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ESDP military crisis management operations

ESDP military crisis management operations. ESDP military operations. Military operations EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia) , 2003, 300 armed personnel EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis) , 2003, 1800 troops

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ESDP military crisis management operations

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  1. ESDP military crisis management operations

  2. ESDP military operations • Military operations • EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia), 2003, 300 armed personnel • EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis), 2003, 1800 troops • EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea), 2004- present 2500 troops • EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, 2008-2009, 3700 troops • EUFOR RD Congo, 2600, 2300 troops • EU military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (EU NAVFOR Somalia) • Military-civilian operations • EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau), 2008, 39 personnel • EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo), 2500, 40 personnel • EU Support to AMIS (Darfur), 2005-06, 31 civilians and 20 military personnel

  3. EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia) • Background The Ohrid Framework Agreement, August 13, 2001 NATO’s operations in FYROM- Essential Harvest (Aug-Sept 2001); Amber Fox (Sept 2001- Dec 2002); Allied Harmony (Dec 2002- March 2003); NATO HQs Skopje • Process that led to the operation President Trajkovski send a letter, inviting the EU to launch a mission in FYROM The Council appointed the Operation Commander, the Force Commander and designated operational HQs/ Exchange of letters with NATO PSC set up a Committee of Contributors/ the Council approved the Operation Plan submitted by the PSC The NAC decided to terminate its operation ‘Allied Harmony’ • Mission and mandate: Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP follow-on to the NATO’s ‘Allied Harmony’; to provide security for implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement Format: Berlin Plus Arrangements, with recourse to NATO’s assets and capabilities; Operation Commander is D-SACEUR Admiral R. Feist, SHAPE- EU Operational HQs

  4. EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia)- framework and objectives • Political control and strategic direction of the operation The Council on the objectives and termination of the operation, assisted by the HR/SG PSC- exercises political control and strategic direction under the responsibility of the Council to which it reports regularly/ power to amend the operational plan, the chain of command and the rules of engagement EUMC- monitors the execution of the military operation; reports to the PSC at regular intervals; point of contact with the Operation Commander, from whom it receives regular reports HR/SG and EUSR in FYROM- primary points of contact with the authorities of FYROM for matters related to the implementation of the Joint Action; the Presidency is kept regularly and promptly informed on this contacts Force Commander- maintains contact with local authorities on issues relevant to his mission

  5. EU Military Operation in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia)- framework and objectives • Organisation and command structure of the operation Operational Headquarters- SHAPE Operation Commander- the D-SACEUR

  6. EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis) • Background Pretoria Peace Accord, Dec. 2002 for power-sharing at national level after nearly 5 years of war (failed administration, weak rule of law, armed militia groups, involvement of neighboring countries). UN peace keeping operation- MONUK Eastern district of Ituri- the most volatile, unpredictable and insecure district in the DRC (MONUK established interim institutions, which it didn’t provide the necessary security, it presence was weak both in terms of numbers and mandate); MONUK HQs were targeted, 60 000 are estimated to have died and half a million were internally displaced; these developments put in jeopardy the negotiated settlement to the conflict in DRC. • Process that led to the operation The UNSG approached the EU (the HR) with a request for forces to help restore the order in and around the town of Bunia The EU had long-term interests in the region (ECHO, Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region) France found this politically advantageous (Turquoise mission in Rwanda, it had plans for a mission codenamed Mamba The US eager to ease the relations with its European allies UNSC Res. 1484 (30 May 2003) authorizing deployment of a French-led force in Bunia Council Joint Action • Mission and mandate: Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter Mandate: to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions in Bunia; improvement of the humanitarian situation; to ensure the protection of the airport and the internally displaced people in camps; safety of the civilian population, the UN personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town Format: France- a Framework Nation

  7. EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis) • Political control and strategic direction of the operation The Council on the objectives and termination of the operation, assisted by the HR/SG PSC- exercises political control and strategic direction under the responsibility of the Council to which it reports regularly/ power to amend the operational plan, the chain of command and the rules of engagement EUMC- monitors the execution of the military operation; reports to the PSC at regular intervals; point of contact with the Operation Commander, from whom it receives regular reports HR/SG- with him and in coordination with Presidency is the prime responsibility for contact with the UN, the authorities of the DRC and neighboring countries, assisted by the EU Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region Force Commander- contact with local authorities and MONUC

  8. EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis)-framework and objectives Organisation and command structure of the operation France acted as a Framework Nation and 16 other states contributed (with forces and/or equipment) Commander of the operation: Gen. Neveux Commander of Forces: Gen. Thonier Operation HQs- Paris (80 military officer from the three services Force HQs- based in Entebbe: multinational, 100 troops from the army and the airforce A Joint support Base- 650 men at Entebbe airport, from where forces and supplies were flown in Bunia Kampala- 100 men, an alternative base if needed French aircombat means, stationed in Chad

  9. EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis)-analysis • The successes • The security situation in Bunia improves/ threats posed by armed militias diminished • Return of a significant number of refugees • Revival of economic life in Bunia • Humanitarian operations resumed were further extended • Boost for the interim institutions in Ituri • Gave the UN time to prepare the new reinforced MONUC mission • The shortcomings - Lessons-learned: shortcomings in terms of strategic transport (was leased from Ukraine), long-distance communications, intelligence sharing, interoperability • Inherent in the mandate: fighting and violence against civilians continued outside Bunia • Militias were not neutralized • The task was demilitarisation not disarmament (could not conduct systemic house searches looking for hidden weapons

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