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C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) Lessons Learned

C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) Lessons Learned. Overview. Purpose Program summary Lessons learned by program phase Lessons learned by functional area Summary Operational experience. Purpose. Summarize pre-MOU lessons learned from the C-17 SAC program for use on other programs

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C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) Lessons Learned

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  1. C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) Lessons Learned

  2. Overview • Purpose • Program summary • Lessons learned by program phase • Lessons learned by functional area • Summary • Operational experience

  3. Purpose • Summarize pre-MOU lessons learned from the C-17 SAC program for use on other programs • Discuss operational results

  4. Papa Air Base, July 27, 2009

  5. Program Summary • NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations consortium to acquire and operate 3 C-17s • Establish a new NATO Production and Logistics Organization (NPLO) to manage acquisition and sustainment • NATO Airlift Management Organization/Agency (NAMO/NAMA) • Establish new multinational Heavy Airlift Wing to operate SAC C-17s at Papa AB, Hungary • US provides 1 C-17 and partners purchase 2 C-17s • Costs shared based on committed flight hours • Hungary serves as Flag Nation and registers the SAC C-17s and certifies airworthiness

  6. SAC Nations

  7. SAC Nations’ Annual FH Share

  8. Lead Agency (SAF/IA) SAC Steering Board (SB) Integrated Product Team (IPT) SAF/IA-Led Senior Steering Group (SSG) MOU Committee O&LWG P&FWG Development Phase Structure United States International Operations & Logistics Working Group Procurement & Finance Working Group

  9. Final SAC Program Concept Purchase Operate at Papa AB Hungary 12 Nations Pool Resources Under MOU Bulgaria Estonia Finland (PfP) Hungary Lithuania Netherlands Norway Poland Romania Slovenia Sweden (PfP) United States • Operated by 130 • person • Multinational • Heavy Airlift Wing • (HAW) • USAF Commander • Sweden Vice • Commander 3 C-17s* and Contractor Logistics (CLS) Support through NATO Airlift Management Agency (NAMA) *1 C-17 provided as U.S. Non-Financial Contribution Aircraft Certified and Registered by Hungary Limited IOC: Jul 09 FOC: 2012 Share costs based on Committed flight hours NAMA standup Sep 08

  10. SAC PROGRAM SAC SB HAW MOB AMP NAMO CHARTER SAC MOU Terms • SAC Program consists of: • SAC Steering Board (SB) to provide oversight of the SAC Program • Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) for operation of the C-17 aircraft • Main Operating Base (MOB) and support facilities • NATO Airlift Management Organization (NAMO) manages Airlift Management Program (AMP) NAC NAMO BOD

  11. SAC Program Phases

  12. NATO ASG/DI program concept created cost and schedule expectations which could not be fulfilled $29K/flight hour – actual 50%+ higher Jun 07 IOC – achieved Jul 09 Denmark, Slovakia, Latvia withdrew from program noting cost increases from time of the LOI as rationale Lesson Learned Program experts need to conduct feasibility studies to benchmark cost, schedule, performance expectations early Initiation Phase

  13. Initial expectation was to use NAMSA Weapons Systems Partnership (WSP) and base aircraft at Ramstein AB A400M countries (France, Germany, and Spain) blocked the use of the NAMSA WSP citing concerns over liability & NAMSA competencies Structure of program had to be changed including establishing a new NATO NPLO and separate operational unit Lesson Learned Major acquisition programs are inherently political; need to structure programs to avoid political roadblocks Development Phase

  14. Combined acquisition and operational MOU (a first) Many legal and policy obstacles encountered and overcome Resulted in acquisition being under NATO and operations conducted outside of NATO jurisdictions; dual board structure MOU entry into effect at 3500 flight hours Lessons Learned Innovative 4-part MOU for acquisition and operations could provide model for other programs Entry into effect approach critical on complex multilateral agreements MOU Negotiation Phase

  15. Transition team formed at NAMSA in Jan 08 4 full time Voluntary National Contributions (VNCs) until Jun 08; then zero 13 Functional Action Teams (FATs) formed in Mar 08 to continue program planning NAMA personnel selection process initiated in Jun 08 in parallel with MOU signature process Lessons Learned Need to manage transition from MOU negotiation phase to execution phase Need to obtain nations commitment to provide VNCs in initial agreements; FATs were a partially successful alternative Need to start hiring actions as soon as possible Transition Phase

  16. 2 Years to MOU Organization Manpower & Personnel Role of NAMSA Program Communication Program Schedule PfP and NATO Mix FMS Legal Cost and Budget Foreign Disclosure Certification and Registration New NATO Partners Functional Area Lessons Learned

