TIMELing 2012: Time and Temporality in Language and Human Experience University of Łódź . 11-13 October 2012

1. TIMELing 2012: Time and Temporality in Language and Human Experience University of Łódź. 11-13 October 2012 Temporality and Epistemic Commitment: An Unresolved Question Kasia M. Jaszczolt University of Cambridge http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21

2. Part I

3. Main questions • Is the human concept of time a universal concept? • Is it primitive or composed of simpler concepts? • How do linguistic expressions of time reflect it?

4. Main questions • Is the human concept of time a universal concept? Probably yes • Is it primitive or composed of simpler concepts? Supervenient on properties of modality • How do linguistic expressions of time reflect it? Representations in Default Semantics/Interactive Semantics

6. What is expressed in the lexicon in one language may be expressed by grammar in another.

7. What is expressed in the lexicon in one language may be expressed by grammar in another. What is expressed overtly in onelanguage may be left to pragmatic inference or default interpretation in another.

8. Swahili: consecutive tense marker ka (1) a. …wa-Ingerezawa-li-wa-chukuawa-le maiti, 3Pl-British 3Pl-Past-3Pl-take 3Pl-Dem corpses ‘…then the British took the corpses, b. wa-ka-wa-tiakatikabaomoja, 3Pl-Cons-3Pl-put.on on board one put them on a flat board, c. wa-ka-ya-telemeshamaji-nikwautaratibu w-ote… 3Pl-Cons-3Pl-lower water-Loc with order 3Pl-all and lowered them steadily into the water…’ adapted from Givón (2005: 154)

9. cf. rhetorical structure rules, Asher and Lascarides 2003 Narration: (2) Lidia played a sonata. The audience applauded. e1 e2

10. St’àt’imcets [ˈstɬʼɛtɬʼemxəʧ](Lillooet Salish), British Columbia only future (kelh) – non-future distinction from Matthewson (2006)

11. Central Pomo Future can be realis or irrealis

12. (3) f3on t1ok rain fall (3a) It is raining. (default meaning) (3b) It was raining. (possible intended meaning)

13. ‘…I shall speak of the series of positions running from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present to the near future and the far future, as the A series. The series of positions which runs from earlier to later I shall call the B series. The contents of a position in time are called events.’ McTaggart (1908: 111)

14. From A series to epistemic detachment ‘Why do we believe that events are to be distinguished as past, present, and future? I conceive that the belief arises from distinctions in our own experience. At any moment I have certain perceptions, I have also the memory of certain other perceptions, and the anticipation of others again. The direct perception itself is a mental state qualitatively different from the memory or the anticipation of perceptions.’ McTaggart (1908: 127)

15. Time as Modality: Supervenience (i) supervenience of the concept of time on the concept of epistemic detachment (temporal properties on modal properties in semantics) (ii) supervenience of the concept of time on space-time (properties of the concept of time on properties of space-time).

16. Time as Modality: Supervenience (i) supervenience of the concept of time on the concept of epistemic detachment (temporal properties on modal properties in semantics) (ii) supervenience of the concept of time on space-time (properties of the concept of time on properties of space-time). (i) + (ii): It is not just the construal of reality that requires modality; it is reality itself.

17. Supervenience A set of properties T supervenes on a set of properties M iff no two things can differ with respect to T properties without also differing with respect to M properties. ‘There cannot be a T-difference without an M-difference.’ adapted from McLaughlin & Bennett 2005

18. Representing Time: Pragmatic Compositionality

19. ? ‘How much pragmatics’ is allowed in the semantic representation?

20. “Is semantic interpretation a matter of holistic guesswork (like the interpretation of kicks under the table), rather than an algorithmic, grammar-driven process as formal semanticists have claimed? Contextualism: Yes. Literalism: No.” Recanati (2012: 148)

21. Assumptions • The output of syntactic processing often leaves the meaning underdetermined.

22. Assumptions • The output of syntactic processing often leaves the meaning underdetermined. • The object of study of a theory of meaning is a pragmatically modified representation. (Default Semantics is a radical contextualist theory.)

