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Western Regional Gas Conference. Anthony Tetto Senior Utility Consultant Loss Control. A E G I S. Complacency, Short-Cuts-Failure to Follow Procedures. A Deadly Combination. The Following Incidents Are Not Typical!.
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Western Regional Gas Conference Anthony Tetto Senior Utility Consultant Loss Control
Complacency, Short-Cuts-Failure to Follow Procedures A Deadly Combination
The Following Incidents Are Not Typical! • The vast majority of the time gas company employees do their jobs properly, nothing happens and there is nothing to talk about. • The following examples occurred when gas company employees lost respect for natural gas, became complacent or did not follow procedures. • These are difficult “Lessons Learned”, but if we don’t learn from history we may be destined to repeat past mistakes.
Incident (2004)Company Retention $5M • A contractor working on a highway reconstruction project struck the service line to a house, causing the service line to separate from a compression coupling near the gas main. • The gas company was called at 11:15 am; a serviceman arrived on the scene at 11:45 and immediately called for a crew. Thinking the gas was venting out into the street, he sat in his truck for 20 minutes until the crew arrived. Although the damage location was only 32 feet from the incident site, no attempt was made to check nearby buildings with a combustible gas indicator for the presence of migrating gas.
Incident (2004)Company Retention $5M • Cont’d. • The leaking gas migrated to the house where an explosion occurred killing an elderly woman and severely burning 3 children, the explosion occurred at 1:00 pm. The children received burns to over 45% of their bodies with most of the burns occurring in the facial areas. • In the settlement the contractor also paid more than $15,000,000.00 in claims. AEGIS Incurred $15 Million
What Happened? • First Responder failed to recognize the gravity of the situation and made the assumption that the pulled line was leaking in only one place. • The First Responder’s main job on a reported gas leak is to determine “Where is the gas?” and “Is it affecting people or property?” The appropriate way of determining this is with a combustible gas indicator (CGI) – Test Don’t Guess! • The first priority must always be focused on • Public Safety
Incident (2002)Company Retention $200K • Veteran gas company meter technicians were assigned to test the flow rate and prove the accuracy of a large meter serving a local elementary school during the summer vacation period. The meter was located inside the school’s boiler room and needed to be taken out of service. • They attempted to turn on the by-pass valve and even with their largest pipe wrench it would not turn. They decided to use another plug valve they found in the truck and change the by-pass valve “on the fly”.
Incident (2002)Company Retention $200K • Cont’d. • While the valve was being changed, a large amount of gas was allowed to escape into the boiler room where it was ignited by the school’s water heater. • The explosion injured the company employees, four school employees and caused extensive property damage. AEGIS Incurred $3.5 Million
What Happened? • The two meter technicians both had over 20 years of experience with the company. The fact that employees are experienced means nothing if they become complacent on the job site. • Experience sometimes includes the use of shortcuts that have worked in the past, and often employed in similar work circumstances with good results. Shortcuts soon become normal operating procedures and accepted work practices.
Incident (2004)Company Retention $1M • An explosion and fire destroyed a mobile home severely burning its occupants a man and his wife. The husband spent 44 days in the hospital undergoing 6 surgical treatments and his wife spent 77 days and underwent 12 surgeries.
Incident (2004)Company Retention $1M • Cont’d. • The cause of the leak was attributed to natural gas leaking from an open fuel line below the mobile home. The open fuel line was the work of a plumber hired to move the gas line. Not being “viable” having sufficient assets or insurance coverage he was not named as a defendant in the case. • That left the local gas company as the sole defendant with the plaintiff only alleging that the gas was improperly odorized (no readily detectable odor).
Incident (2004) Cont’d.Company Retention $1M • Cont’d. • Since the gas company performed and documented an odor-level test immediately after the incident, which indicated that the gas was readily detectable at levels 3 times the federal requirement, it was believed that the allegation would be difficult to prove.
Incident (1996) Cont’d.Company Retention $1M • Cont’d. • During the trial, the odor meter used to conduct the test was introduced as evidence. When it was shown to the jury, its flexible tubing, which transports gas samples from the source into the instrument, had a distinct odor of gas; it should have borne no odor. • The tubing, not being made of material intended for use with the instrument, retained odorant molecules thus the smell.
