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EE562 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ENGINEERS

EE562 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ENGINEERS. Lecture 14, 5/23/2005 University of Washington, Department of Electrical Engineering Spring 2005 Instructor: Professor Jeff A. Bilmes. Uncertainty. Chapter 13. Outline. Limitations of logic (Gödel) Uncertainty Probability

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EE562 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ENGINEERS

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  1. EE562 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ENGINEERS Lecture 14, 5/23/2005 University of Washington, Department of Electrical Engineering Spring 2005 Instructor: Professor Jeff A. Bilmes EE562

  2. Uncertainty Chapter 13 EE562

  3. Outline • Limitations of logic (Gödel) • Uncertainty • Probability • Syntax and Semantics • Inference • Independence and Bayes' Rule EE562

  4. Reminder • HW4 Due Today!! EE562

  5. General Logics • Ontology: • science or study of being, which problems are being investigated, the kinds of abstract entities that are to be admitted to a language system, things that exist in a system. • Epistemology: • study of methods and grounds of knowledge, its limits, and its validity, theories of knowledge. EE562

  6. Example knowledge base • The law says that it is a crime for an American to sell weapons to hostile nations. The country Nono, an enemy of America, has some missiles, and all of its missiles were sold to it by Colonel West, who is American. • Prove that Col. West is a criminal EE562

  7. Example knowledge base (in logic form) ... it is a crime for an American to sell weapons to hostile nations: American(x)  Weapon(y)  Sells(x,y,z)  Hostile(z)  Criminal(x) Nono … has some missiles, i.e., x Owns(Nono,x)  Missile(x): Owns(Nono,M1) and Missile(M1) … all of its missiles were sold to it by Colonel West Missile(x)  Owns(Nono,x)  Sells(West,x,Nono) Missiles are weapons: Missile(x)  Weapon(x) An enemy of America counts as "hostile“: Enemy(x,America)  Hostile(x) West, who is American … American(West) The country Nono, an enemy of America … Enemy(Nono,America) EE562

  8. Forward chaining proof Note: can be seen as simply a list of logic sentences. So, any proof is just a other facts that can be deduced from the KB to achieve new knowledge. EE562

  9. Gödels Incompleteness Theorem (general idea) • Each sentence in logic has a length (say number of symbols). • We can enumerate all the sentences in any logic system with a finite number of different types of function symbols (e.g., 8, 9, +, £,, x, etc.) • First enumerate all sentences of length 1 (a finite number of them), then number all of length 2 (again, a finite number), etc. • Thus, there are a countable number of possible sentences in logic. EE562

  10. Gödels Incompleteness Theorem (general idea) • Let #() be the number of sentence  • Let #-1(j) be the sentence for number j • Note that all proofs have numbers also. • i.e., a sequence of sentences also has a number, and any proof can be seen as a sequence of sentences. • Let A be a set of true sentences. EE562

  11. Gödels Incompleteness Theorem (basic idea) • Let A be a set of true premises (e.g., could be thought of as a KB, i.e., A=KB) • Consider the following sentence, represented by the function (j,A), • when we use only premises in A, then: • In words: there is no sentence i that proves j, when we start using only A. • This sentence (j,A), like all others, is one that can be either true or false under A. EE562

  12. Gödels Incompleteness Theorem (basic idea) • Repeated: (j,A) is the sentence: • when we use only premises in A, then: • Now consider the sentence defined as: •  is the sentence that states its own unprovability when using only A. The sentence , again, can be true or false. • In A, assume  true, then it is false • In A, assume  false, then it is true. EE562

  13. Gödels Incompleteness Theorem (basic idea) • Assume  follows from A, but then  is false (since  says it doesn’t follow from A). • But then if  is false, then  does follow from A, which means A must be false (violating our premise) • Thus  is not provable from A, which is what  claims, so  is true. • Key:  is true, but we can’t prove it. • We could always make A bigger, but then same problem would arise in the new A for a new . EE562

  14. General Logics • Ontology: • science or study of being, which problems are being investigated, the kinds of abstract entities that are to be admitted to a language system, things that exist in a system. • Epistemology: • study of methods and grounds of knowledge, its limits, and its validity, theories of knowledge. EE562

  15. Uncertainty • The real world contains uncertainty, we can never be sure of our premises and we can never be sure our outcomes follow our premises. • Instead, we have degrees of belief about the world. Our knowledge ideally reflects degrees of belief in a way that helps us make decisions when uncertainty abounds. EE562

