1 / 28

Fukushima Nuclear Accident ~ Personal Perspective on The Human Impact~

Fukushima Nuclear Accident ~ Personal Perspective on The Human Impact~. National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference Austin, Texas April 8 th , 2013 Kenji Tateiwa Manager, Nuclear Power Programs Tokyo Electric Power Company, Washington Office tateiwa.kenji@tepco.co.jp.

blaze-rowe
Télécharger la présentation

Fukushima Nuclear Accident ~ Personal Perspective on The Human Impact~

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Fukushima Nuclear Accident~Personal Perspective on The Human Impact~ National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference Austin, Texas April 8th, 2013 Kenji Tateiwa Manager, Nuclear Power Programs Tokyo Electric Power Company, Washington Office tateiwa.kenji@tepco.co.jp

  2. My Background • ’90~’96: Kyoto University • BS/MS in Nuclear Engineering • ’96~: TEPCO • ’96~’00: Fukushima Daini NPS • ’00~’02: Nuclear Engineering Dept., Tokyo-H/Q • ’02~’04: MBA, Stanford Graduate School of Business • ’04~’05: Nuclear Engineering Dept. • ’05~’11: International Affairs Dept. • Mar.~Sept.’11: Fukushima Response Int’l Team, Tokyo-H/Q • Sept. ’11~: Washington DC Office TEPCO class of ‘96 in Naraha-town, Fukushima (Jan. 2000) Pursued “Nuclear Renaissance” in Texas (June 2010)

  3. My Post-Accident Activities IAEA Preliminary Mission (4/6/2011@1F) IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

  4. My Post-Accident Activities “Bedroom” of Emergency Response Center (5/21/2011@1F)

  5. My Post-Accident Activities “Nothing has been more important in my career than supporting TEPCO.” Discussion with U.S. INPO-Industry Support Team (8/19/2011@2F) INPO: Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

  6. Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) Houses Swept Away Cruise Ship Stranded http://archive.shinsai.yahoo.co.jp/ http://archive.shinsai.yahoo.co.jp/ • March 11, 2011 at 2:46pm • Magnitude 9.0 • 19,000 dead/missing • Largest earthquake/tsunami in recorded history of Japan http://archive.shinsai.yahoo.co.jp/

  7. Damage Caused by GEJE (cont’d) Fire Truck Abandoned Gas Tank Exploded http://archive.shinsai.yahoo.co.jp/ http://archive.shinsai.yahoo.co.jp/

  8. Comparison of Seismic Energy (Magnitude) M5.8 Meiji Sanriku (1896) Jogan (869) Keicho-Sanriku (1611) Hanshin Awaji (1995) 6,400 casualties GEJE (2011) Virginia, USA (2011) x 63,000 http://wcrnews.wordpress.com/2011/08/23/5-9-earthquake-rocks-virginia-d-c/

  9. Impact of GEJE to TEPCO Facilities Epicenter • Shutdown: • Nuclear power: 7 units • Thermal power: 12 units • Hydro power: 25 units • Substations: 8 • Power outage: • 4 million households • Rolling blackout for 10 days • Massive interruption of infrastructure: • Public transportation • Telecommunication • Food/water supply Lost 40% of power supply capacity 52 GW 31 GW Before earthquake Shortly after earthquake

  10. TEPCO’s Nuclear Power Stations Fukushima Daiichi (1F) Kashiwazaki-Kariwa (KK) U-6 U-5 U-5,6,7 U-1 U-2 U-4 U-3 U-3 U-4 U-2 U-1 Fukushima Daini (2F) U-4 U-3 U-2 U-1 (source) JAIF

  11. TEPCO Emergency Response Centers (ERC) Tokyo H/Q Fukushima Daiichi Video conference among multiple ERCs played instrumental role