Incident (1996) Cont’d.Company Retention $1M • Cont’d. • The plaintiff argued this nullified the company’s odor readings taken immediately after the incident. • The jury originally found for the plaintiff and awarded $6,500,000.00. Based on the improbability of a successful appeal, the utility accepted a negotiated settlement of $4,100,000.00 AEGIS Incurred $3.1 Million
What Happened? • The concept of proper operation, calibration and normal maintenance of test instrumentation consistent with their manufacturers’ recommendations cannot be over emphasized not only for odor meters, but combustible gas indicators, flame ionization instruments, carbon monoxide detectors, oxygen level instruments and other safety and hazard detection instruments. • Calibration and training in the proper operation and maintenance of these instruments is essential. • Theinstrumentis only as good as the operator who uses it.
What Can You Do? • Training programs, safety meetings and peer supervisory reviews are a few of the options that can be utilized to ensure established work practices are followed, thereby reducing the hazards associated with using shortcuts or allowing complacency to interfere with good judgment. • Field visits on a frequent basis • We must NEVER lose respect for natural gas. • Complacency can kill.
Lessons Learned • Experience is good but could be a double edge sword • “It can’t happen to me” syndrome • Field visits and safety audits can’t be replaced • Take corrective action • Lead by example
Incident (2004)Company Retention $5M • A contractor working on a highway reconstruction project struck the service line to a house, causing the service line to separate from a compression coupling near the gas main. • The gas company was called at 11:15 am; a serviceman arrived on the scene at 11:45 and immediately called for a crew. Thinking the gas was venting out into the street, he sat in his truck for 20 minutes until the crew arrived. Although the damage location was only 32 feet from the incident site, no attempt was made to check nearby buildings with a combustible gas indicator for the presence of migrating gas.
Gas-Oil Production/Exploration 3% Other LPG 5% 3% Gas Transmission 5% Gas Distribution 60% Third-Party Premises 24% 84% of all reported incidents Distribution of Reported Gas Utility Claims
Gas Distribution System 60% Other 4% Vehicle Accident Regulators 1% Worksite 2% Relief Valve 2% Other 2% 6% Explosion or Fire Meter 95% 4% Mains 52% (Data Not Available) 10% Service Lines 22% Gas Distribution SystemLoss Types & Components Affected
Gas Distribution SystemActivity or circumstance causing explosion or fire on mains *100% of claims due to Material Failure in this category were due to corrosion.
Gas Distribution SystemActivity or circumstance causing explosion or fire on service lines *100% of claims due to Operator Error in this category were Installation/Construction related.
Gas Distribution SystemContributing factors causing explosion or fire during construction activities
Electric Distribution OH 78% Third-Party PremisesGas Claims by Object
Third Party PremisesSources contributing to explosion or fire involving a water heater
Third Party PremisesTypes of loss involving furnaces, boilers and other heaters
Switchgear, Outdoor 0.2% Street/Area Lighting Electric Distribution OH 78% 0.4% Meter Manhole/Vault 0.4% Other 0.2% 13.7% Worksite 0.6% Guy Wire 0.7% Overhead Lines Poles 74.4% Failure to Supply 7.8% Explosion or Fire Other 1% 7% 3% Equipment Overhead Vehicle Accident 1.7% 7% Electric Contact 74% Stray Voltage 8% Overhead (OH) Electric Distribution SystemLosses and Equipment Involved
Electric Contact 74% From Electrical Device From Construction Failure Equipment 1% From Aerial Lift 1% From Platform 1% 1% From Aircraft Other From Crane 2% 8% 18% Sailboat Mast 5% From Tower 6% From "Down" or Sagging Wires 14% From Roof 9% From Mast or Pole 10% From Ladder From Tree 12% 12% Overhead (OH) Electric Distribution SystemSources of Electric Contact
Overhead (OH) Electric Distribution SystemActivity or circumstance causing electric contact
Underground (UG) Electric Distribution SystemActivity or circumstance causing electric contact
Distribution of Electric Utility ClaimsTrending 3 recent five-year periods
Distribution of Reported Gas Utility ClaimsTrending 3 recent five-year periods
Why was the gas company involved? AWARD • Allegation: • Gas company did not warn the customer of an installation that did not meet NFPA 54 • (National Fuel Gas Code) $2 Million
Why was the gas company involved? AWARD • Allegation: • Gas company did not warn the customer that the water heater did not meet the 18” rule. • They failed to recognize the improper installation of the furnace. $15 Million
Why was the gas company involved? AWARD • Allegation: • Gas company failed to follow its own procedures for operating bypass valves and monitoring pressures. $22 Million
Why was the gas company involved? AWARD • Allegation: • Gas company failed to follow their own procedures. $1.8 Million