  16. Why we need uncertainty Let action At = leave for airport t minutes before flight Will At get me there on time? Problems: • partial observability (road state, other drivers' plans, etc.) • noisy sensors (traffic reports, road conditions) • uncertainty in action outcomes (flat tire, etc.) • immense complexity of modeling and predicting traffic Hence a purely logical approach either • risks falsehood: “A25 will get me there on time”, or • leads to conclusions that are too weak for decision making: “A25 will get me there on time if there's no accident on the bridge, and it doesn't rain, and my tires remain intact, and they aren’t doing construction, etc etc.” (A1440 might reasonably be said to get me there on time but I'd have to stay overnight in the airport …) EE562

  17. Methods for handling uncertainty • Default or nonmonotonic logic: • Assume my car does not have a flat tire • Assume A25 works unless contradicted by evidence • Key issue: we draw conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract a conclusion in light of further information. Set of conclusions entailed by KB does not increase, and might decrease, with size of the KB itself. • Issues: What assumptions are reasonable? How to handle contradiction? • Rules with fudge factors: • A25 |→0.3 get there on time • Sprinkler |→0.99WetGrass • WetGrass |→0.7Rain • Issues: Problems with combination, e.g., Sprinkler causes Rain?? • Probability • Model agent's degree of belief • Given the available evidence, • A25 will get me there on time with probability 0.04 • Fuzzy logic handles degree of truth, NOT uncertainty. • E.g., WetGrass is true to degree 0.2 EE562

  18. Probability as Belief Probabilistic assertions summarize effects of • laziness: failure to enumerate exceptions, qualifications, etc. • ignorance: lack of relevant facts, initial conditions, etc. But this presupposes a deterministic world, i.e., uncertainty exists only from laziness or ignorance. Does randomness truly exist?? Subjective (Bayesian) probability: • Probabilities relate propositions to agent's own state of knowledge e.g., P(A25 | no reported accidents) = 0.06 These are not assertions about the world, rather agent’s belief. These are NOT claims of a “probabilistic tendency” in current situation (but might be learned from past experience of similar situations) Probabilities of propositions change with new evidence: e.g., P(A25 | no reported accidents, 5 a.m.) = 0.15 EE562

  19. Making decisions under uncertainty Suppose I believe the following: P(A25 gets me there on time | …) = 0.04 P(A90 gets me there on time | …) = 0.70 P(A120 gets me there on time | …) = 0.95 P(A1440 gets me there on time | …) = 0.9999 • Which action to choose? Depends on my preferences for missing flight vs. time spent waiting, etc. • Utility theory is used to represent and infer preferences • Decision theory = probability theory + utility theory EE562

  20. Probability basics • Begin with set , sample space • e.g., 6 possible rolls of a die • 2 is a sample point, possible world, or atomic event • A probability space (or prob. model) is a sample space with a numeric assignment P() for every 2, s.t.: • 0 · P() · 1 •  P() = 1 • e.g., P(1)=P(2)=…=P(6) = 1/6 • An event A is any subset of  • P(A) = 2 A P() • E.g., P(die roll < 4) = P(1)+P(2)+P(3)+P(4)=3*1/6=1/2 EE562

  21. Random Variables • A random variable is a function from sample points to some range, e.g., the reals or booleans • e.g., Odd(i) = true, whenever i is odd. • P induces a probability distribution for any r.v. X: • P(X=xi) = :X() = xi P() • e.g., in die case, we have that P(Odd = true) = P(1)+P(3)+P(5) = 1/2 EE562

  22. Propositions • Think of a proposition as the event (set of basic sample points in ) where the proposition is true. • Given Boolean random variables A and B: • event a = set of sample points where A() = true • event :a = set of sample points where A() = false • event aÆb = points where both A() = true and B() = truen • Often in AI applications, sample points are defined by the values of a set of random variables, i.e., sample space is Cartesian product of r.v.’s ranges • With boolean variables, sample point = model in propositional logic (i.e., assignment to prop log vars) • e.g., A=true, B=true, or aÆ: b • Proposition = disjunction of atomic events that are true • e.g., (a Ç b) ´ (: a Æ b) Ç (a Æ: b) Ç (a Æ b) •  P(a Æ b) = P(: a Æ b) + P(a Æ: b) + P(a Æ b) EE562

