Nancy L. Rose MIT and NBER

1. Do Markets Reduce Costs? Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on the Efficiency of Electricity Generation Nancy L. Rose MIT and NBER COMPETE Forum November 5, 2007 Washington, DC

2. Electricity markets in historical perspective • Early industry evolution led to monopoly concerns • Government ownership or regulation arose to limit firms’ exercise of pricing power • “Traditional” rate-of-return regulation of investor-owned utilities (IOUs) dominated in US • Worked well to keep prices close to costs • But provided limited incentives to keep costs low • Higher costs generally flowed through to ratepayers • Distortion of investment incentives • Insulation from competition reduces feedback and cost pressure

3. Restructuring has recently replaced traditional cost-plus regulation in many jurisdictions • Institutional choices balance costs/benefits of imperfect markets vs. imperfect regulation • Generation and Retail Services: Vertically disintegrate, move to markets • “Natural monopoly” not relevant to current technologies, scale of markets in generation and retailing • Recognition that cost inefficiencies entail first-order welfare loss • Transmission and Distribution: Incentive regulation • Trade-off market power (potentially substantial in these sectors) and efficiency concerns • “Natural monopoly”/ Network domains benefit from “smarter” regulation

4. Does restructuring improve efficiency? This is the billion dollar question • Theory: Changes in incentives can change behavior • Empirical evidence: What happens? Focus on electricity generation

5. What does restructuring do to generation? • US: 1,000+ interconnected generating plants built and operated mainly by investor-owned utilities (IOUs). • What changes in restructured regimes? • New incentives for operation by existing owners (anticipatory, short- to medium-run) • Divestitures/new owners of existing plants (short- to medium-run) • Investment in new plants (long-run)

6. What choices might restructuring affect? • Start with a stylized description of what plants do • To produce electricity (MWhs), plants combine fuel, labor, materials and capital • This process can be described by a production function: y = f(F,L,M,K)

7. A one-input production function y = f(F) Electricity (MWh) Efficient plant “Lost” MWhs Inefficient plant Excess fuel Fuel (Btu)

8. What might change: plant level • Technical efficiency (e.g. improved heat rates) • Input mix (e.g. substitute away from fuel) • Cost of inputs (e.g. fuel procurement practices change) • Balance between expense of preventative maintenance and cost of forced outages

9. What might change: dispatch level • Mix of plants included in the dispatch improves due to expanded coordination areas (+) • Regional trading organizations may improve inter-regional trade and congestion management • Mix of plants included in the dispatch worsens due to dispatch on price (bids) not costs (-) • If some firms withhold capacity from the market to exercise market power, it will be replaced by power from plants that otherwise would have been too expensive to run. • Mix of plants brought online improves (+)

10. Empirical assessment: Measuring the effects of restructuring • We can’t simply compare prices, costs or efficiency measures across restructured v. traditional regulatory environments • Restructured states tended to have higher electricity prices before restructuring • Input shocks, especially fuel prices, change costs over time even without restructuring • Plant mix is different in states that have restructured • We need a counterfactual: What would have happened without restructuring?

11. Empirical assessment: The importance of the counterfactual • To measure empirical effects of restructuring, consider a set of efficiency measures • X {investment, fuel use, staffing levels, etc.} • Some candidate counterfactuals: • X before restructuring • X in other parts of the world. • X in states that aren’t progressing with restructuring quickly. Restructuring Effect: X2000 – X1990 “difference in differences” (X2000, CA – X1990,CA) - (X2000,KY –X1990,KY)

12. Restructuring effects on generation efficiency • Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007) explore whether impending restructuring caused existing owners (IOUs) to operate their plants differently. • Difference in difference analysis: • Compare changes at large fossil IOU plants in restructuring states over 1980-1999 to two “control groups” • Similar IOU plants in non-restructuring states • Cooperatively- and publicly-owned plants • Restructuring states are those that passed restructuring legislation by 2001. See K. Fabrizio, N.L. Rose and C.D. Wolfram, “Do Markets Reduce Costs? Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on US Electric Generation Efficiency,” American Economic Review, (2007) 97:1250-1277.

13. 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 Employment Growth Relative to 1981 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1998 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Year MUNI IOU: Non-restructured States IOU: Restructured States Figure 1: Employment Trends by Company Type and Restructuring Status

14. 0.2 0.1 0 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 -0.1 Nonfuel Expense Growth Relative to 1981 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 MUNI Plants IOU: Non-restructured States IOU: Restructured States Figure 2: Nonfuel Expense Trends by Company Type and Restructuring Status

15. Divestiture and Efficiency • Bushnell and Wolfram (2006) estimate that fossil plants have ~2% lower heat rates after divestitures • At current fuel prices, this amounts to $1/MWh or more • At the plants that were divested, this adds up to savings of roughly $1 billion per year • Barmack, Kahn, & Tierney (2007) estimate nuclear plant capacity factors increase about 10% post-divestiture • Improving efficiency helps achieve environmental goals, especially with respect to CO2 J. Bushnell and C.D. Wolfram, “Ownership Change, Incentives and Plant Efficiency: The Divestiture of U.S. Electric Generation Plants,” UCEI CSEM Working Paper 140. M. Barmack, E. Kahn and S. Tierney, “A cost-benefit assessment of wholesale electricity restructuring and competition in New England,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, (2007) 31:151–184.

16. Markets improve the mix of plants in dispatch • Mansur and White (2007) examine effects of PJM market expansion • Centralized market replaced bilateral trading between PJM East and the Midwest • Dramatic increase in volumes that flowed from inexpensive coal plants in the Midwest to Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland. • Estimated savings on the order of $180m/year E. Mansur and M. White, “Market Organization and Market Efficiency in Electricity Markets,” Yale School of Management Working Paper.

17. Quantities traded: Day-ahead net exports, Midwest  East

18. What’s the bottom line on restructuring? • Remind ourselves about the source of potential gains from restructured electricity markets: • It’s not about short-term price effects • That may be due to temporal shifts (from differences in plant age, regulatory rate base accounting, treatment of “stranded costs,” ), or changing input prices, especially fuel • Real benefits arise from lower costs due to increased efficiency (short- to medium-run) and better investment decisions (long-run) • Evidence on operating efficiency at existing generating plants is positive. • Additional efficiency gains possible through: • More efficient long-term (capital) investment. • Incentive regulation for transmission and distribution.