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The CPSU Legacy and the Economic and Political Institutions in Russian Regions

The CPSU Legacy and the Economic and Political Institutions in Russian Regions Alexander Libman Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Russian Academy of Sciences (based on joint wor k with Anastassia Obydenkova , UPF). Motivation.

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The CPSU Legacy and the Economic and Political Institutions in Russian Regions

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  1. The CPSU Legacy andtheEconomicand Political Institutions in RussianRegions • Alexander Libman • Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Russian Academy of Sciences • (based on joint work with AnastassiaObydenkova, UPF)

  2. Motivation • Legacies of the Socialist past in post-Socialist countries • An arguably important factor in the development of CEE and CIS countries • But where do these legacies come from? (LaPorte and Lusser 2011) • Institutional: survival of Socialist institutional structures (bureaucracies, parties etc.) • Behavioral: people still use practices inherited from the Socialist past • Attitudinal: attitudes of the public and of various social groups are influenced by myths and reality of the Socialist past • And are all post-Socialist countries (and their regions) exposed to the same legacies to the same extent? • Differences in the models of Socialism in CEE countries and the USSR • Different level of control and propaganda in various parts of the same country? • Differences in the mode of governance in the same country (“southern” republics of the USSR or agricultural/industrial regions) • This paper: a particular factor associated with survival of legacies • The “penetration” of the CPSU membership in different regions of the Russian Federation

  3. Russianregionsand CPSU legacies • Heterogeneity of Russian regions • 1990s: proliferation of heterogeneous sub-national regimes (“isles of democracy” and “isles of autocracy”) • 2000s: variations in the level of federal control and monitoring => variations in the bureaucratic practices • Furthermore, strong variations in paths of economic development • How could CPSU legacy matter? • (assuming there was a variation in the share of CPSU members in different regions) • CPSU membership • Indoctrination • Career concerns and opportunistic behavior • Rudimentary form of political participation (“party saturation” literature) • Effects of CPSU legacy • Public attitude => does it survive over time? does it spread? • Composition of political elites => resolution of uncertainty in the initial moment of transition and path-dependence • Elite networks (governments and business)

  4. Variationsof CPSU membership • Problem • No data on the size of party organizations in regions available (maybe archival research)? • Solution • CPSU congress: each delegate from a certain number of CPSU members • E.g. XXV congress (1976): 1 delegate from 3,000 CPSU members • Count the size of regional delegations (published) and obtain the proxy for CPSU penetration • Evidence • Very strong variation across Russian regions • Relative persistence over time across regions (XXV congress vs. XIX conference)

  5. Variationsof CPSU membership

  6. Russianregionsand CPSU legacies • Proxies for institutions in Russian regions • Sub-national democracy: • Carnegie Center: 1991-2001 • Carnegie Center: 2000-2004 = > e.g. excellent predictor for voting outcomes of 2011 • Ten sub-indices (elections, press, balance of power within elites etc.) 2000-2004 • Corruption: • Transparency International / INDEM 2002: real corruption • Transparency International / INDEM 2002: perceived corruption • FOM 2010: real corruption • FOM 2010: perceived corruption • FOM 2011: real corruption • Carnegie Center: 2000-2004 • Approach • Regress democracy / corruption indicators on the share of CPSU members in 1976 in the regional population and a set of other controls typically used in the literature

  7. Result: Democracy

  8. Results: Corruption

  9. Results Democracy Corruption

  10. Alternative explanations • Aging population and persistence of legacies • Controlling for share of elderly population => results stay robust • Role of contemporary Communist party (CPRF) • Controlling for electoral support of CPRF at various elections => results stay robust • Industrial structure of the regions and late Soviet mode of governance • Controlling for industrial structure => results stay robust • Attention of the central government • Controlling for the number of presidential visits into the regions => results stay robust • Non-random distribution of CPSU members • Controlling for Soviet-period characteristics of regions (education, proxies of well-being etc.) => results stay robust

  11. Conclusionandoutlook • Regions with strong CPSU penetration in the past • … are less democratic and more corrupt… • … even twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union • What else? • (work in progress) • … but these regions also have lower income inequality • Is Russia still a “post-Communist” country?

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