Does Proportional Representation Foster Closer Congruence Between Citizens and Policy Makers?

1. Does Proportional Representation Foster Closer Congruence Between Citizens and Policy Makers? André BlaisMarc André Bodet

2. Composition of Presentation • What is our ‘research substance’? • Research Background/Why is PR interesting to observe? • Research Methodology/How did the authors approach the problem? • Conclusion/Remarks/Discussion Teasers

3. What is our ‘research substance’? • Electoral system, proportional representation (PR) • The influence of PR on the relationship betweencitizens and policy makers (‘voters and governments’) • Does PR foster closer congruence between the views of thecitizens and the positions of the government?

4. QUESTION Is PR indeed more likely to induce governments to adopt positions that are close to those of the median voter? OR Does PR with ‘its way of being’ encourage harmony between voters and the governments / legislatures?

5. ANSWER (1) • Strong electoral system, low proportionality: the party might deviate from the median voter position if there are more than two parties (in that case ‘there is no clear optimal position for the parties to take’ and ‘parties strive to distinguish themselves ideologically from each other’) (Cox, 1997, Osborne; 1993); in case there are only two parties, each party will maximize its votes by converging to the median voter (Downs, 1957).

6. ANSWER (2) • Weak electoral system, high proportionality: because there are more parties and each of them wants to distinguish itself from another, there is no move towards a median voter position; parties move away from the center and the overall distance between parties and voters is not minimized  smaller congruence  but centripetal process do take place does take place at the government formation stage paradox

7. CSES Dataset • 21 countries and 31 elections (1996-2003) • direct information about the distance between the voter’s positions and those of governing parties • 48.675 respondents (excludingmissingvalues) • questionnaire (respondents were asked to place themselves on 0-10 L-R scale and also place 6 major parties on the same scale locating respondents and parties)

8. Research Methodology FIVE HYPOTHESIS • H1: PR produces less centrist parties and thus greater diversity • H2: PR increases the number of parties in government • H3: The greater the diversity in the party system, the weaker the congruence between government and voters • H4: The more parties in government the stronger the congruence between government and voters • H5: PR has no net effect on the congruence between the government and voters

9. Hypothesis 1PR Produces Less Centrist Parties and Greater Diversity • The choice of an electoral system has a major impact on the survival of small parties • Disproportional system: fewer parties which converge to the center in order to maximize their share of votes • Proportional system: more parties, less centralized, large range of options for the voter • What is the ‘position’ of the parties in PR?

10. H1:Part I (Less or More Centrist?) • Median voter as a starting point (a way how parties can min. the distance between themselves and voters table 1) • DEPENDANT VARIABLE: centrifugal strength of the party system • Goal: to characterizehow centrist parties are in a given country • Formula: voter’s median placement of each party; compute the average absolutedistance of each party from the median voter’s position  the higher the distance the less centrist parties (table 1) • Interpretation: small average distance  more centrist parties, bigger average distance  more dispersed parties • Hypothesis (part I) confirmed

11. H1: Part 2(Greater Diversity?) • Indicator of diversity: inverse ofAlvarez and Nagler’s party system compactness indicator • the numerator corresponds to the relative dispersion of party locations on the L and R scale great dispersion, great diversity (choice); small dispersion, smaller diversity (choice); the denominator is voter’sdispersion on the same scale • correlation (disproportionality/range of choice/centrifugal strength) tested with least squares regressions (Gallagher’s index)  • findings: olderdemocracy produce less centripetal party system, less choice  more proportional systems provide greater range of ideological options, less centrist parties • Hypothesis confirmed

12. Hypothesis 2PR Increases the Number of Parties in Government • in our model  the most crucial centripetal moment in a PR system occursat the time of formation of the cabinet  why? • PR facilitates a big amount of parties to enter (and survive), also small parties can obtain seats, seldom one party has enough seats to form the government  often coalitions • outcome: more proportional systems produce more parties and less proportional producefewer parties • hypothesis confirmed (Table 3)

13. Hypothesis 3 and 4Diversity Hinders CongruenceMore Parties in Government Fosters Congruence • after elections (congruence between voter’s views and the government’s position) • author’s approach assumes that a party’s relative share of cabinet seats is an indicator of its relative influence and that the weighted location of the parties forming the government is a valid appx. of the governments overall ideological orientation • the cabinets are not always centrist (table 1)  distance between voters and cabinets • hypothesis confirmed (table 4)

14. Hypothesis 5PR has no Net Effect on Distance • Contradiction: 1. PR leads to more parties and to lesscentralistparties, smaller convergence BUT 2. PR increases the number of the parties in thegovernment and tends to produce more centralist government and more convergence. • Authors conclude that these two effects wash out: effect is nil (table 5)

15. Conclusion • In PR voters can choose among parties that are more ideologically dispersed and offer a greater range of choice BUT • they are notautomatically closer or further from the government. • No electoral system is superior when it comes down to convergence towards the median voter to minimize the average distance between the voter and itself. • The moment of convergence is different in other electoral systems but ‘the result is the same’.

16. Remarks • Measuring average distance / what is ‘small’, what is ‘big’ • more responsive government / the most responsive government?