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A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION

A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION. EITM Summer Institute Ann Arbor Gisela Sin University of Michigan. Existing Theories. Distributional (Shepsle & Weingast) “Congressional institutions allow members to capture the gain from cooperation” Informational (Krehbiel)

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A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION

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  1. A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION EITM Summer Institute Ann Arbor Gisela Sin University of Michigan

  2. Existing Theories • Distributional (Shepsle & Weingast) • “Congressional institutions allow members to capture the gain from cooperation” • Informational(Krehbiel) • “Majoritarianism acts as a constraint on procedural choice” • Party Cartel(Cox & McCubbins) • “The House has structured the delegation of authority…to ensure that the majority party has an advantage” • Conditional Party Government(Aldrich & Rohde) • “When the conditions of CPG are met (intraparty preferences becoming more homogeneous, divergent preferences between Democrats and Republicans), congressional members should strengthen the power of the majority party”

  3. Common Assumptions • House members are rational, strategic, and policy oriented * * • Internal institutions allow House members to obtain their preferred outcome * * • Exclusive focus on the internal dynamics of the House • Senate and President are considered irrelevant for the internal dynamics of the House

  4. Constitutional Theory If we hold constant the preferences of all House members… changes in the partisan balance of the Senate or the identity of the President… can alter the balance of power in the House.

  5. Existing TheoriesArgument Preferences of the House Organizational decisions in the House

  6. Anticipation of reconciliation and constitutional stage: Function of the preferences of the Senate, President and House Constitutional TheoryArgument Preferences of the House Reconciliation of Constitutional stage: Organizational differences between House, Senate and decisions in the House and Senate President enact new laws House

  7. Constitutional TheoryFormal Model • Assumptions • N + 2 players • N House members • President: a unitary actor • Senate: a unitary actor • Each player belongs to one of three ideological factions: F1, F2 and F3. No faction controls a House majority. • Complete Information • Representative bill • The game has three stages: leadership, reconciliation and constitutional.

  8. Leadership Stage F1 - F2 accept F2 F2 – F3 accept Offer to F3 reject Offer to F2 q F2 F3 reject F1 F1 - F3 accept Offer to F3 F3 F2 – F3 accept Offer to F3 reject q F2 F3 reject

  9. Reconciliation Stage • House and Senate HAVE to agree on the same exact bill • House negotiator is determined in the organizational stage. • The Senate conferee shares the Senate’s ideal point. • We assume a simple algorithm “split the difference if possible, otherwise recognize bargaining power” • Implication: • Best: midpoint of line connecting conferee ideal points • 2nd best: Point in Constitutionally Acceptable Set closest to the original midpoint.

  10. cb(CH,s) sign 2/3 accept cb(CH,s) President 2/3 accept Senate accept veto reject q House factions Senate reject q 50% accept reject q House factions reject q Constitutional Stage

  11. Move the President, Change the House The President moves from faction F1 to faction F3 The Constitutional Set changes • Faction F3: Gets the President & leverage,  utility • Faction F1: Loses the President & leverage,  utility • Balance of power shifts despite no HM ideal point changes!

  12. Empirical Implications • Existing Theories • Changes in the Senate and/or President should not affect decisions to redistribute power in the House • Constitutional Theory • Changes in the Senate and/or President do have and effect decisions to redistribute power in the House

  13. Data • Every Congress from 1879 to 2001 (N: 61) • Dependent Variable • Changes in the distribution of power in the House • Explanatory variables • Changes in the Senate • Changes in the Presidency

  14. Predictions  in Rules ~  in Senate and /or President NO changes in House All theories imply a baseline  in Senate and /or President ~  in House Existing theories imply no differences with baseline Constitutional Theory predicts more changes

  15. 82% p-value: 0.0001 (Fisher’s Exact Test) Results Changes in Rules NO CHANGES in Senate and /or President NO changes in House 37% CHANGES in Senate and /or President NO changes in House

  16. Conclusion Incorporating the Senate and President into a legislative organization model provides a new understanding of legislative institutional design and who gets what in the House

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