  17. What were the main reasons that the SAC nations were able to conclude the MOU within two years after signature of the LOI and field a capability 10 months later? The program focus was on fielding capability – not on industrial participation Off-the-shelf system precluded industrial participation; any industrial participation arrangements are outside scope of MOU SAC aircraft were taken from USAF production line FMS was selected over DCS Time to stand up NAMA removed from critical path for aircraft procurement 2 Years to MOU/10 Months to Capability

  18. US Structure Senior Steering Group (SSG) highly effective Establishing a single OSD office (AT&L/IC) as focal point beneficial SAC IPT, involving over 100 people, key to program coordination/issue resolution Should have involved NSA and DSCA earlier Should have developed agreement on DoD organizational responsibilities for execution phase in parallel with program definition Organization

  19. Multinational Structure USAF leadership was key to program success SAC Steering Board Chairman MOU Committee Chairman Procurement and Finance Working Group Co-Chair Operations and Logistic Working Group Co-Chair Legal Experts lead Cost Experts lead 1 of the 4 full-time VNCs Meetings were held approximately every 3 weeks for two years; significant time commitment Organization

  20. SAF/IA Manpower Complex programs where SAF/IA takes on the program leadership role require a significant manpower commitment From Spring 07 to Spring 08 SAF/IA had 6 near full time people working on the program SAF/IAPQ – 1 GS-15, 1 GS-14, 1 Lt Col, 1 GS-13 SAF/IARE – 2 Lt Cols 5 of 6 personnel reassigned/retired Mar-Jun 08 with only 2 backfills Significant manpower contribution from SAF/IAPD, SAF/GCI, SAF/FMBM NAMA Personnel Recruitment Need to aggressively manage personnel recruitment actions for NATO NPLOs 24 positions advertised on USA jobs and recommended candidates submitted for consideration Manpower and Personnel

  21. MOU provides that NAMA will initially be co-located with an existing NPLO and then move to Hungary to be closer to the MOB NAMSA was involved in the SAC program from the beginning as a result of WSP plans NAMSA provided critical support to the SAC program during transition phase Personnel Finance Logistics planning Standing up a new NPLO is very complicated and tapping into existing NPLO for support is important Role of NAMSA

  22. Effective communication between nations is essential Extensive use of mass emails NAMSA provided secretariat function and INFOHUB; secretariat function was a full-time job US IPT kept informed by monthly reports and teleconferences Strategic Communication Plan with FAQs to guide nations’ interaction with media should be prepared early in the program Program Communications

  23. Ambitious, best-achievable schedule objective was used throughout the program Effective in pushing approvals through 12 nation’s bureaucratic processes Downside is that people believe schedule is real and begin making commitments based on a schedule unlikely to be achieved Need to strike a good balance between a motivational and executable schedule Program Schedule

  24. SAC is the first major “NATO” cooperative program with PfP (Sweden and Finland) participants MOU provides that Finland and Sweden participation in the NAMO BoD is the same as the NATO participants All MOU language which had Article 5 (collective self defense) implications were carefully worded to satisfy Finland and Sweden concerns Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) is not part of the NATO force structure Command and Control (OPCON) of the SAC C-17s assigned to the HAW/CC who is responsible to the SAC nations NATO and PfP Mix

  25. Aircraft acquisition originally planned to be DCS with sustainment through the Globemaster Sustainment Partnership (GSP) through FMS Nations later agreed to all FMS approach 516 AESW, AFSAC, and AFSAT were involved from the beginning of MOU discussions Allowed presentation of FMS cases within 1-month after MOU entry into effect DSCA joined IPT and expedited review of the LOAs Foreign Military Sales

  26. Forming Legal Experts team essential on complex programs SAC legal experts dealt with many issues Responsibilities of the Flag Nation Liabilities and claims under different operational scenarios Customs duties, taxes, and similar charges Many legal agreements in addition to the MOU NATO Airlift Management Organization (NAMO) Charter Host Nation Agreements Hungary Luxembourg US Hungary Basing Arrangement NAMA and NAMSA MOA Legal

  27. Cost estimates Developing program cost estimates was a significant effort Acquisition, sustainment, base infrastructure improvements, and operations for 30 years Served as basis for MOU cost target and cost ceiling Forming Cost Experts group is essential Budget considerations Meeting frequency and team size drives a large TDY bill Need to centrally budget TDY funds for US support to program through the transition phase Need to aggressively work linkages with PPBES US MOU signature was contingent on Congressional approval of reprogramming action Cost and Budget

