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Introduction to Biases and Mindsets: Understanding Perception and Cognitive Biases

This module provides an overview of cognitive biases, their implications on analysis, and the influence of mindsets. It covers the types of biases, dangers and benefits, principles of perception, and how biases impact decision-making.

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Introduction to Biases and Mindsets: Understanding Perception and Cognitive Biases

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  1. ANSK2001 Critical Thinking Structured Analysis Module 1, Lesson 1: An Introduction to Biases and Mindsets (Instructor: Unhide All Slides for Display.) UNCLASSIFIED

  2. What do we see here? (Source undetermined.) UNCLASSIFIED

  3. What do we see here? (Source undetermined.) UNCLASSIFIED

  4. Module 1, Lesson 1 Objectives At the end of today’s class you will be able to: • Define cognitive (inherited, not learned) bias and the implications of biases on analysis. • Identify types of cognitive biases. • Describe the inherent dangers/benefits of biases and the difficulty of compensating for perceptual biases. • Describe the characteristics and three principles of perception. UNCLASSIFIED

  5. Module 1, Lesson 1 Objectives • Describe how analysts fall prey to absence of evidence biases. • Describe how anchoring impacts analytical decision-making. • Describe how a target can use assimilation biases to deceive. • Describe how analysts unwittingly use confirmation bias to support early assessments. • Describe mirror imaging. UNCLASSIFIED

  6. Module 1, Lesson 1 Objectives • Define mindsets, how they are derived, and how they influence analysis • Describe how cultural, personal, and organizational mindsets impact analysis. UNCLASSIFIED

  7. Agenda • Define Terms of Reference • Examine Cognitive Biases • Consider Implications • Provoke Discussion UNCLASSIFIED

  8. Pictures from a Greek Newsmagazine • 15 July 2001 Image Source: FBIS UNCLASSIFIED

  9. Pictures from a Greek Newsmagazine • 22 July 2001 Image Source: FBIS UNCLASSIFIED

  10. Pictures from a Greek Newsmagazine • 2 Aug 2001 Image Source: FBIS UNCLASSIFIED

  11. Pictures from a Greek Newsmagazine • 19 Aug 2001 Image Source: FBIS UNCLASSIFIED

  12. Pictures from a Greek Newsmagazine • 26 Aug 2001 Image Source: FBIS UNCLASSIFIED

  13. Pictures from a Greek Newsmagazine • 9 Sept 2001 Image Source: FBIS UNCLASSIFIED

  14. What do these pictures seem to predict? • 16 Sept 2001 Image Source: FBIS UNCLASSIFIED

  15. What do we know? • What do we know? • What do we assume? • What do we infer? Image Source: FBIS UNCLASSIFIED

  16. What’s a Bias? • A preference or inclination, especially one that inhibits impartial judgment; prejudice. • [Generally] defined as ‘uninformed or unintentional inclination’; as such it may operate either for or against someone or something. • American Heritage Dictionary, 2nd College Edition, 1982 UNCLASSIFIED

  17. Types of Cognitive Biases • Perception • Absence of Evidence • Anchoring • Assimilation/Accommodation • Confirmation UNCLASSIFIED

  18. Question • Which is more likely to cause death in the United States — being killed by falling airplane parts or by a shark? UNCLASSIFIED

  19. AnswerThis is an example of vividness bias, part of perception bias. • In the United States, the chance of dying from falling airplane parts is 30 times greater than dying from a shark attack. • Newsweek, 1994 UNCLASSIFIED

  20. Perceptual Biases • We take our perception of the world for granted…If someone else points out that our perceptions may be wrong, we may intellectually admit the possibility but continue to act as though our perception were true…It is precisely in this feeling of certainty that the danger lies. • Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968) UNCLASSIFIED

  21. Dangers?Benefits? UNCLASSIFIED

  22. Perception • A process of inference. • An active rather than a passive process. • Implies understanding as well as awareness. • A critical human process: • Links people to their world; • Essential for understanding the world. UNCLASSIFIED

  23. Three Principles of Perception • We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive. • It takes more information, and more unambiguous information, to recognize an unexpected phenomenon than an expected one. • Mindsets tend to be quick to form, but resistant to change. • New information is assimilated to existing images. • Initial exposure to blurred or ambiguous stimuli interferes with accurate perception even after more and better information becomes available. UNCLASSIFIED

  24. Pay close attention to the screen UNCLASSIFIED

  25. 5 A 7 7 5 A 5 3 5 3 UNCLASSIFIED

  26. Pay close attention to the screen How many cards were Hearts? Was there anything unusual about the cards? Please write down your answers. UNCLASSIFIED

  27. 5 A 7 7 5 A 5 3 5 3 Is this what you saw? • Again, we see what we expect to see. UNCLASSIFIED

  28. Absence of Evidence Biases • Evidence not available to analysts tends to be ignored even if its absence is known. • Analysts do not even question whether the absence of certain evidence is normal or an indicator in itself. • Analysts tend to forget that what they do not know may be more important than what they do know. UNCLASSIFIED

