1 / 28

Chapter 10

Chapter 10. Chapter 10 Europe’s exchange rate question. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1999/mundell-lecture.html. Robert Mundell – Nobelprize 1999

Télécharger la présentation

Chapter 10

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Chapter 10

  2. Chapter 10 Europe’s exchange rate question

  3. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1999/mundell-lecture.htmlhttp://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1999/mundell-lecture.html • Robert Mundell – Nobelprize 1999 • "for his analysis of monetary and fiscal policy under different exchange rate regimes and his analysis of optimum currency areas"

  4. The impossible trinity • Monetary union implies a choice between exchange rate stability and monetary policy autonomy • ‘The impossible trinity’, as only 2 of the following can be in place: • Full capital mobility • Autonomous monetary policy • Fixed exchange rates

  5. The Unholy Trinity

  6. What’s On The Menu? Types of exchange rate regimes

  7. Free floating • The case of the Eurozone, the UK currency, etc • Main Advantages: • autonomous monetary policy making • protection from foreign disturbances • Issue: currency can fluctuate widely and have strong impact on exports

  8. Foreign disturbance and flexible exchange rates Interest rate LM B Foreign rate of return A IS’ IS Output Gap

  9. Other exchange rate regimes • Managed floating: avoiding the ‘fear of floating’ through occasional intervention • Target zones: wide range in which currency is allowed to move vis-à-vis anchor • Crawling pegs: sliding central parity and band of fluctuation • Fixed and adjustable: declared parity vis-à-vis anchor and the realignment option in the face of serious disturbances • Currency boards: fixed exchange rate with monetary policy dedicated entirely to exchange rate target • Dollarization/euroization: adopting a foreign currency with no monetary policy

  10. Hong Kong Currency Boad

  11. The Choice of an Exchange Rate Regime • The monetary policy instrument: • can be useful to deal with cyclical disturbances • can be misused (inflation). • The fiscal policy instrument: • can also deal with cycles but is often politicised • can be misused (public debts, political cycles).

  12. The New Debate: The Two-Corners Solution • Only pure floats or hard pegs are robust: • intermediate arrangements (soft pegs) invite government manipulations, over or under valuations and speculative attacks • pure floats remove the exchange rate from the policy domain • hard pegs are unassailable (well, until Argentina’s currency board collapsed…).

  13. Actual Exchange Rate Regimes

  14. The New Debate: The Two-Corners Solution • In line with theory: • soft pegs are half-hearted monetary policy commitments, so they ultimately fail. The World as a Monetary Union • Under metallic money (overlooking the difference between gold and silver) the whole world was really a monetary union. • Previous explicit unions only agreed on the metal content of coins to simplify everyday trading.

  15. The Gold Standard and Hume’s Mechanism • Hume’s mechanismimplies an automatic change in the money stock to achieve balance of paymentsequilibrium. Balance of payments = net increase in money supply C C  A A 0 0  B B Gold money 

  16. The Gold Standard and Hume’s Mechanism: The Trade Account • Money determines the price level (in the long run). Price level Gold money

  17. The Gold Standard and Hume’s Mechanism: The Trade Account • The price level affects the trade balance: • if domestic prices are high relative to foreign prices, we have a deficit • conversely, relatively low domestic prices lead to a trade surplus. Price level Trade deficit Trade surplus Gold money

  18. The Gold Standard and Hume’s Mechanism: The Trade Account • Trade balance is achieved when the stock of money is M1. Price level Current account deficit  P1 Current account surplus M1 Gold money

  19. The Gold Standard and Hume’s Mechanism: The Trade Account • Hume’s mechanism: return to balance is automatic: • if we start with deficit (point A, high money stock M0), money flows out until we get back to balance (M1). Price level A  Current account deficit  P1 Current account surplus M1 M0 Gold money

  20. The Gold Standard and Hume’s Mechanism: The Trade Account • Much the same story applies to the financial account: if the domestic interest rate is high (low), capital flows in (out) and the return to balance is automatic. Interest rate A Financial account surplus  i* Financial account deficit M0 M2 Gold money 0 • The balance payments adds the current and financial accounts.

  21. The Interwar Period: The Worst Of All Worlds • Paper money starts circulating widely. • Yet the authorities attempt to carry on with the gold standard but: • no agreement on how to set exchange rates between paper monies • an imbalanced starting point with war legacies • high inflation • high public debts.

  22. The Interwar Period: Three Case Studies • The UK:a refusal to devalue an overvalued currency breeds economic decline. • France: devaluation, under-valuation and beggar-thy-neighbour policies, until others retaliate and the currency becomes overvalued. • Germany: hyperinflation, devaluation and, finally, evading the choice of an appropriate exchange rate by resorting to ever-widening non-market controls.

  23. Lessons Learnt • No agreement leads to misalignments, competitive devaluations and trade wars. • Management of exchange rates can’t be left at each country’s discretion: a ‘system’ is required

  24. European Postwar Arrangements • An overriding desire for exchange rate stability: • initially provided by the Bretton Woods system • the US dollar as anchor and the IMF as conductor. • Once Bretton Woods collapsed, the Europeans were left on their own: • the timid Snake arrangement • the European Monetary System • the Monetary Union.

  25. The BrettonWoods System Collapse • Initial divergence.

  26. NOK/USD

  27. The European Monetary System: ERM and EMU • ERM – a system of jointly managed fixed and adjustable exchange rates + mutual support: • Fluctuations between +/-2.25% and +/-15% • German Mark as initial anchor • Currently: the ERM 2 system, as entry point into the monetary union • EMU since 1999 and currently with 16 members

  28. € members 2011 http://www.ecb.int/euro/intro/html/map.en.html

More Related