Ramifications Concerning Argumentation of a Pretence-Based Approach to Metaphor

1. Ramifications Concerning Argumentationof a Pretence-Based Approach to Metaphor John Barnden Emeritus Professor of Artificial Intelligence School of Computer Science University of Birmingham, UK Conference on Metaphor and Argumentation University of Cagliari, May 2017

2. Plan of Talk Loose notion of argumentation in this talk Quasi-unparaphrasability of metaphor and a “specifics provision” aspect Examples/discussion of that aspect, with focus on reasons Toenail sketch of a pretence/fiction-based account of metaphor How pretence/fiction illuminates issues above.

3. Arguments/Argumentation in This Talk • I will use the terms merely in an intuitive sense as covering any conveying (perhaps implicitly) of (alleged) reasons or reasoning in support of some conclusion that the speaker(/writer) wishes the hearer(/reader) to draw, • for whatever reason, whether sincere or deceptive, • and however fleetingly in the flow of discourse. • I will use brief metaphor examples from real, everyday discourse : • Hence, mundane, fleeting “micro-argumentation”. • (But there is a link to some work on philosophical argumentation.) • No appeal to particular, technical models of argumentation as such, but • perhaps my comments hold lessons for more elaborate and explicit argumentation that involves metaphor.

4. (Quasi-)Unparaphrasability

5. (Quasi-)Unparaphrasability • Often said that metaphorical utterances (at least when not completely conventional) are difficult/impossible to paraphrase in literal terms, • if anything like the complete meaning in context is to be captured. • [See, e.g., Stern 2000 for discussion] • I agree, though this talk relies merely on difficulties — • cumbersomeness, lack of clearness, etc. of attempted paraphrases • — rather than actual impossibility.

6. (Quasi-)Unparaphrasability, contd • E.g., how paraphrase • “The idea was buried in the far reaches of Anne’s mind” ? • Would need something like the following (although one might argue whether it’s itself completely literal): • The idea played a role in Anne’s mind that made it difficult or impossible for her to be consciously aware of the idea or to use it in reasoning, communication and action, and meant that she would need to have spent much effort and time in order to achieve such awareness or usability. • Even if roughly correct, this is lengthy and tedious, and impractical as a tool for clear, efficient meaning in ordinary discourse • and indeed it could hinder on-the-fly argumentation rather than help it by overloading the hearer.

7. (Quasi-)Unparaphrasability, contd • Key point: • there doesn’t seem to be any literal phraseology that would capture “was buried in the far reaches of her mind” and would be even approximately as clear and succinct. • Presumably therefore, • the difficulties arise because (at least relatively unconventional) metaphors describe complex and/or subtle and/or special and/or exceptional situations, and such situations are not well served (or even in some cases at all served) by succinct literal language – and in particular not by literal words and short phrases used for the target subject matter.

8. (Quasi-)Unparaphrasability and Specificty, contd • Central claim: • Literal terminology (words and short phrases) for (at least) an abstract subject matter often places strong limits on how specific a speaker can be in describing a situation • and the more specific about the situation the speaker wants to be the greater the tendency for him/her to need (at least in practice) to use relatively rich metaphor (rich = unconventional/elaborated).

9. (Quasi-)Unparaphrasabilityand Specificty, contd • The claim holds partly because literal language is good for the specifics of concrete source subject-matters. • The more concrete the source, the better literal language is at describing specifics about it, including examples and exceptions, in a succinct, easy to understand and reason-about way. • This is a special case of the common view in Cognitive Linguistics that metaphor helps us understand targets by using sources that are more familiar and understandable through being more concrete (generally). • However, previous work does not seem to have focussed on the ramifications of the specifics-describing power, particularly when they lead to the overriding defaults about the target subject-matter.

10. (Quasi-)Unparaphrasability and Specifics, contd • I will mention cases where metaphorical is helpful in providing specifics that have the effect of one of: • ADDING detail about a target situation, not violating any general default about the target subject-matter • VIOLATING A DEFAULT about the target subject-matter • including cases of heightening or attenuating the intensity of some feature away from its normal intensity range • [e.g., Gibbs & Tendahl 2006 ] • The “specifics” in examples will be (at least purported) REASONS for particular other things to be the case.

