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Payment systems

Payment systems. Aalto University , autumn 2011. Outline. Money transfer Card payments Anonymous payments. MOney transfer. Common payment systems. Cash Electronic credit transfer Direct debit, e- lasku Check Credit card Cash transfer Mobile payment Anonymous payment

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Payment systems

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  1. Payment systems Aalto University, autumn 2011

  2. Outline • Money transfer • Card payments • Anonymous payments

  3. MOney transfer

  4. Common payment systems • Cash • Electronic credit transfer • Direct debit, e-lasku • Check • Credit card • Cash transfer • Mobile payment • Anonymous payment Which are regulated?

  5. Electronic credit transfer • Also called bank transfer, wire transfer • Payment process (e.g. UK CHAPS): • Clearing: if the payment is between two banks, the sending bank sends the information to a central processor, which keeps track of payments • Settlement: transfer of funds between the central-bank reserve accounts of the two banks at the end of the day for the balance of all transactions that day ( risk to central bank or receiving bank if a sending bank fails) • Float: money between being debited from the sender’s bank account and credited to the receiver’s account  banks gain interest on float  payments take days even when no technical reason • Finality varies for sender, banks and receiver • Most electronic transfers immediately final to sender and bank, not receiver • Direct debit in Finland final for sender; SEPA direct debit will be reversible Sender Sending bank Central processor Receiving bank Receiver float Timeline Sender makes payment Clearing Settlementbetween banks Funds available to receiver

  6. [classhelper.org] Check • Check payment: • Payer writes the check • Clearing: payee deposits the check, bank collects payment, paying bank inspect the check for authenticity and sufficient funds • Settlement: transfer of funds between banks • Float: in some countries, funds are available soon after deposit, before clearing and settlement  payee effective gets an interest-free loan float Timeline Clearing Settlementbetween banks Payee depositscheck Payer writes check Funds available to payee

  7. Credit card • Credit card issuer takes a ~2-5% transaction fee from seller • Buyer protection: issuer takes some of the risk • Initial 30–60 days interest-free credit for buyer • Kickbacks to some buyers • Transaction final after 90 days more certainly than in bank transfer interest-free Timeline Transaction final Funds available to seller Creditcard purchase Buyermay paybalance

  8. Cash transfers • Western Union, MoneyGram: money transfer for people without bank accounts • Sender pays cash at one branch office; receiver gets the cash at another branch office • Used mostly by migrants to send money to 3rd-world countries • Receiver must have id card or answer test question • Example: NAME: MICHAEL SMITHADDRESS: 144 EAST STREET LAGOS TEST QUESTION: WHAT IS THE DOGS NAMEANSWER: SPOT • Hawala: informal network of agents based on Islamic law or honor system • Problems with money laundering legislation

  9. Issues with float • Victim receives a check or credit card details; ships goods before payment clears • Victim receives a check; funds available before the check clears; victim makes an irreversible payment (e.g. refunds all or part of the money) Timeline Victim shipsgoods Check found to be false or no funds reversed Victim depositscheck Scammerwrites false check Funds available to victim Timeline Check found to be false or no funds reversed Victim depositscheck Scammerwrites false check Funds available to victim Victim returns (part of) the money Funds available to scammer

  10. Issues with float • Victim receives a reversible payment; victim makes an irreversible payment Timeline Muleasked to repay Criminal (e.gphisher) makes a moneytransfer Funds available to mule Mule makes payment Funds available to scammer

  11. Mobile payment • Replacing banks in countries where branch network is sparse and carrying cash unsafe • M-PESA in Kenya • MTN Mobile Money in South Africa • Implemented with SMS and SIM-Toolkit • PIN and some kind of symmetric crypto • Deposit and withdrawal at agent offices • Money transfer and bill payment with phone • SMS money transfer to unregistered users • Anyone can just start using the service; some limits relaxed if strong authentication with id card • Nokia Money in India • App on phone, not bound to SIM

  12. PayPal • Payment between registered accounts on central server • Used for Internet purchases especially on auction web sites • Depends on credit cards and banks accounts for deposit and withdrawal • Payer and payee can remain pseudonymous • Stronger traceability of verified accounts • Links user to a bank account

  13. Card payment

  14. Mag-stripe bank cards • Magnetic stripe contains primary account number (PAN), name, expiration date, service code, PVKI, PVV, CVV1 • Signature and (sometimes) id card required at point of sale (POS) • PIN required by automated teller machines (ATM) and some POS • PIN is a function of data on mag stripe and key in terminal  offline PIN verification at POS or ATM • Possible to copy data on the mag stripe • CVV1 is a cryptographic MAC of the PAN, name, expiration and service code (based on 3DES) • Offiline terminal has a security module to store the card and PIN verification keys • CVV2 to make online fraud harder • 3-4 digits printed on card but not on mag stripe • Required for online (card not present) transactions • Not stored by merchant after online verification • Vulnerable to online phishing