23. Assumptions • The output of syntactic processing often leaves the meaning underdetermined. • This pragmatically modified representation is an object of study of a theory of meaning (Default Semantics is a radical contextualist theory). • There is no syntactic constraint on the object of study.

24. (4)A:Shall we meet tomorrow? B: I’m in London. (4a) B is in London at the time of speaking. (4b) B will be in London the following day. (4c)B can’t meet A the following day.

25. Interlocutors frequently communicate their main intended content through a proposition which is not syntactically restricted. Experimental evidence: Nicolle and Clark 1999 Pitts 2005 Schneider 2009

26. Merger Representation  • Primary meanings are modelled as merger representations.

27. Merger Representation  • Primary meanings are modelled as merger representations. • The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing.

28. Merger Representation  • Primary meanings are modelled as merger representations. • The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned. • Merger representations have the status of mental representations.

29. Merger Representation  • Primary meanings are modelled as merger representations. • The outputs of sources of information about meaning merge and all the outputs are treated on an equal footing. The syntactic constraint is abandoned. • Merger representations have the status of mental representations. • They have a compositional structure.

30. Sources of information for  (i) world knowledge (WK) (ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS) (iii) situation of discourse (SD) (iv)properties of the human inferential system (IS) (v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture (SC)

31. (iv) properties of the human inferential system IS (5)The author of The Catcher in the Rye still shocks the readership. (5a)J. D. Salinger still shocks the readership.

33. sources of information types of processes

35. Mapping between sources and processes WK  SCWD or CPI SC  SCWD or CPI WS  WS (logical form) SD  CPI IS  CD DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of  with a subscript standing for the type of processing.

36. Compositionality of Primary Meanings • DS: compositionality of utterance meaning rather than sentence meaning. ? Fodor (2008) compositionality of Mentalese only?

37. Compositionality is a methodological principle: ‘…it is always possible to satisfy compositionality by simply adjusting the syntactic and/or semantic tools one uses, unless that is, the latter are constrained on independent grounds.’ Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991: 93)

38. Compositionality should be an empirical assumption about the nature of possible human languages. Szabó (2000)

39. Merger Representations for the Past (6) Lidia went to a concert yesterday. (regular past) (7) This is what happened yesterday. Lidia goes to a concert, meets her school friend and tells her… (past of narration) (8) Lidia would have gone to a concert (then). (epistemic necessity past) (9) Lidia must have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic necessity past) (10) Lidia may have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic possibility past) (11) Lidia might have gone to a concert (yesterday). (epistemic possibility past)

40. Fig. 3: Degree of epistemic commitment for selected expressions with past-time reference

41. Acc ├ p ‘it is acceptable that it is the case that p’ Grice (2001)

42. ACCΔ ├ Σ ‘it is acceptable to the degree Δ that Σ is true’

43. amended and extended language of DRSs (Kamp and Reyle 1993)

44. Fig. 4: Σ for ‘Lidia went to a concert yesterday.’ (regular past) Σ

45. Merger Representations for the Present (12) Lidia is at a concert now. (regular present) (13) Lidia will be at a concert now. (epistemic necessity present) (14) Lidia must be at a concert now. (epistemic necessity present) (15) Lidia may be at a concert now. (epistemic possibility present) (16) Lidia might be at a concert now. (epistemic possibility present)

46. Fig. 5: Degree of epistemic commitment for expressions with present-time reference

47. Fig. 6: Σ for Lidia will be at a concert now’ (epistemic necessity present) Σ

48. Merger Representations for the Future (17) Lidia goes to a concert tomorrow evening. (‘tenseless’ future) (18) Lidia is going to a concert tomorrow evening. (futurate progressive) (19) Lidia is going to go to a concert tomorrow evening. (periphrastic future) (20)Lidia will go to a concert tomorrow evening. (regular future) (21) Lidia must be going to a concert tomorrow evening. (epistemic necessity future) (22)Lidia may go to a concert tomorrow evening. (epistemic possibility future) (23)Lidia might go to a concert tomorrow evening. (epistemic possibility future)

49. Fig. 7: Degree of modal detachment for selected expressions with future-time reference

50. Fig. 8: Σ for ‘Lidia is going to a concert tomorrow evening.’ (futurate progressive) 