11. Examples and Discussion about Providing Specifics, especially Exceptions

12. Example: A Literal Default • “Anne knew that her husband Kyle was unfaithful. [So] she started divorce proceedings.” • “Anne knew that her husband Kyle was unfaithful. But it took her three months to acknowledge this to herself and start divorce proceedings.” • “Anne knew that her husband Kyle was unfaithful. So it took her three months to acknowledge this to herself and start divorce proceedings.” Literal phraseology like “know [that] P, ” “believe [that] P,” “think [that] P” means by default that P is known (etc.) in a straightforwardly conscious way, allowing immediate use of the proposition in conscious reasoning, communication and action. • (1) sounds fine: the knowing provides a clear REASON for the divorce action. • (2): sounds fine: the “But” fits the OVERRIDING OF THE DEFAULT. • (3) sounds ODD. Appropriate reaction: Eh? Why? The knowing does NOT here provide a clear reason for the delay!

13. Adding an Exception through Metaphor • “In the far reaches of her mind, Anne knew that her husband Kyle was unfaithful. So she started divorce proceedings.” • “In the far reaches of her mind, Anne knew that her husband Kyle was unfaithful. But it took her three months to acknowledge this to herself and start divorce proceedings.” • “In the far reaches of her mind, Anne knew that her husband Kyle was unfaithful. [So] it took her three months to acknowledge this to herself and start divorce proceedings.” “in the far reaches of her mind”  a complex/subtle exception to the above default about knowing: Anne is (very) unconscious in her knowledge, and would find it hard and time-consuming to use it. • (1) sounds ODD. The exceptional situation is NOT A REASON for the delay! • (2): now sounds FAIRLY ODD. Surely “And” or “So” would be better than “But”?? • (3) sounds FINE. The exceptional situation provides a SOURCE-SIDEREASON for the delay. BUT it does not imply a similarly specific TARGET-side reason.

14. Far-Reaches Example, contd • The exception might possibly instead be provided through literal (and/or highly conventional metaphorical language), but with more effort, less vividly, and less specifically: • Would need something like “The knowledge was not very conscious or usable in reasoning, communication and action and would have been difficult to make conscious and usable” rather than add “in the far reaches of her mind.” • There is no objective, well-known (or at-all-known) aspect of Anne’s mind that corresponds to the far reaches.

15. Another Example: A Conventional-Metaphorical Default • “There are strings attached to this deal. So I can’t see them.” • “There are strings attached to this deal. But I can’t see them. • Assuming the speaker is fairly knowledgeable about the deal, a default is that he is able to see (be aware of) the strings (constraints). [This reflects what would happen for literal strings and seeing.] • “Seeing”, whether literal or metaphorical, is neutral on whether not-being-able-to-see is due to a feature of the seer or of the object. • (1) is therefore ODD, unaccountably violating the default (D). • (2) is fine. The “But” fits with the OVERRIDING OF THE DEFAULT (D). • (2) does not indicate whether the problem is in the speaker or in the constraints, but that’s fine because of the neutrality in (N).

16. Adding an Exception through Richer Metaphor • “There are strings attached to this deal. They’re made of nylon. So I can’t see them.” • “There are strings attached to this deal. They’re made of nylon. But I can’t see them.[ODD] • The nylon constitution is specific extra information explaining why the “strings” are difficult to see. • (1) sounds fine. It gives a reason for why the default (D) is overridden. It simultaneously makes it clear that the problem lies in the strings (constraints) themselves, not the seer—it’s not the speaker’s fault. • BUT while (1) gives a specific reason is given on the SOURCE side, it is difficult for the hearer to work out any comparably specific reason on the TARGET side. All that’s conveyed is that SOME quality of the constraints is the problem.

17. Nylon Strings Example, contd • The exception might possibly be provided through literal and/or highly conventional metaphorical language, but with more effort, less vividly and less specifically: • Would need to say something like “The constraints are of such a nature that people cannot easily be aware of / notice them” rather then “The strings are made of nylon”.

18. Example: A Literal Neutrality “My car isn’t moving forward. There’s something wrong with it / the clutch.” “My car isn’t moving forward. There’s something outside stopping it / There’s a big log in the way.” “isn’t moving” is neutral as between intrinsic deficit in the would-be-moving-object and an external impediment. Vague or specific extra info about a difficulty can of course be stated with literal language. BUT …

19. Adding Metaphorical Phraseology • “My car doesn’t want to move forward. There’s something wrong with the clutch.” • “My car doesn’t want to move forward. There’s something wrong with the car itself.” • “My car doesn’t want to move forward. But there’s something wrong with the car itself / the clutch.” [ODD] • (1) is fine. The metaphorical “doesn’t want to” implies that the not-moving is not (entirely) due to external impediment. IT’s (PARTLY) THE CAR’s FAULT. The metaphor is breaking the neutrality noted above. The literal detail about the clutch makes the situation specific. • (2) is mainly fine but a LITTLE ODD in being REDUNDANT – the message of the second sentence is already implied. • And“My car doesn’t want to move forward” gives a somewhat specific SOURCE-SIDE meaning but not a comparably specific TARGET-side one.

