Introduction

1. AgendaKick Off Meeting of the contract EFDA-ENEA 05/1252 - Task TW5-SEA 4.2“Update Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) for ITER”Garching, October 17th 2005

2. Introduction • Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a useful tool for safety and availability assessment • A systematic approach is particularly important in complex devices, like ITER, with limited operating experience • The results of FMEA addresses deterministic design and bounding accident analysis to evaluate the radioactive releases to population and workers • This impact has to be inside the release design limits for ITER that are below the threshold for evacuation • FMEA and the deterministic analyses will form part or will be the reference docs for the PSAR

3. Introduction Sv/y Effluents DCF Normal working Occupational dose man*Sv/y conditions PST SOURCE PIE DCF Containments Thermodynamic transients dose/sequence TERMS Release from the plant Aerosols and H3 transport to MEI ASSESSMENT PST EST Overall Plant Safety Analysis FMEA frequency*dose • Inventory • evaluation • Radioactive • Energies • Magnetic • Chemical • Fluids • …. • Management • On-site • Recycling • Final disosal Quantity and Radioactive waste waste Identification&classification Operational&Decomm waste categories General safety analysis approach

4. Status of FMEAs for ITER • Accident sequence analyses performed for ITER are documented in the ITER Generic Site Safety Report (GSSR) issued in July 2001. • GSSR Volume X addresses the identification of postulated accident event sequences, through FMEA, i.e., off-normal events which may result in hazardous consequences. • Detail of its application has varied by system, because analysis has proceeded in parallel with the evolution of the ITER design, resulting in systems being studied at various stages of their design maturity. • Some systems have not been covered by a detailed component-level study and some of the studies are based on the 1998 ITER design.

5. Status of FMEAs for ITER

6. PIEs (Vol X, GSSR) • Magnets 1 • Vacuum Vessel 15 • FW/Bk CWS 13 • Divertor CWS 9 • Fueling system 8 • Divertor RH 5 • Cryostat 9 • Heat rejection system 6 • Vacuum pumping 4 • Cryoplant 2 • Coil Power supplies 6 • Electrical power network 11 • Neutral beam 11 • Hot cell 6

7. Status of FMEAs for ITER FMEA non yet planned • HVAC, ADS, VDS • CODAC • Plasma Control System • PI-Fuelling system • Hot Cells • Drainage System • Maintenance states for the tokamak, tritium building and hot cell source terms • Review of FMEA done before 2001: changes in the confinement aspects of port cells, Vacuum Vessel Pressure Suppression System venting, TCWS vault, etc. as noted in TCM-7 (October 2002) require more detailed assessment

8. Objectives of present contract Development of the following FMEAs  • Cask operation (KoM already done, 14 Sept 05) • Vacuum pumping • IC H&CD • EC H&CD • Diagnostics • Water Detritiation System

9. Aim of the KoM Meeting "Define in detail the task, the methodology, the reference design documents, the information needed from Designers, the relevant planning of deliverables and meetings” • T.Pinna will present an example of FMEA already done • ITER Designers should • describe the systems (status of the art): main characteristics, operation/duty cycle, • point out possible malfunctions and interfaces with safety function/systems, • indicate reference documents and also possible design options under consideration • The task should progress through exchange of information-documents between T.Pinna & Designers and if necessary with focused meetings too • Output of the task: • PIE’s for further deterministic analysis • DCRs • Ultimate aim of the task: FMEA results should be also agreed/shared by Designers

10. Planning