  29. Anchoring • Anchoring involves the (often unwitting) use of arbitrary values in decision-making. • Analysts will unwittingly use the conclusions developed by others as anchors. • Ensures errors already committed are perpetuated. • Anchoring involves the (often unwitting) use of arbitrary values in decision-making. • Analysts will unwittingly use the conclusions developed by others as anchors. • Ensures errors already committed are perpetuated. UNCLASSIFIED

  30. Question • A piece of paper is folded in half. It is folded in half again, and again….After 100 folds, how thick will it be? UNCLASSIFIED

  31. Assimilation Bias • It is far easier to lead a target astray by reinforcing the target’s existing beliefs, thus causing the target to ignore the contrary evidence of one’s true intent, than to persuade a target to change his…mind. • Richards S. Heuer, Jr. UNCLASSIFIED

  32. Question • How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the ark? (Source undetermined.) UNCLASSIFIED

  33. Confirmation Bias • Analysts typically undervalue or ignore evidence that contradicts an early judgment about something. • As additional evidence is considered — even contradictory evidence, the level of confidence held by those analysts about that judgment stays the same or increases. • Indicators selected as being valid tend to be those that confirm already held hypotheses and not the ones with the most diagnostic authority. UNCLASSIFIED

  34. Confirmation Bias and the U.S.S. Vincennes • On 3 July 1988 Aegis operators aboard the U.S.S. Vincennes decided early that an approaching Iranian aircraft was hostile. • Evidence that contradicted this hypothesis was discounted or ignored. • The Aegis system provided evidence that indicated the Iranian airplane was a civilian aircraft even though it did not respond to IFF. • The original hypothesis was not challenged • Short decision time discouraged this. • Recent attack on the U.S.S. Stark increase analyst fears. • Aircraft shot down with civilian loss of life. • M. Tolcott, F. Marvin, T. Bresnick, “The Confirmation Bias in Military Situation Assessment,” Proceedings, 58th MORSS, June 1990, 181-189. UNCLASSIFIED

  35. Confirmation Bias: What the Navy Said • “The mind may reject incongruent data and facillitate misperception which promote (sic) internal consistency.” • U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, 1988, First Endorsement on Rear Admiral Fogarty’s letter of 28 July 1988, Subject: Formal Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988. UNCLASSIFIED

  36. Cultural and Personal Learned Biases • Mirror-Imaging • Presumption of Unitary Action by Organization UNCLASSIFIED

  37. Organizational Biases • Excessive Secrecy (Compartmentation) • Group-Think • Organizational parochialism UNCLASSIFIED

  38. Wishful Thinking (Pollyanna Complex) • Based on a character developed by Eleanor Porter and made into a Disney movie. • Eternally Optimistic • Everything will always turn out for the best. • Only looks at the positive. • Ignores anything that might be negative. UNCLASSIFIED

  39. Worst-Case Scenario (Cassandra Complex) • Daughter of Priam, King of Troy • Cursed by the gods to always prophesy the truth. • But never to be believed. • Everything will always turn out for the worst. • Only looks at the negative. • Only considers the worst-case scenario. • Ignores anything that might be positive. • Cries Wolf and is not believed. UNCLASSIFIED

  40. What are Mindsets? • Patterns of expectations that predispose one to think in certain ways. • Distillation of analyst’s cumulative factual and conceptual knowledge into a framework. • Used for making estimative judgments on complex subjects. UNCLASSIFIED

  41. Impact of Analyst Reliance on Mindset • In strategic intelligence estimation, analysts’ mindsets derive from • Complexity • Ambiguity Force us to develop rules-of-thumb • Deadlines • Mindsets affect how predictions are made and viewed. • Analysts working tough issues skimp on • Evaluating evidence • Challenging assumptions • Seeking alternative explanations UNCLASSIFIED

  42. One Mindset • A totalitarian government enjoying the support of effective military and security organizations cannot be overthrown by popular opinion. • When the position of a dictatorial ruler is threatened, he will defend his position with force if necessary. • The principal threat to friendly governments comes from the left, not the right. UNCLASSIFIED

  43. Intelligence Implications… • The process is consistently biased, and…bias is the cornerstone of intelligence failures. • Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack, 85 • Our mental processes are surely among the most important and the most difficult to deal with. • Richards Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis • [Intelligence analysts] are supposed to have had more training in the techniques of guarding against their own intellectual frailties. Policing their inescapable irrationalities is a twenty-four-hours-per-day task. • Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy UNCLASSIFIED

  44. So What? • Professional Implications • As intelligence analysts we need to guard against biases coloring the results of our work. • Biases and mindsets lead to intelligence failures. • When we’re wrong, people die. • Assumption: Avoiding intelligence failures is desirable. UNCLASSIFIED

  45. Module 1, Lesson 1 Review • Define cognitive (inherited, not learned) bias and the implications of biases on analysis. • Identify types of cognitive biases. • Describe the inherent dangers/benefits of biases and the difficulty of compensating for perceptual biases. • Describe the characteristics and three principles of perception. • Describe how analysts fall prey to absence of evidence biases. • Describe how anchoring impacts analytical decision-making. • Describe how a target can use assimilation biases to deceive. • Describe how analysts unwittingly use confirmation bias to support early assessments. • Define mindsets, how they are derived, and how they influence analysis • Describe how cultural, personal, and organizational mindsets impact analysis. UNCLASSIFIED

  46. QUESTIONS UNCLASSIFIED

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