20. Car Example, contd • The vague neutrality-breaking might possibly be provided through literal and/or highly conventional metaphorical language, but with more effort, less vividly and less specifically: • Would need to say something like “There is some fault in the car that tends to make it not move” rather then “The car doesn’t want to move forward”. • NB a subtlety here: “Doesn’t want to move forward” doesn’t definitely imply not moving forward, but rather a tendency not to move forward, just as someone might do something even though they don’t want to.

21. The Provision of (Apparent) Reasons

22. Help in Giving (or Not Giving) Reasons • Mentioning that the “strings” are “made of nylon” serves two complementary functions: • Making it clear that the problem (inability to see the constraints) lies in the constraints themselves, not the seer. • But doing so in a succinct, forceful, apparently-specific way, avoiding the need for lengthy, vague, unspecific language such as “the constraints are of such a nature that it is difficult to be aware of them”. • Where also: if the speaker were to specify a real, specific reason, e.g. that the constraints are too complicated and subtle to be noticed, this reason may be a wrong conjecture, or contain detail that’s excessive for the purpose of the discourse. • So the metaphorical reason (nylon constitution) combines the confidence, vividness, clarity and simplicity of a specific, possibly exemplificatory reason with the avoidance of the dilemma between (a) being vague and unspecific and (b) offering a spurious, over-specific target-side claim or example as the reason.

23. Help in Giving (or Not Giving) Reasons, contd Similar observations apply to the far-reaches-of-mind and car-not-want examples.

24. Help in Giving (or Not Giving) Reasons, contd • The above claims about (not) giving reasons apply to sincere language. • But the technique could similarly be used deceptively to give the impression of there being a specific reason when in fact the speaker does not know one. • E.g., the speaker hopes that the hearer will assume that made-of-nylon is a metaphorical description of a specific real reason the speaker knows.

25. Using Pretence/Fiction for Metaphor

26. ATT-Meta:A Pretence/Fiction-Based Approach to Metaphor[Barnden 2001—2016, Barnden & Lee 2002] • “ATT-Meta” = “[propositional] attitudes” + “metaphor” • ATT-Meta general theoretical approach to (much) non-conventional metaphor, and a working AI computer program that partially realizes the theory.

27. The ATT-Meta Approach • “The strings are made of nylon. I can’t see them.”: • The understander (as well as the speaker) momentarily pretends that the constraints are really strings that are really made of nylon, and that the speaker is someone who is not able to physically-see the strings . • The nylon constitution implies (by default) a high degree of physical invisibility, • and so this can be taken as the reason for the person’s not being able to physically-see the strings • and hence it is not his fault that he cannot see the strings (he does not cause his own inability to physically see them). • Those premises from the sentence and inferences from them are within the pretence …

28. the strings are made of nylon Pretence inference The speaker cannot see the strings Reality (incl. target-side scenario) the strings are invisible the invisibiity causes the inability to see the strings the inability … is not the speaker’s fault

29. The ATT-Meta Approach, contd • Assume there is a known correspondence (mapping) between • physically-seeing and being-mentally-aware-of. • Part of the ATT-Meta approach (in its “View-Neutral Mapping Adjuncts”) is that a wide variety of operations/qualities/relationships including negation, ability, and causation map over (by default), • irrespective of whatever specific metaphorical view is involved (constraints-as-strings or any other view of something as something). • So get target-side conclusions (i.e. conclusions about the real situation) that • the speaker is unable to be aware of the constraints, • this inability is not his fault …..

30. Reality the strings are made of nylon Pretence inference The speaker cannot see the strings The speaker cannot be aware of the constraints the strings are invisible the invisibiity causes the inability to see the strings the inabiity … is not the speaker’s fault the inability … is not the speaker’s fault

31. Restrained-Parallelism Tendency(Analogy-Minimization Thesis) • I claim: “made of nylon” , and indeed “physically-made -of” and “nylon” separately, are merely mental tools towards the target-side meaning of the utterance. • There is no need to, and it could be difficult to, • discover mappingsfor them. • The familiar, existing parallelism (analogy) between target and source subject-matters need not (and often cannot) be extended beyond the known mappings (such as between strings and constraints). • The unmapped things can instead be connected by inference to the already-known mappings.

