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David Lemmons ECCTF Chair

David Lemmons ECCTF Chair. ECCTF Update to ISAS 01/16/2013. ECCTF Background. Motion 3: The OC supports the development of a business case evaluating an ECC tool (such business case subject to future approval by the OC) with the following capabilities.

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David Lemmons ECCTF Chair

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  1. David LemmonsECCTF Chair ECCTF Update to ISAS 01/16/2013

  2. ECCTF Background Motion 3: The OC supports the development of a business case evaluating an ECC tool (such business case subject to future approval by the OC) with the following capabilities. • The ability to unload overloaded BES elements. • The ability to identify every significant contributor to BES facility or path loading, including contributing schedules and contributing generation. • The ability to be predictive in nature. • The ability to integrate load and generation forecasts into the solutions. • The ability to calculate Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs) and Outage Transfer Distribution Factors (OTDFs) based on real-time conditions. • The creation and seamless integration with a centralized outage management tool. • The ability to add system elements as needed in real-time for analysis and possible mitigation. • The ability to ensure Transmission Priority is used in conjunction with TDFs for schedule curtailments. • The ability to incorporate sub-hourly schedules.

  3. ECCTF Background • Explanation: The OC agreed with the ECC Task Force that the tool should be examined, but required that a business case addressing the need for a tool, a detailed specification, and a detailed budget and personnel estimate be brought back to the OC for review and approval. • This charter was given to ECCTF at the March 28, 2012 OC meeting. • The original motion (Motion 2) to approve the budget for the ECC failed by two votes: • Yes votes = 19 • No votes = 21

  4. Change in Process • The WECC RC has determined that it needs the ECC. • The RC will be leading the effort and not the WECC Standing Committees • Primary difference is who will provide justification and to what level the Standing Committees will have input into the need for the tool. • WECC Stakeholder input is still requested and desired by the RC. • Stakeholder input will be more focused on the commercial impacts of the tool, not the justification or cost of the tool.

  5. New Landscape Several key industry developments that have occurred since the 3/28/2012 OC meeting have changed the landscape with regard to the ECC: • On 5/1/2012 FERC and NERC issued the report entitled “Arizona – Southern California Outages on September 8th, 2011” • On 7/20/2012 WECC issued a White Paper entitled “High Level Summary of September 8, 2011 Pacific Southwest Outage Survey Results” • On 7/26/2012 Gerry Cauley, President and CEO of NERC issued a letter to Mark Maher, President and CEO of WECC, in response to the White Paper • On 9/13/2012 Gerry Cauley, President and CEO of NERC issued a letter to Mark Maher, President and CEO of WECC summarizing NERC’s comments on WECC’s Preliminary Response to the “Arizona-Southern California Outages on September 8, 2011” report • Recently issued RC Procedures and RC initiatives will result in significant changes in operations

  6. New Landscape – Sept 8th Report • Finding 11 – Lack of Real-Time External Visibility: Affected TOPs have limited real-time visibility outside their systems, typically monitoring only one external bus. As a result, they lack adequate situational awareness of external contingencies that could impact their systems. They also may not fully understand how internal contingencies could affect SOLs in their neighbors’ systems. • Recommendation 11: TOPs should engage in more real-time data sharing to increase their visibility and situational awareness of external contingencies that could impact the reliability of their systems. They should obtain sufficient data to monitor significant external facilities in real time, especially those that are known to have a direct bearing on the reliability of their system, and properly assess the impact of internal contingencies on the SOLs of other TOPs. In addition, TOPs should review their real-time monitoring tools, such as State Estimator and RTCA, to ensure that such tools represent critical facilities needed for the reliable operation of the BPS. • ECC would provide enhanced reliability and situational awareness by quantifying schedule and generation impacts on BES Facilities and paths.

  7. New Landscape – Sept 8th Report • Finding 12 – Inadequate Real-Time Tools: Affected TOPs’ real-time tools are not adequate or, in one case, operational to provide the situational awareness necessary to identify contingencies and reliably operate their systems. • Recommendation 12: TOPs should take measures to ensure that their real-time tools are adequate, operational, and run frequently enough to provide their operators the situational awareness necessary to identify and plan for contingencies and reliably operate their systems. • The ECC represents a mechanism that will implement necessary pre-contingency curtailments that are aimed at ensuring BES reliability.