  12. Impact of Earthquake/Tsunami at 1F • After the Earthquake (near design-basis): • Loss of all off-site power • Plant responded as designed (automatic shutdown of operating units/startup of emergency diesel generators) • After the Tsunami (beyond design-basis): • Station Black Out (SBO) for 5 out of 6 units • Loss of almost all safety system, instrumentation, lighting, etc. Unit 1 Unit 4 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 5 Unit 6 Radwaste Processing building Seismically Isolated Bldg. (ERC) （C)GeoEye

  13. Tsunami Observed at 1F 2 1 Breakwater (height: 10m) 4 3

  14. Tsunami Observed at 1F (cont’d) 重油タンク Tank (height:5.5m) Ground Level (10m above sea) 撮影日：2011/3/11 15:43 撮影日：2011/3/11 15:42 撮影日 ：2011/3/11 15:42 Tank Fully Submerged Car Stuck in the Building 撮影日：2011/3/11 15:44 撮影日：2011/3/11 15:43 撮影日：2011/3/11 15:43

  15. Accident Response at 1F: In the Field Roads damaged by earthquake Continual aftershocks, tsunami alerts, open manholes, etc. exacerbated the situation. Roads blocked by tsunami debris

  16. Accident Response at 1F: In the Main Control Room Checked instrumentation in near-complete darkness. Supervised operation wearing full-face mask. Brought in heavy batteries to restore instrumentations. • Lack of: instrumentation, communication means, lighting, food, water, sleep, ... • Increase in: radiation level, fatigue, fear, despair, ...

  17. Accident Response at 1F: Containment Venting (Unit 1) Exhaust stack Rupture disc MO Venting required to avoid catastrophic failure. Remote operation unavailable due to SBO. AO AO AO AO MO • Six men formed 3 “last-resort teams” to manually open 2 valves in highly-radioactive area. • Core damage already progressing by this time(3/12 9:04-9:30). • One operator exceeded 100 mSv (10 rem).

  18. Accident Response at 1F: Water Injection by Fire Trucks • Fire trucks played critical role in injecting water into reactors. • Fire brigade operated fire trucks amidst high radiation/successive explosions. inoperable Fire Cistern Fire Cistern Fire Cistern Valve Pit Valve Pit Valve Pit Valve Pit standby Fire Cistern Shallow Draft Quay Fire Cistern Status as of 3/14/2011 Sea

  19. Overview of the 10-Unit Simultaneous Accidents 3/11 15:27 1st Tsunami, 15:35 2nd Tsunami 3/11 15:22~ Tsunamis 3/20 15:46 P/C-2C 3/20 15:46 P/C-2C 3/22 10:36 P/C-4D 3/22 10:35 P/C-4D 3/12 8:13 D/G-6B 3/19 22:14 RHR 3/14 1:24 RHR 3/14 7:13 RHR 3/14 15:42 RHR Station Blackout Water Injection: YES Heat Removal: NO Water Injection: NO Heat Removal: NO 3/19 5:00 RHR 3/12 12:15 3/12 15:36 Unit 1 Explosion Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink 3/14 11:01 Unit 3 Explosion 3/14 17:00 3/14 18:00 3/15 6:00-6:10 Unit 4 Explosion 3/15 7:15 Water Injection: YES Heat Removal: YES 3/20 14:30 3/20 14:30 Cold Shutdown

  20. Hundreds of Aftershocks Greater than M 5.0 On March 11th alone 179 times > M 5.0 38 times > M6.0 3 times > M7.0 Cumulative Number of Aftershocks Daily Number of Aftershocks cf. Earthquake in Virginia on Aug. 23, 2011: M 5.8 (Source) Japan Meteorological Agency

  21. Voices from the Field • “In an attempt to check the status of Unit 4 D/G, I was trapped inside the security gate compartment. Soon the tsunami came and I was minutes away from being drowned, when my colleague smash opened the window and saved my life.” • “In total darkness, I could hear the unearthly sound of SRV dumping steam into the torus. I stepped on the torus to open the S/C spray valve, and my rubber boot melted.” • “Unit 3 could explode anytime soon, but it was my turn to go to the main control room. I called my dad and asked him to take good care of my wife and kids should I die.” Torus Room Unit 1 Main Control Room