32. Restrained Parallelism in The Other Examples • “The idea was buried in the far reaches of her mind”: • buried and far reachesdon’t need / cannot readily get parallels. • “My cardoesn’t want …”, “My car thinksit’s on holiday” : • being-on-holiday, thinking and not-wantingdon’t need / cannot readily get parallels.

33. Pretence/Fiction, Restrained Paralellism And This Talk’s Issues

34. Pretence/Fiction -with-Restrained-Parallelismand This Talk’s Issues • Pretence/fiction is a natural framework in which to couch elaborative source-side inferences, such as • inferring relative invisibility from nylon constitution • inferring lack of physical accessibility from buried-ness and distance • inferring tending-not-to-do and problem-is-internal from not-wanting • More pointedly: ………

35. Pretence/Fiction -with-Restrained-Parallelismand This Talk’s Issues, contd • Restrained parallelism means that reasons (claims or examples) of arbitrary specificity, exceptionality and complexity can be constructed in the pretence/fiction with no need for them to correspond to anything in reality. This helps the following: • For insincere purposes: • speaker can (try to) give the impression of giving a specific reason without actually doing so. • For sincere purposes: • speaker can encourage possibly complex or subtle conclusions within the pretence that do map over to reality to provide useful information that is difficult to convey literally. • NB: the hearer may wrongly think a specific target-side reason has been given, but this doesn’t matter as long as they don’t waste time trying to work out what it is.

36. Restrained-Parallelism Tendency, contd(Analogy-Minimization Thesis) • The benefits of restraining the extension of parallelism is recognized in some of the idiom literature [notably by Langlotz, 2006], but not usually in other mapping-based metaphor theories. • Indeed, analogy-construction approaches to metaphor such as SMT [Gentner 1983, Bowdle & Gentner 2005, Forbus et al 2016] seek to maximize the amount of analogy on any given occasion.

37. Coda: Another Piece of Work,about Philosophical Argumentation • Eugen Fischer & John Barnden talk • In Theme Session on Metaphor and (Un)Consciousness at 6th International Conf. of the Scandinavian Association for Language and Cognition (SALC 6), April 2017 • & Fischer’s prior articles/talks and forthcoming article in Connection Science. • Showing how some philosophical argumentation has used a form of analogical reasoning — a maximal form, as in SMT— that may be appropriate for problem solving when it should have been using a form —a minimal form as in ATT-Meta— suitable for understanding metaphor in ordinary discourse. • This has helped derail philosophical argumentation about introspection • and has in particular led to the wrong inference that the mind is in reality an identifiable entity that plays an analogous role to a space or visual field, rather than being merely a faculty of thinking, understanding, etc.

38. Conclusions • In the case especially of relatively abstract subject-matters, metaphor, notably when richly or creatively elaborated, is a powerful tool for overriding defaults or just adding extra detail to otherwise generic situations • overcoming (relative) limitations of literal language and some conventional metaphorical language in this regard. • The specific information contributed by the metaphors can constitute easily absorbed (alleged) reasons for other implicit or explicit claims in the discourse. • These reasons can be easier to understand and at least look more convincing than trying to give target-side parallels for them. • All this is facilitated by restrained parallelism (analogy minimization) in a treatment of metaphor, and this restraint is a natural path for a pretence/fiction-based approach to follow.

39. THANKS

40. References Barnden, J.A. (2001). Uncertainty and conflict handling in the ATT-Meta context-based system for metaphorical reasoning. In V. Akman, P. Bouquet, R. Thomason & R.A. Young (Eds), Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 2116, pp.15--29. Berlin: Springer. Barnden, J.A. (2008). Metaphor and artificial intelligence: Why they matter to each other. In R.W. Gibbs, Jr. (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, pp.311--338. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Barnden, J.A. (2009). Metaphor and context: A perspective from artificial intelligence. In A. Musolff & J. Zinken (Eds), Metaphor and Discourse, pp.79-94. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Barnden, J.A. (2015). Open-ended elaborations in creative metaphor. In Besold, T.R., Schorlemmer, M. & Smaill, A. (Eds,) Creativity Research: Towards Creative Machines, pp.217--242. Atlantis Press (Springer). [Includes an overview of the ATT-Meta approach.] Barnden, J.A. (2016). Mixed metaphor: Its depth, its breadth, and a pretence-based approach. In Gibbs (2016), pp.75—111. [Includes an overview of the ATT-Meta approach.] Barnden, J.A. & Lee, M.G. (2002). An artificial intelligence approach to metaphor understanding. In Tomasz Komendzinski (Ed.), “Metaphor: A Multidisciplinary Approach,” a special issue, Theoria et Historia Scientiarum, 6 (1), pp.399--412.