  8. New Landscape – Sept 8th Report • Finding 13 – Reliance on Post-Contingency Mitigation Plans: One affected TOP operated in an unsecured N-1 state on September 8, 2011, when it relied on post-contingency mitigation plans for its internal contingencies and subsequent overload and tripping, while assuming there would be sufficient time to mitigate the contingencies... • Recommendation 13: TOPs should review existing operating processes and procedures to ensure that post-contingency mitigation plans reflect the time necessary to take mitigating actions, including control actions, to return the system to a secure N-1 state as soon as possible but no longer than 30 minutes following a single contingency. As part of this review, TOPs should consider the effect of relays that automatically isolate facilities without providing operators sufficient time to take mitigating measures. • The ECC represents a mechanism that will implement pre-contingency schedule curtailments necessary to ensure that the mitigation is adequately and equitably sustained throughout the duration of the congestion event.

  9. New Landscape – Sept 8th Report • Finding 14 WECC RC Staffing Concerns: WECC RC staffs a total of four operators at any one time to meet the functional requirements of an RC, including continuous monitoring, conducting studies, and giving directives. The September 8th event raises concerns that WECC RC’s staffing is not adequate to respond to emergency conditions. • Recommendation 14: WECC RC should evaluate the effectiveness of its staffing level, training and tools. Based on the results of this evaluation, it should determine what actions are necessary to perform its functions appropriately as the RC and address any identified deficiencies. • The ECC represents a significant step forward in the RC’s toolkit for managing congestion and mitigating SOL and IROL exceedances in the Western Interconnection.

  10. New Landscape – the 7/26 Letter • NERC believes that the September 8th event along with the WECC White Paper are indicative of “underlying systemic or institutional issues with the management of reliable interconnected operations and planning, and with the culture of reliability in the Western Interconnection.” • Key bullet points of Systemic/institutional issue #1: • 1. WECC Reliability Coordinator Tools, Authorities, Capabilities and Support • Ensure sufficient staff resources, tools, and training. • Ensure reliability coordinator has situational awareness of the entire bulk electric system in the Western Interconnection • Benchmark reliability coordinator capabilities and performance compared to other reliability coordinators. • The ECC represents a tool to increase situational awareness of the entire BES. The Eastern Interconnection has the IDC; the West has webSAS.

  11. New Landscape – the 9/13 Letter • “First and foremost, I want to encourage you to continue to enhance the capabilities of the WECC Reliability Coordinator function. I see this as one of the more critical elements in addressing the reliability issues faced in the West, and believe that the enhancement of that function should move forward independent of your consideration of governance and institutional issues.” • NERC suggests that you also review the concept of Path Ratings and whether, as the Western Interconnection has become more highly interconnected, the Path Rating and Path Operator concept, along with the use of nomograms, still has merit for real-time operations. Other Interconnections do determine Flowgate limits for purposes of interchange scheduling, but rely more fully on RTCA for real-time operating reliability. • The ECC is the tool that links interchange schedules to real-time operations. No such link exists without the ECC.

  12. RC Procedure Development • From the WECC RC Communication Protocol Procedure, version 4.0, issued 9/21/2012:

  13. What we do know • The following data are already available to WECC RC: • Node-breaker West-wide System Model (WSM) • Real-time Transmission and Generation outages in WSM • Scheduled Transmission and Generation outages in COS • Interchange Schedule (through WIT) • Load Forecast • The data above are more than sufficient to start a “congestion management tool” • Some data are available and some are not (such as generation merit order data). But these data are not critically needed to perform congestion management. (e.g. Eastern Interconnection does not have this data, but yet can still perform congestion management). • All congestion management needs to involve some type of generation redispatch.

  14. What we do know • There are two working approaches in other Interconnections: • Approach #1: Tag/Schedule based curtailment (Utilized in WECC and Eastern Interconnection) • Approach #2: Market based generation redispatch (Utilized in Texas Interconnection) • These two approaches are not mutually exclusive; however, without a centralized market, approach #1 is required. • For example: in Eastern Interconnection, Tag/Schedule curtailment are still needed even though there are many market based ISO. • Why re-invent the wheel ? • We still need to have Tag/Schedule curtailment • Schedule curtailment will not go away even there is an Energy Imbalance Market in WECC (e.g. SWPP still has Tag/Schedule curtailment)

  15. Questions?

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