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Dual Use Research, Bioweapons and Biosecurity

Dual Use Research, Bioweapons and Biosecurity. Iris Hunger Research Group for Biological Arms Control Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Centre for Science and Peace Research University of Hamburg, Germany International Forum on Biosecurity, Amman, 27-29 October 2008. Dual Use.

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Dual Use Research, Bioweapons and Biosecurity

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  1. Dual Use Research, Bioweapons and Biosecurity Iris Hunger Research Group for Biological Arms Control Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Centre for Science and Peace Research University of Hamburg, Germany International Forum on Biosecurity, Amman, 27-29 October 2008

  2. Dual Use Technology, equipment, material, or knowledge that can be used for: Peaceful or hostile Legitimate or illegitimate Beneficial or destructive purposes without, or only minor, modification.

  3. Dual Use Activities of Concern Dual use activities whose misuse would result in particularly grave consequences. Two approaches: Based on the agents involved. Based on the results planned or achieved.

  4. Dual Use Activities of ConcernAgent Based Anthrax, hemorrhagic fevers (Ebola etc.), plague, smallpox, tularemia. 1918 influenza? SARS? Genetically enhanced measles?

  5. Dual Use Activities of ConcernResult Based • Rendering a vaccine ineffective • Creating resistance to therapeutics • Enhancing the virulence of a pathogen • Rendering a nonpathogen virulent • Increasing transmissibility of a pathogen • Altering the host range of a pathogen • Enabling the evasion of diagnosis/detection • Enabling the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism, U.S. National Research Council, 2004.

  6. Dual Use Activities of Concernin Biodefence Programmes Creating agents with improved bioweapons characteristics Engineering anthrax to be vaccine resistant Increasing the lethality of pox viruses Creating people knowledgable about bioweapons relevant agents Giving rise to suspicions of bioweapons development

  7. Dual Use Activities of ConcernGovernance Thorough risk assessment before work is started Maximum transparency including full publication Should not be carried out in the framework of biodefence/biosecurity

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