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A harmadik Öböl-háború

A harmadik Öböl-háború. 2003 március. Előzmények: embargó. ENSZ BT 661. (1990. aug. 6.): kereskedelmi embargó, kivétel egyes élelmiszerek és gyógyszerek ENSZ BT 986. (1995. ápr. 14.): oil for food: meghatározott mennyiségű olaj exportja - cserében élelmiszerek és gyógyszerek

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A harmadik Öböl-háború

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  1. A harmadik Öböl-háború 2003 március

  2. Előzmények: embargó • ENSZ BT 661. (1990. aug. 6.): kereskedelmi embargó, kivétel egyes élelmiszerek és gyógyszerek • ENSZ BT 986. (1995. ápr. 14.): oil for food: meghatározott mennyiségű olaj exportja - cserében élelmiszerek és gyógyszerek • embargó hatása: 1 millió halott, fele gyermek

  3. CBS - 60 Minutes: Madeleine Albright (US ambassador to the UN)1996, May 12th LESLEY STAHL: "...We have heard that a half a million children have died. I mean that's more children than died when-wh-in- in Hiroshima. And- and, you know, is the price worth it?" MADELEINE ALBRIGHT: "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price--we think the price is worth it... It is a moral question. but the moral question is even a larger one. Don't we owe to the American people and to the American military and to the other countries in the region that this man not be a threat?"

  4. Madeleine Albright

  5. STAHL: "Even with the starvation and the lack..." ALBRIGHT: "I think, Lesley--it is hard for me to say this because I am a humane person, but my first responsibility is to make sure that United States forces do not have to go and refight the Gulf War."

  6. Madam Secretary “I must have been crazy; I should have answered the question by reframing it and pointing out the inherent flaws in the premise behind it. Saddam Hussein could have prevented any child from suffering simply by meeting his obligations.... As soon as I had spoken, I wished for the power to freeze time and take back those words. My reply had been a terrible mistake, hasty, clumsy and wrong. Nothing matters more than the lives of innocent people. I had fallen into the trap and said something I simply did not mean. That was no one’s fault but my own.” (p. 275)

  7. Repüléstilalmi övezetek • 1991 április • USA, Nagy-Britannia, Franciaország • kurdok és síiták védelme • iraki kormány katonai nyomás alatt • Franciaország kilépett • 1998 után rendszeres fegyveres támadások • 1998 december: Bagdad bombázása

  8. Amerikai motivációk

  9. Deklaráltak • Iraknak tömegpusztító fegyverei vannak - közvetlen fenyegetés (szomszédaira, USA-ra, világbékére) • kapcsolat nemzetközi terrorista szervezetekkel • ENSZ BT határozatok (16) megsértése • emberi jogi okok: zsarnoki, brutális diktatúra • demokratizálás láncreakció: “demokrácia-dominó” • feltartóztatás nem alkalmazható (Szaddám pszichés jegyei)

  10. Mögöttes okok • neokonzervatívok befolyása • evangelikalista vallási fundamentalizmus • globális vezető szerepre törekvés • nemzetközi rendszert új alapokra (unilateralizmus) • példa statuálása • amerikanizmus (érdekek és értékek) • geostratégiai érdekek • olaj • Izrael biztonsága • amerikai lakosság közhangulata • következő választások • terrorizmus elleni háború “szinten tartása” • “apa-komplexus”

  11. Tömegpusztító fegyverek • már előző Öböl-háború idején is - fenyegetés • szakértők ellentmondó véleményei • fegyverzetellenőrök • UNSCOM (UN Special Commission - 1991 UNSCR 687) • UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission - 1999 UNSCR 1284) • Irak akadályozza • sokat leszerelnek és megsemmisítenek • Richard Butler 1998 december: semmi sem bizonyítható

  12. Ellentmondások • fegyverzetellenőrök 2002 november (1441) után nem találnak semmit • Irak átad 10.000 oldalas dokumentációt • Blix: nincs bizonyíték a megsemmisítésre - 29 pontos lista • Amerikai és brit titkosszolgálatok: komoly WMD készletek Irakban • Blair és Bush beszédei

  13. Hans Blix előterjeszti beszámolóját 2003. március 7-én az ENSZ BT-ben

  14. A Blix-jelentés “Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programs. Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections. …I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment of a governmental commission, will give significant results.”

  15. 6. As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has: ●continued to produce chemical and biological agents; ●military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them; ●command and control arrangements in place to use chemical and biological weapons. Authority ultimately resides with Saddam Hussein.

  16. President Delivers "State of the Union"January 28, 2003

  17. “The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.”

  18. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the U.N. Security CouncilFebruary 5, 2003

  19. A Carnegie-jelentés

  20. “Iraq’s WMD programs … did not, however, pose an immediate threat to the United States, the region, or global security.”

  21. Elősegítette-e az USA Irak tömegpusztító fegyverkezési programját?

  22. Donald H. Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of Defense, stated in testimony before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee on September 19, 2002 : "Certainly not to my knowledge. I have no knowledge of United States companies or government being involved in assisting Iraq develop, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons."

  23. U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Gulf War A Report of Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. and Ranking Member Alfonse M. D'Amato of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs with Respect to Export Administration; United States Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session
May 25, 1994

  24. "In October 1992, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, which has Senate oversight responsibility for the Export Administration Act (EAA), held an Inquiry into the U.S. export policy to Iraq prior to the Persian Gulf War. During that hearing it was learned that U.N. Inspectors identified many U.S.-manufactured items exported pursuant to licenses issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce that were used to further Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons development and missile delivery system development programs."

  25. "[T]he United States provided the government of Iraq with 'dual use' licensed materials which assisted in the development of Iraqi chemical, biological and missile-system programs...[Including] chemical warfare-agent precursors; chemical warfare-agent production-facility plans and technical drawings; chemical-warfare filling equipment; biological-warfare-related materials; missile-fabrication equipment and missile-system guidance equipment… [T]he same micro-organisms exported by the United States were identical to those the United Nations inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi biological warfare program."

  26. "U.N. inspectors identified many United States manufactured items that had been exported from the U.S. to Iraq under licenses issued by the Department of Commerce, and [established] that these items were used to further Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons development and its missile delivery development programs…Between January 1985 and August 1990], the executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual-use technology to Iraq.”

  27. Terrorizmus - az al-Káida-kapcsolat • Bush tényként kezeli • veszélyforrás - WMD terroristák kezébe juthat • Szaddám és bin Láden inkább ellenfelek • szakértők cáfolták • Szándékozhatott volna-e Szaddám WMD-t átadni? - Nem

  28. State of the UnionJanuary 28, 2003 “Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.”

  29. President Bush Outlines Iraqi ThreatCincinnati, Ohio,October 7, 2002 “We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. .. We've learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases.”

  30. George Bush's war ultimatum speech from the Cross Hall in the White HouseMarch 18, 2003 “The regime … has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda.”

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