  28. On programs like SAC, need to determine at program onset if releases are to NATO or the individual nations Releases were made to NATO, Sweden and Finland; in hindsight, releases to individual nations plus NATO would have been more appropriate (corrected after the fact) In addition to disclosure for aircraft and equipment, need early identification of tactics, training, and C2 systems required for disclosure review Allow sufficient time for disclosure officers to comply with US law and policy Identify potential non-starters before making commitments to international partners Foreign disclosure needs to be part of the formal review process for documents such as CONOPS or CONSUP Foreign Disclosure

  29. Consult with OSD/NII and Joint Staff early on GPS releases COMSEC release process for multinational programs is incredibly complex and must be started at program inception Involve NSA in program IPTs from the beginning Foreign Disclosure (con’t)

  30. European Union policies are driving nations toward “civil-like” certification of military aircraft Impacts to SAC program A Military Type Certificate to be developed Hungarian authorities to certify Boeing as the designer and manufacturer NAMA, as the Weapon System Management Organization (WSMO) Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) as the operator Boeing as the maintenance organization Detailed exhibits developed in conformance with organizational policies and procedures SAC program will set precedent on certifying US military aircraft to EU standards Certification & Registration

  31. New NATO partners are still learning how to work with the US and “old Europe” on cooperative programs of this type National representatives have mixed English skills Prudent for program leaders to develop white papers on key program issues to assist national representatives in explaining the program within their nation New NATO Partners

  32. Briefing provides a top-level snapshot of major lessons learned on the SAC program Lessons learned are very applicable to all types of international armaments cooperation programs Summary

  33. The Strategic Airlift Capability

  34. HAW Units

  35. Heavy Airlift Wing • 12 Nations • 145 Employees in HAW • 47 Employees in • NAMPO (Papa) • 66 Employees in • Boeing • Approximately 700 • people including, • family members HAW/CC HAW Senior Enlisted Advisor HAW Vice Commander HAW QM XO / HAW Support Staff Quality Assurance Evaluation HAW Safety Staff C2 Commander LSS/CC HAS/CC Flying Crew Chiefs C2Adm. Sup. and Analysis HAS Support Staff C2 Director of Operations HAS/DO LSS DO LSS/DO LSS Support Staff Loadmaster Flight Deputy Chief Msn Planning/ Execution Pilot Flight Chief Msn Planning/ Execution Maintenance Flight Supply & Mobility Readiness Mission Security Force Intel Flight Aerial Port Airlift Validation Cell Mission Planning Cell Dip Clearance Cell Aviation Management Stan/Eval Vehicle Maintenance Aircrew Flight Equipment Tactics Flight TrainingFlight 15 December 2008 35

  36. HAW Leadership Rotation Plan

  37. Mission Capabilities • All Crews Trained to USAF C-17 Standards • Airland (All Crewmembers) • Night Vision Goggle (NVG) • Tactical / Low Level • Assault Landings • Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) • Air Refueling (Min 50% of Aircraft Commanders) • Single Ship Airdrop (2 Aircrews) • Heavy Equipment (HE) • Container Delivery System (CDS) • Personnel (PERS) NATO - Unclassified 37

  38. SAC Mission Highlights 2009-2015 NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan • ISAF (2009-14) • RSM (2014-) UN / EU Operations in Africa • UN MINUSMA / Mali (2013–) • EUFOR RCA & UN MINUSCA/ Republic of Central Africa (2014–) National & NATO training activities • Support to various exercises and training events in Europe (2014-) • Other • March 2011:Support to NATO operations in Libya • 14 April 2010: Repatriation of Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash victims from Smolensk, Russia to Warsaw • December 2009: Missions to Iraq in support of NATO Training Mission • 13 August 2009: 1st operational HAWmission (Ramstein AB - Pristina, Kosovo) MH17 Crash Investigation • Support flights to Kharkiv, Ukraine (2014) Humanitarian Relief • Earthquake Relief in Haiti (2010) • Flood Relief in Pakistan (2010)

  39. SAC Program Successes “Poster Child” for Pooling & Sharing, Smart Defence Investment Funds Available (Hangar, etc) Executing Below Expected Costs Mission Accomplishment Rates Very Good

  40. SAC Potential NATO - Unclassified • SAC Program vs. C-17 Aircraft Life Expectancy • 30, 45, 60 years? • Increase Hours to Existing Nations • Add Nations to the Program • Enlarge the Fleet of C-17s • Add other Airlift Mission Set(s) • Add non-Airlift Mission Sets • Using Pápa more as a hub • Extend cooperation with other Programs (EATC, etc)

  41. QUESTIONS?

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