41. References, contd Bowdle, B.F. & Gentner, D.~(2005). The career of metaphor. Psychological Review, 112 (1), pp.193—216. Carston, R. & Wearing, C. (2011). Metaphor, hyperbole and simile: A pragmatic approach. Language and Cognition, 3(2): pp.283—312. Davidson, D. (1979). What metaphors mean. In S. Sacks (Ed.), On Metaphor, pp.29--45. U. Chicago Press. Fauconnier, G. (2009). Generalized integration networks. In V.~Evans \& S.~Pourcel (Eds), New Directions in Cognitive Linguistics, pp.147--160. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Fauconnier, G. & Turner, M. (1998). Conceptual integration networks. Cognitive Science, 22 (2), pp.133—187. Forbus, K. D., Ferguson, R. W., Lovett, A. and Gentner, D. 2016. Extending SME to handle large-scale cognitive modelling. Cognitive Science. doi:10.1111/cogs.12377 Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: a theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7 (2), 95—119.

42. References, contd Gibbs, Jr., R.W. (Ed.) (2016). Mixing metaphor. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Gibbs, R.W., Jr. & Tendahl, M. (2006). Cognitive effort and effects in metaphor comprehension: Relevance theory and psycholinguistics. Mind and Language, 21 (3), 379--403. Grady, J.E. (1997). THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS revisited. Cognitive Linguistics, 8 (4), pp.267--290. Langlotz, A. (2006). Idiom creativity: A cognitive-linguistic model of idiom-representation and idiom-variation in English. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Levin, S.R. (1993). Language, concepts, and worlds: three domains of metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and Thought, 2nd edition, pp.112--123. New York and Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Littlemore, J. (2015). Metonymy: Hidden shortcuts in language, thought and communication. Cambridge University Press. Stern, J. (2000). Metaphor in context. Cambridge, MA and London, UK: Bradford Books, MIT Press. Walton, K. (2004/1993). Metaphor and prop oriented make-believe. In E. John & D.M. Lopes (Eds), Philosophy of Literature—Contemporary and Classic Readings: An Anthology, pp.239--247. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. Reprinted from European J. of Philosophy, 1, pp.39-42, 45-49, 51-57.

44. Note: Transfer from Source can Override Target • Often claimed or tacitly assumed in analogy and metaphor research that transfers from the source cannot override known information about the target. • But researchers generally do not consider uncertain information of the target. Of course, source transfers can’t override certain information about the target. • “John is [like] a pot that’s about to boil”: • We cannot transfer the emission of steam to John, because it is certain that John cannot emit steam. • But this provides no reason to think that source transfers cannot override uncertain target information, even strong defaults. • Suppose now that people can emit literal steam, but by default do not do so. • Then steam emission could well be part of the intended likeness between John and the pot. • Indeed, examples such as those above and many others that an important function of metaphor is precisely to override target-side defaults (and other uncertain information), and moreover to do so in an especially effective way.

45. Providing Examples through Metaphor The nylon constitution of the strings could be intended/taken as an example of why the strings would be intrinsically quasi-invisible. Hearing a specific example is cognitively easier for the hearer than a vague, more abstract account. And if the speaker were to give a real, target-side example of what might be wrong with the constraints, that could be incorrect, excessive or too expert for the hearer. Similarly with mentioning far-reaches of a mind.

46. Interim Summary of the Examples Literal and manyhighly conventional metaphorical terms are good for covering normal situations or a generic range of situations. Addition of (richer) metaphor can provide exceptions to those defaults, or construct a specific case of a general situation, in an easy, economical and vivid way. The added specifics might possibly instead be provided through literal and/or highly conventional metaphorical language about the target, but with more effort, and less vividly, and with less surface specificity. BUT the surface specificity in the reason stated (of far reaches, nylon constitution, and not-wanting) does not imply a target side element of comparable specificity.

47. Using Pretence/Fiction for Metaphor • Pretence (in various guises!), or similarly fiction, has been to some extent proposed as the core of various accounts of metaphor other than my own … • in various disciplines ... • Cognitive Linguistics: “blending” theory • [Fauconnier & Turner 1998, Fauconnier 2009] • Philosophy: “pretences”, “games of make-believe”, “fictions” • [Walton 2004/1993; also Yablo, Hills, Camp, Egan] • Literary theory: “metaphoric worlds” [Levin 1993] • Language pragmatics: RT + metarepresentations [Carston & Wearing 2011]