“a past formula” )

  25. Obligation • Conjunction of formulas of the form []P v <> Q (again: P and Q are any PAST formulas) • Includes all Safety and Guarantee, plus... • Claim: <> problem => <> solution is of this form

  26. Recurrence (or Response) • Equivalent to [] <> P (infinitely often P) • Claim: [] ( P => <> Q) is recurrence. • [] <> ( ~enabled (act) v did ( act ) ) weak fairness • [] <> ~ in (prob-area) no livelock

  27. Persistence • Equivalent to <> [] P • Is [] ( P => <> [] Q ) also of this form? • <> [] ( P => [] Q ) eventual latching == <> [] Q v <> [] ~P This is also a persistence property.

  28. Reactivity • Conjunctions of [] <> P v <> [] Q • Includes everything else. • Often written [] <> r => [] <> p • Infinitely often enabled => infinitely often executed • Strong fairness

  29. Branching Time • Is it enough to relate to “the sequence that will occur” as is done in Linear TL ? • Sometimes we may want to relate to there being a computation with a certain property, or to relate to the relations among the computations. • Relate to “possible worlds” that can be, depending on which action occurs.

  30. Example for Branching Time • How can we specify a random-number generator? • Each time it is activated, some value from the given range will be returned. • Is this enough? • Is “return 53” a correct implementation? • Want: there is a possibility of getting any i

  31. Semantics of Branching Time • View the computations as organized into a tree: all with a common prefix will be along a path from the root, until they split at some state. • Can also be seen as an “unwinding” of a state machine. Sometimes viewed as a directed acyclic graph of computations (the same state can be reached in more than one way). • Assertions are about these trees, which are NOT ever constructed....

  32. CTL* • Computation Tree Logic by Ed Clarke • Use F for <> , G for [] • Add: A for “all computations starting in this state” E for “there is a computation starting in this state” • A and E relate to the subtree starting from that state, while F and G relate to a path

  33. Branching Examples • AGp is like []p of linear (why?) • EGp • EFp versus AFp • EFAGp versus EFGp • AGEF interrupted (= potential events)

  34. Model Checking • Verify temporal logic properties of an explicit state machine model (with a finite number of states) by checking all possibilities --efficiently. • Formal verification, without using invariants-- an alternative to Hoare logic-type proofs. • Widely used for hardware designs, some use for protocols and key software.

  35. CTL* versus CTL • Restrictions on expressibility in CTL: Only pairs of AG, AF, EG, EF, (AX, EX) • Allows efficient model checking • Cannot express in CTL that all FAIR computations have a desired eventuality property: (in CTL* : A(GFp => Fq ) )

  36. SMV • Express the system as a collection of transitions (also for gate-level spec. of hardware). • Express the property to be shown as a CTL assertion. • Express the fairness as GF `CTL assert.’ • Builds a compact version of the model, and checks on the compact version. • Can still have problems of state explosion.

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