  23. Why use probability? • The definitions imply that certain logically related events must have related probabilities: • P(A B) = P(A) + P(B) - P(AB) • A rationality argument: probabilities are rational. • de Finetti (1931): an agent who bets according to probabilities that violate these axioms can be forced to bet so as to loose money regardless of outcome. EE562

  24. Syntax for propositions • Propositional or Boolean random variables: • E.g., Cavity (do I have a cavity?) • Cavity=true is a proposition, also written just as cavity. • Discrete random variables e.g., Weather is one of <sunny,rainy,cloudy,snow> Weather=train is a proposition Domain values must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive • Elementary proposition constructed by assignment of a value to a random variable: e.g., Weather =sunny, Cavity = false (abbreviated as cavity) • Complex propositions formed from elementary propositions and standard logical connectives e.g., Weather = sunny  Cavity = false EE562

  25. Syntax • Atomic event: A complete specification of the state of the world about which the agent is uncertain E.g., if the world consists of only two Boolean variables Cavity and Toothache, then there are 4 distinct atomic events: Cavity = false Toothache = false Cavity = false  Toothache = true Cavity = true  Toothache = false Cavity = true  Toothache = true • Atomic events are mutually exclusive and exhaustive EE562

  26. Prior probability • Prior or unconditionalprobabilities of propositions e.g., P(Cavity = true) = 0.1 and P(Weather = sunny) = 0.72 correspond to belief prior to arrival of any (new) evidence • Probability distribution gives values for all possible assignments: P(Weather) = <0.72,0.1,0.08,0.1> (normalized, i.e., sums to 1) • Joint probability distribution for a set of random variables gives the probability of every atomic event on those random variables P(Weather,Cavity) = a 4 × 2 matrix of values: Weather = sunny rainy cloudy snow Cavity = true 0.144 0.02 0.016 0.02 Cavity = false 0.576 0.08 0.064 0.08 • Every question about a domain can be answered by the joint distribution EE562

  27. Conditional probability • Conditional or posterior probabilities e.g., P(cavity | toothache) = 0.8 i.e., given that toothache is all I know (at the moment). This is *NOT* saying that “if toothache, then 80% chance of cavity”. There might be other information that could either increase or decrease this probability that is simultaneously true along with toothache. • (Notation for conditional distributions: P(Cavity | Toothache) = 2-element vector of 2-element vectors) • If we know more, e.g., cavity is also given, then we have P(cavity | toothache,cavity) = 1 Note: the less specific belief (toothache) remains valid after more evidence arrives, but it is not always useful • New evidence may be irrelevant, allowing simplification, e.g., P(cavity | toothache, SeaHawksWin) = P(cavity | toothache) = 0.8 • This kind of inference, sanctioned by domain knowledge, is crucial EE562

  28. Conditional probability • Definition of conditional probability: P(a | b) = P(a  b) / P(b) if P(b) > 0 • Product rule gives an alternative formulation: P(a  b) = P(a | b) P(b) = P(b | a) P(a) • A general version holds for whole distributions, e.g., P(Weather,Cavity) = P(Weather | Cavity) P(Cavity) • (View as a set of 4 × 2 equations, not matrix mult., rather “table multiplication”) • Chain rule is derived by successive application of product rule: P(X1, …,Xn) = P(X1,...,Xn-1) P(Xn | X1,...,Xn-1) = P(X1,...,Xn-2) P(Xn-1 | X1,...,Xn-2) P(Xn | X1,...,Xn-1) = … = πi= 1^n P(Xi | X1, … ,Xi-1) EE562

  29. Inference by enumeration • Start with the joint probability distribution: • For any proposition φ, sum the atomic events where it is true: P(φ) = Σω:ω╞φ P(ω) EE562

  30. Inference by enumeration • Start with the joint probability distribution: • For any proposition φ, sum the atomic events where it is true: P(φ) = Σω:ω╞φ P(ω) • P(toothache) = 0.108 + 0.012 + 0.016 + 0.064 = 0.2 EE562

  31. Inference by enumeration • Start with the joint probability distribution: • For any proposition φ, sum the atomic events where it is true: P(φ) = Σω:ω╞φ P(ω) • P(toothache Ç cavity) = 0.108 + 0.012 + 0.016 + 0.064 = 0.2 EE562

  32. Inference by enumeration • Start with the joint probability distribution: • Can also compute conditional probabilities: P(cavity | toothache) = P(cavity toothache) P(toothache) = 0.016+0.064 0.108 + 0.012 + 0.016 + 0.064 = 0.4 EE562

