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Enforcement of the Icelandic cod fishery

Ragnar Arnason. Enforcement of the Icelandic cod fishery. – A two management control, two enforcement tool fishery –. Preliminary results from the Cobecos Project Presented at the Special Workshop for the EU Commission and EU Fisheries Control Administrations. Bruxelles, December 3, 2008.

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Enforcement of the Icelandic cod fishery

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  1. Ragnar Arnason Enforcement of the Icelandic cod fishery – A two management control, two enforcement tool fishery – Preliminary results from the Cobecos Project Presented at the Special Workshop for the EU Commission and EU Fisheries Control Administrations Bruxelles, December 3, 2008

  2. Background • Icelandic cod fishery • Quite sizable(MSY 0.330 m.mt; landed value600-900 m.US$) • Currently depressed(biomass0.7 m.mt.; OSY biomass1.2 m.mt) • Capitalistic fishery- fishers are profit maximizers • About 700 fishing vessels (some multi-purpose) • About 60 landing places • Managed on the basis of ITQs • Individual harvest restrictions • Also area/time/gear restrictions • Quite profitable (quota rental values 2-3 US$/kg)

  3. Icelandic cod: Sustainble depiction

  4. Enforcement Situation • Enforcement agencies • The Fisheries Directorate (the key agency) • Assisted by the Coast Guard • Two management tools • The quota constraint ─ the key management control • Fishing area/time/gear restrictions ─ mix of controls • Two enforcement tools • Enforcement of harvest or quota • Enforcement of area/time/gear restrictions

  5. Modelling the situation Biomass Fishers’ Benefits Mesh size Harvest Enforcementof mesh size Enforcementof harvest Social Benefits

  6. Functional specifications Fishers’Profit function: Cost coefficient: Biomass growth function:

  7. Functional specifications (cont.) Probability function 1: Probability function 2: Cost of enforcement:

  8. Empirical specifications

  9. Empirical Specifications

  10. Private benefits Social benefits Benefits from harvest(=0.5)

  11. =1 =0.5 Mesh-size effect on biomass growth(million metric tonnes)

  12. Social benefits Fishers’ benefits Benefits from alpha(Harvest=0.215)

  13. Enforcement of “mesh-size” Enforcement of harvests Probability of penalty Probability of penalty Enforcement effort

  14. Model calculations(to find optimal enforcement mix) • Mathlab-code • (Mathlab: Standard general numerical package) • Have developed a stand-alone Mathlab-code • To be used on all Windows-based computers

  15. Results(Target: Harvest: 0.215 m.mt; Mesh size: 1)

  16. Optimizing surfaces

  17. Sensitivity to fines

  18. Sensitivity analysis

  19. Findings • Application of enforcement theory to real fisheries enforcement situations is quite feasible • N actions and M enforcement tools • Data is the main constraint • Benefits of enforcement may be great compared to the costs • Depends on the fishery and the fisheries management system • Optimal enforcement complicated • Few simple rules of thumb

  20. END

  21. Social benefits Private benefits Private benefits Socialbenefits Figure 3

  22. Sustainble revenues Costs Sustainble benefits Sustainble benefits(=0.1)

  23. =0.5 =1 Private Profit function Fishers would like α=0.5!

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