  15. Visa PIN verification • Input from magnetic stripe: • Primary account number (PAN) i.e. 15-digit card number • PIN verification key indicator (PVKI, one digit 1..6) • PIN verification value (PVV, 4 decimal characters) • Verifier must have • PIN verification key (PVK, 128-bit 3DES key) • PVKI is an index for PVK to enable PVK changes • Create security parameter (TSP): • Concatenate 11 rightmost digits of PAN, PVKI and PIN • The 16-digit concatenation is one hexadecimal DES block • PVV generation: • 3DES encryption of TSP with the key PVK • Decimalization of the encryption result to 4-digit PVV • Decimalization happens by taking the 4 leftmost digits 0..9 from the hexadecimal encrypted block • If less than 4 such digits, take 4 first digits A..F and map A=0,B=1,C=3... [For details see IBM]

  16. Chip-and-PIN bank cards • EMV standard (Europay, Mastercard, Visa) • Smartcardchip (ICC) on the bank card • Tamperproof ICC stodes a cryptographic signature key • Card also contains a certificate • Three levels of secure tranactions: • Static data authentication (SDA): • Certificate verification (not used in ATMs) • Dynamic data authentication (DDA): • Card signs a random challenge sent by terminal • Combined DDA and application cryptogram (CDA): • Card signs transaction details incl. random challenge • Card holder authenticated with PIN or signature

  17. EMV security issues • Not possible to copy the chip • Mag stripe can still be copied  Possible to create a copy with “broken” chip or use at offline POS in the US • Stripe data is also readable from the chip • PIN used frequently  easier to capture

  18. Anonymous payments

  19. Anonymous digital cash • David Chaum 1982, later DigiCash product — never really used but an influential idea • Participants: bank, buyer Alice, merchant Bob • Anonymous: • Bank cannot link issued and deposited coins, not even with Bob’s help • Not transferable: must be deposited to bank after one use • Uses blind signatures: bank signs coins without seeing their contents  cannot link events of coin issuing and use 1. Bank issues coin 3. Bob deposits coin Bank Alice buyer Bob merchant 2. Alice spends coin

  20. Anonymous digital cash • Blind signature: Bank has an RSA signature key pair key (e,d,n) for signing 1€ coins (and different keys for 10€, 100€,...) • Alice creates a coin from random “serial number” SN and redundant padding required for RSA signature; Alice generates a random number R, computes coin ⋅ Re mod n, and sends this to the bank • Bank computes (coin ⋅ Re)d mod n = coind ⋅ R mod n and sends this to Alice • Alice divides with R to get the signed coin coind mod n  Bank has signed the coin without seeing it and cannot link the coin to Alice • Alice can pay 1€ to Bob by giving to coin to him • Bob deposits coin to bank; bank checks signature and only accepts the same coin once • Problem: Cheaters are anonymous; if someone pays the same coin to two merchants, how to know who it was?

  21. Anonymous digital cash • Double-spending detection: • Alice must set SN = h( h(N) | h(N xor “Alice”) ) where N random • After Alice has given the coin to Bob, Bob asks Alice to reveal one of h(N),N xor “Alice” or N,h(N xor “Alice”)  If Alice spends the coin twice, she reveals her name with 50% probability • Make each 1€ coin of k separately signed sub-coins  detection probability p = 1-2-k • Coins will be quite large: k=128 with 2048-bit RSA signatures is 32kB/coin • Q: But how to force Alice to create SN this way? How can bank check the contents of the message when she signs blindly? • Cut and choose: • Alice creates kpairs of sub-coins for signing • Bank asks Alice to reveal N for one sub-coin in each pair and signs the other one  cheating detection probability p = 1-2-k • Alice can make anonymous payments but will be caught with probability p = 1-2-k if she tries to create an invalid coin or spend the same coin twice

  22. Reading material • Ross Anderson: Security Engineering, 2nd ed., chapter 10 • Interesting reading online: • http://thescambaiter.com/ (warning: site contains some offensive language) • University of Cambridge Security Group: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/banking/

  23. Exercises • What are the main threats in • online card transactions? • POS transactions? • ATM cash withdrawals? What differences are there in the way credit cards and bank debit cards address these threats? • Could you (technically) use bank cards or credit cards • as door keys? • as bus tickets? • for strong identification of persons on the Internet? • How could a malicious merchant perform a man-in-the-middle attack against chip-and-PIN transactions? • When a fraudulent bank transaction occurs, who will suffer the losses? Find out about the regulation and contractual rules on such liability. • Bank security is largely based on anomaly detection and risk mitigation. In what ways could a bank reduce the risk of fraud in mag-stipe or chip-and-PIN payments? • Even though DigiCash coins are unlinkable, what ways are there for the merchant or bank (or them together) to find out what Alice buys?

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