  22. Voices from the Field (cont’d) “At that time, I was conjuring up faces of fellow colleagues who would die with me.” (Masao Yoshida, Site Superintendent) • “I was determined to stay behind to my death; however I was resolved to send my men back home alive.” • (Ikuo Izawa, Shift Manager) • “Let me go and vent the containment. I know where the valve is and I can run fast. Let me protect the unit that I love.” • (Kazuhiro Yoshida, Deputy Shift Manager) “The Man Who Saw The Brink of Death” “Book reveals human drama in Fukushima No. 1 crisis” The Japan Times 12/11/2012 http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/11/national/book-reveals-human-drama-in-fukushima-no-1-crisis/

  23. Current Status of 1F Live Camera Image (as of 3/10/2013) http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/f1-np/camera/index-e.html • All reactors stably cooled by circulating water system • Radioactivity release significantly reduced • Preparation ongoing for removal of fuels from spent fuel pools • Progress being made in investigating inside containment vessels

  24. Current Status of 1F: Off-site Radiation Dose and Evacuation Zones 30km 20km 10km 1F Aerial Radiation Dose Map (μSv/h at 1 m above ground; as of Dec. 2012) Evacuation Zones (from April 2013) Measured Value 1 μSv/h = 8.76 mSv/y 2.3 μSv/h = 20 mSv/y 1F http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/20130307_shiryo1-1.pdf • Evacuation zones to be relaxed for areas below 20 mSv/y • Int’l consensus on health impact of low-dose radiation urgently needed http://ramap.jaea.go.jp/map/map.html

  25. Safety Enhancement Measures at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS D/G trucks (500kVA): 23 GTG trucks (4500kVA): 2 Fire trucks: 8 Current Height: 10 m (15 m above sea) After Width: 15 m Length: 1.5 km Seawall Water-tight doors

  26. Reforming TEPCO’s Nuclear Operation Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee Dr. Dale Klein, Chairman • (Former Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) • Lady Barbara Judge, Deputy Chairman • (Former Chairman, U.K. Atomic Energy Authority) • Dr. Kenichi Ohmae, Member • (CEO, Business Breakthrough, Inc.) • Mr. Masafumi Sakurai, Member • (Former Superintendent Public Prosecutor) • Mr. Kazuhiko Shimokobe, Member • (Chairman, TEPCO) • Mr. Kazuhiro Suzuki, Secretary-General • (CEO, Nuclear Fuel Transport Co.) Supervision TEPCO Board of Directors Request Proposal Observation Reporting Observation / Supervision Reference Reporting TEPCO Nuclear Reform Special Task force Mr. Naomi Hirose (President) Mr. Zengo Aizawa (Chief Nuclear Officer) Mr. Takafumi Anegawa (General Manager, Nuclear Asset Management Dept.) Execution

  27. My Post-Accident Activities in the U.S. Nuclear Industry Gov’t Agencies Global Organizations Professional Organizations, Think Tanks, NPOs Academia Committed to disseminating lessons learned globally and working together to make nuclear power plants safer.

  28. References • [Japan] • Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) • http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/index-e.html • Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee of TEPCO • http://www.nrmc.jp/en/index-e.html • Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) • http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/ • Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) • http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/ • Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) • http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/ • Japan Nuclear Safety Institute (JANSI) • http://www.genanshin.jp/english/index.html • [USA] • Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) • http://www.nei.org/filefolder/INPO_11-005_Fukushima_Addendum_1.pdf • Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) • http://www.epri.com/Pages/Default.aspx • Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) • http://safetyfirst.nei.org/japan/ • National Academy of Science—Fukushima Lessons Learned Committee • http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=49465 [International] • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) • http://www.iaea.org/ • World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) • http://www.wano.info/ • World Health Organization (WHO) • http://www.who.int/entity/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/fukushima_report/en/index.html

More Related