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Bounded Rationality in Markets (1)

Bounded Rationality in Markets (1). Bounded Rationality in Markets (2). Example: Design of Distribution Contract. Manufacturer. C = 2. W (Integrated)?. Retailer. Price(Integrated)?. Demand = 10 - price. Integrated versus Independent Channels. Integrated Independent. Manufacturer.

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Bounded Rationality in Markets (1)

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  1. Bounded Rationality in Markets (1) AMA Doctoral Consortium

  2. Bounded Rationality in Markets (2) AMA Doctoral Consortium

  3. Example: Design of Distribution Contract AMA Doctoral Consortium

  4. Manufacturer C = 2 W (Integrated)? Retailer Price(Integrated)? Demand = 10 - price Integrated versus Independent Channels Integrated Independent Manufacturer C = 2 W (Independent) ? Retailer Price(Independent) ? Demand = 10 - price AMA Doctoral Consortium

  5. Double Marginalization Problem • Price (Integrated) = 6 < Price (Independent) = 8 • Total Profit (Integrated) = 16 > Total Profit (Independent) = 12 Manufacturer C = 2 Manufacturer C = 2 W (Integrated) = 2 W (Independent) = 6 Retailer Retailer Price(Independent) = 8 Price(Integrated) = 6 Demand = 10 - Price Demand = 10 - Price AMA Doctoral Consortium

  6. Solution to Double Marginalization Problem: Two-Part Tariff (TPT) • Price (TPT) = Price (Integrated) = 6 < Price (Independent) = 8 • Total Profit (Integrated) = Total Profit (TPT) = 16 > Total Profit (Independent) = 12 Manufacturer C= 2 Manufacturer C = 2 F, W (TPT) = 2 W (Independent) = 6 Retailer Retailer Price (TPT) = 6 Price(Independent) = 8 Demand = 10 - Price Demand = 10 - Price AMA Doctoral Consortium

  7. Standard Theory and Experimental Results Significant Differences No Difference AMA Doctoral Consortium

  8. Loss Aversion and Mental Accounting • Up-front payment (F) and variable payment (w x Demand) are kept in two separate mental accounts. • F is a loss that is incurred before any sales is realized and at the point where the reference profit is zero. • Variable payment is incurred only after each unit of sales is realized. • $1 of up-front payment is equivalent to $X of variable payment • The value of $X that maximizes the likelihood of observing the data turns out to be $X =1.5 AMA Doctoral Consortium

  9. Theory with Loss Aversion and Experimental Results No Difference No Difference AMA Doctoral Consortium

  10. Necessary Conditions for Generalization to Games and Markets • Simple and precise alternative • Can be used as a productive tool to generate testable hypotheses in different settings • Explains behaviors better in existing settings • Generate interesting predictions in new market settings AMA Doctoral Consortium

  11. Key Takeaways • This emerging perspective spans traditional boundaries between consumer behavior (CB) and modeling (i.e., psychology and economics) • The goal is help you to answer the question "are you a CB person or a modeler?” with "both!" AMA Doctoral Consortium

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