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Rod Mullen, CEO, Amity Foundation

Promise and Paradox In-Prison Therapeutic Communities in the California Department of Corrections: 1990-2007. Rod Mullen, CEO, Amity Foundation Arizona & California Presentation to: European Federation of Therapeutic Communities June 2007. My Point of View…. Prisons can be:

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Rod Mullen, CEO, Amity Foundation

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  1. Promise and ParadoxIn-Prison Therapeutic Communities in the California Department of Corrections: 1990-2007 Rod Mullen, CEO, Amity Foundation Arizona & CaliforniaPresentation to: European Federation of Therapeutic CommunitiesJune 2007

  2. My Point of View… • Prisons can be: • Warehouses…where time and life are essentially “on hold.” • Hell (places where inhuman behavior is tolerated or even encouraged )---Abu Garib • The Prison/Industrial Complex (a big money maker –for private companies, unions, builders, etc). • Places of humanity and transformation…. • I opt for the latter…

  3. Historical Background • Synanon: Nevada State Prison: 1961—closed 1964 • Late 60’s—70’s: many TCs, none survived • Stay N’ Out: 1977--present • Project Reform: 1987 • Amity (CA); Key-Crest (Delaware); Kyle (Texas)

  4. Timeline—U.S. Prison TCs

  5. Overview: California • The California Department of Corrections is one of the largest correctional organizations in the world, housing over 170,000 adult inmates (both male and female) and supervising over 100,000 parolees. • Annual budget in excess of US$8 Billion. • California's recidivism rate (return of inmates to incarceration) is the highest in the U.S. • In 1990, a progressive Director instituted the first in-prison TC for 200 medium security inmates - today the number of inmates in prison TCs is 10,000. All of the TCs are operated privately.

  6. Players in the Drama Main characters Department of Corrections Secretary Director OSAP Warden; Parole CCPOA (Union • The Governor(s) • The Department of Corrections • The Legislature (and Legislators) • NGO TC Providers • Federal Judiciary Over 17 years the names of the cast have changed many times

  7. First U.S. Prison TC: Synanon at the Nevada State Penitentiary 1962-1964

  8. Results from Project Reform % Rearrested (18 Months) Key-Crest % Reincarcerated (3 Years) R.J. Donovan/Amity % Rearrested (3 Years) Kyle New Vision

  9. What did we learn? • TC can be extremely effective in reducing recidivism to crime (and reincarceration. • But ONLY if there is a continuation of treatment in community based residential programs ( consistent philosophically and methodologically with the in-prison TC). • “Aftercare” is the wrong term---primary treatment is a single episode that occurs in two locations, in prison and in the community

  10. Amity participants at the R.J. Donovan State Prison: 2000

  11. Increase in Prison TCs in California Amity begins

  12. When does success = failure? • Chasing funding—compromising fidelity (“if you want the $, do it our way”). • Workforce issues—depletion of TC practitioners/leaders; inability to “convert” new workers to the TC. • Lack of continuity in leadership---Legislature, Correctional administration, Local (Warden) support • Failure to contract for quality; failure to fund adequately; failure to insure independence of contractors

  13. Principles and Practices (1) • Commitment from the top • Initial Program had support from Correctional Director , Administrative Management, Warden. (not the Governor) • After 1997, Correctional Director not committed to these programs, Administrators often incompetent, and much turnover, Wardens often not committed to the programs; Governor continued to be threatened by political fall out

  14. Principles and Practices (2) • Immersion & Intensity • TCs work because they immerse participants in a 24/7 environment with different philosophy, practices, expectations • Initial TC was 7 days a week; full access to housing unit and program area. Day and evening activities—minimal restrictions. • Later programs half day—5 days a week; often little or no access to housing unit, no integration with jobs, education. Began to mimic typical low intensity corrections “programs.”

  15. Principles and Practices (3) • Integrity • Original TC had trained TC staff • As growth occurred (and with correctional restrictions on staff background) trained TC practitioners scarce---positions filled with poorly paid staff with no TC experience and minimal training • Low salaries, inability to train, and shortage of trained counselors lowered standards

  16. Principles and Practices (4) • Partnership • Original TC---Corrections staff had the attitude, “we don’t know how to do this—tell us.” • Later, Corrections began to micromanage, to institute overly bureaucratic management, and to implement programs & practices without thoroughly “vetting” them with providers. • Results---lots of expedient decisions to deal with population crisis; much failure and subversion of existing programs.

  17. Principles and Practices (5) • Bidding & contracting • CDCR does not involve providers in developing bids---thus bid packages are written by bureaucrats those who do not understand treatment. • CDCR “requests for proposal” do not put in points for prior experience and a “track record” of success. • Bids emphasize lowest price at the expense of quality. • No increases in funds for over 10 years • Contracts are administered by bureaucrats who do not understand treatment—and who micromanage contractors who operate without sufficient flexibility.

  18. Principles and Practices (6) • Mandates and Incentives • Original TC was voluntary • In order to fill the beds, CDC dictated mandatory placement, and provided no incentives (and many disincentives) for participation. • Generalized from studies that were not relevant (+ no discussion with providers) • Many of those placed in TCs are inappropriate

  19. Principles and Practices (7) • Understanding the science and implementing it. • If best outcomes require everyone to complete both phases of the TC (in-prison and post-prison) then the government must follow the science. • Legislators appropriate the money—but are unwilling to be prescriptive in how it is spent ( to avoid blame). • Governor does not want to be labeled “soft” on crime by instituting policies that would actually increase public safety and save taxes—but would be perceived as “soft.” • Politics vs “the public interest”

  20. Lessons learned • We know we can have individual success (eg. Individual programs that succeed) • The unresolved question is can we have an integrated SYSTEM that succeeds??? • The challenge is the one the Dr. DeLeon has pointed out---the problem of getting all parties agreed upon (1) the nature of the disorder, (2)the basic principles of treatment, and (3)getting (and keeping) all parties on the same page in implementation over years….

  21. 2007 • 2005---CDC changed to CDCR (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation). But did not act… • Federal receiver takes over CDCR medical system. Threatens to take over CDCR entirely. • Inspector General Report calling the treatment initiative a “1 billion dollar mistake.” • New management installed at CDCR • Jury is still out…….I’ll let you know in Amsterdam!!

  22. additional information available at www.amityfdn.org • Look for articles in the r e-mail: rmullen@amityfdn.org

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