  33. Normalization • Denominator can be viewed as a normalization constant α P(Cavity | toothache) = α, P(Cavity,toothache) = α, [P(Cavity,toothache,catch) + P(Cavity,toothache,catch)] = α, [<0.108,0.016> + <0.012,0.064>] = α, <0.12,0.08> = <0.6,0.4> General idea: compute distribution on query variable by fixing evidence variables and summing over hidden variables EE562

  34. Inference by enumeration, contd. Let X be all the variables. Typically, we are interested in the posterior joint distribution of the query variablesY given specific values e for the evidence variablesE Let the hidden variables be H = X - Y - E Then the required summation of joint entries is done by summing out the hidden variables: P(Y | E = e) = αP(Y,E = e) = αΣhP(Y,E= e, H = h) • The terms in the summation are joint entries because Y, E and H together exhaust the set of random variables • Obvious problems: • Worst-case time complexity O(dn) where d is the largest arity • Space complexity O(dn) to store the joint distribution • How to find the numbers for O(dn) entries? EE562

  35. Independence • A and B are independent iff P(A|B) = P(A) or P(B|A) = P(B) or P(A, B) = P(A) P(B) P(Toothache, Catch, Cavity, Weather) = P(Toothache, Catch, Cavity) P(Weather) • 16 entries reduced to 10; for n independent biased coins, O(2n) →O(n) • Absolute independence powerful but rare • Dentistry is a large field with hundreds of variables, none of which are independent. What to do? EE562

  36. Conditional independence • P(Toothache, Cavity, Catch) has 23 – 1 = 7 independent entries • If I have a cavity, the probability that the probe catches in it doesn't depend on whether I have a toothache: (1) P(catch | toothache, cavity) = P(catch | cavity) • The same independence holds if I haven't got a cavity: (2) P(catch | toothache,cavity) = P(catch | cavity) • Catch is conditionally independent of Toothache given Cavity: P(Catch | Toothache,Cavity) = P(Catch | Cavity) • Equivalent statements: P(Toothache | Catch, Cavity) = P(Toothache | Cavity) P(Toothache, Catch | Cavity) = P(Toothache | Cavity) P(Catch | Cavity) EE562

  37. Conditional independence contd. • Write out full joint distribution using chain rule: P(Toothache, Catch, Cavity) = P(Toothache | Catch, Cavity) P(Catch, Cavity) = P(Toothache | Catch, Cavity) P(Catch | Cavity) P(Cavity) = P(Toothache | Cavity) P(Catch | Cavity) P(Cavity) I.e., 2 + 2 + 1 = 5 independent numbers • In most cases, the use of conditional independence reduces the size of the representation of the joint distribution from exponential in n to linear in n. • Conditional independence is our most basic and robust form of knowledge about uncertain environments. EE562

  38. Bayes' Rule • Product rule P(ab) = P(a | b) P(b) = P(b | a) P(a)  Bayes' rule: P(a | b) = P(b | a) P(a) / P(b) • or in distribution form P(Y|X) = P(X|Y) P(Y) / P(X) = αP(X|Y) P(Y) • Useful for assessing diagnostic probability from causal probability: • P(Cause|Effect) = P(Effect|Cause) P(Cause) / P(Effect) • E.g., let M be meningitis, S be stiff neck: P(m|s) = P(s|m) P(m) / P(s) = 0.8 × 0.0001 / 0.1 = 0.0008 • Note: posterior probability of meningitis still very small! EE562

  39. Bayes' Rule and conditional independence P(Cavity | toothache  catch) = αP(toothache  catch | Cavity) P(Cavity) = αP(toothache | Cavity) P(catch | Cavity) P(Cavity) • This is an example of a naïve Bayes model: P(Cause,Effect1, … ,Effectn) = P(Cause) πiP(Effecti|Cause) • Total number of parameters is linear in n EE562

  40. Key Benefit • Probabilistic reasoning (using things like conditional probability, conditional independence, and Bayes’ rule) make it possible to make reasonable decisions amongst a set of actions, that otherwise (without probability, as in propositional or first order logic) we would have to resort to random guessing. • Example: Wumpus World EE562

  41. Summary • Probability is a rigorous formalism for uncertain knowledge • Joint probability distribution specifies probability of every atomic event • Queries can be answered by summing over atomic events • For nontrivial domains, we must find a way to reduce the joint size • Independence and conditional independence provide the tools EE562

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