SHIP TO SHIP (STS) TRANSFER OF CARGO: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AND OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT

1. SHIP TO SHIP (STS) TRANSFER OF CARGO: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AND OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT N.P. Ventikos1 , D.I. Stavrou2 National Technical University of AthensSchool of Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering 1. Assistant Professor, Laboratory for Maritime Transport, School of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, NTUA 2. PhD Candidate, Laboratory for Maritime Transport, School of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, NTUA

2. OUTLINE STS transfer operation 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

3. INTODUCTION • Significant development due to: • Operational factors (optimization of the distribution plan) • Trading factors (offshore storage - contango situation) 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

4. INTRODUCTION • AIM OF THIS STUDY : • Describe the latest developments, • Preliminary risk analysis/assessment of the procedure, • Importance of lessons learnt from case studies • PhD: development of a dynamic risk framework for STS transfers. 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

5. INTRODUCTION Petroleum products (Usaly) STS transfer of cargo Ore lightering (Rarely) LNG, LPG transfer (Under development) 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

6. INTRODUCTION • Initially used on the decade of 1960s in the Gulf of Mexico. • Transfer of cargo between seagoing ships positioned alongside. • “Constant heading vessel” moves on a study direction with slow speed, while the other ship called “maneuvering vessel” approach the first ship • Objective cause for both ships is to come on parallel courses with similar speed and their manifolds in line so to continue with the transfer procedure. • Stationary or underway. • “Lightering” transshipment from a larger ship to a smaller one or “Reverse Lightering” transshipment vice versa 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

7. PHASES OF A STS TRANSFER OPERATION 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

8. LEGISLATIVE REGIME FOR STS OPERATIONS • The STS transfer operations were initially based on guidelines or recommendations made primarily from: • ICS • OCIMF • IMO • Although few accidents or spills, public concerns about consequences of oil spills led to the adoption of international regulations • First significant action: • Addition of Chapter 8 to MARPOL Annex I of the Protocol of 1978 related to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships. 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

9. LEGISLATIVE REGIME FOR STS OPERATIONS • The IMO resolution MEPC 186(59)/2009 entered into force on April 1st, 2012 and it comprises three regulations of interest; • Regulation 40. Scope of Application: • Apply to oil tankers above 150 GT • exceptions: Bunkering, FPSOs & FSUs, offshore platforms, warships. • Regulation 41. General Rules on Safety and Environmental Protection: • STS operation Plan • Qualified Person in Overall Advisory Control (POAC) • Records for inspection. • Regulation 42. Notification: • Applies to territorial waters/ EEZ • notification to the Party 48 hours prior to the operation. 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

10. FACTORS THAT AFFECT AN STS TRANSFER OPERATION The development of an STS transfer operation depends on different factors: •The vessels and their technical specifications(dimensions, compatibility issues, propulsion installations, mooring and anchorage equipment etc.). •The human factor (master’s experience, training skills and qualifications, preparation of the crew for emergency conditions etc.). •The special STS equipment (transfer hoses, fenders etc.). 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

11. FACTORS THAT AFFECT AN STS TRANSFER OPERATION •The Person of the Overall Advisory Control (POAC) and his assistants; complete the operation safely and in accordance with the regulations set by IMO; criteria to abort/suspend the operation. •Other external factors such as the selected transfer area (traffic density, geological factors, security threat, underwater pipelines and/or cables, water depth), prevalling weather and environmental conditions (sea state, wind, tidal currents, visibility etc.). Emergency STS transfer in the strong wind conditions and 2m swells 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

12. FACTORS THAT AFFECT AN STS TRANSFER OPERATION Coastal Authorities POAC Supervise/control the STS operation Responsible for the Ship/Ship Interface Master of constant heading vessel Responsible for his own vessel Master of maneuvering vessel Responsible for his own vessel Vessel Crew Vessel Crew STS Superintendent STS Superintendent

13. RISK ASSESSMENT OF AN STS TRANSFER OPERATION 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

14. RISK ASSESSMENT OF AN STS TRANSFER OPERATION minimum level of absolute risk • Analysis conducted in 2004; • 1,270 STS transfer operations; • a time window of 10 years • No major pollution incident; • Oil leakage in 7 cases (5.5‰) from which only two ended up to the sea. • Minor collisions was 11.81 cases per 1000 operations • Major collisions was 1.57 cases per 1000 operations. • One fatality and one crew injury occurred. • A rate of 3.6 accidents /year 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

15. LESSONS LEARNED FROM STS ACCIDENTS Case 1: Collision between VLCC and Aframax tanker at the beginning of STS procedure Case 2: Collision between two Aframax oil tankers at the end of the STS procedure

16. CASE 1: COLLISION AT THE BEGINNING OF STS PROCEDURE Narrative Two tankers conducted “run-in” procedure for STS operation; helmsman (maneuv. vessel) on the wheel for 1 ½ hours. Operationduring the night. Poor exterior helm repeater illumination. When manifolds came in line the superintendent used steering orders to do final approach. The maneuvering vessel start swing towards to the constant heading vessel. The superintendent tried to correct the movement. He then noticed that the indicator of the helm was on the opposite direction to the one he ordered. The two ships collided. Wrong impression for steering orders

17. CASE 1: COLLISION AT THE BEGINNING OF STS PROCEDURE Investigation analysis • Delay of the initiation led STS to be conducted in darkness. That had adverse affection on the procedure. • Poor visibility of the helm indicator in the wing bridge caused lack of control at the executed orders. • Superintendent was not checking if his orders were executed correctly. • Helmsman was executing orders to keep courses for 1 1/2h and during final approach he had to adjust to a different situation in which he had to execute specific helms angle. This led to a lapse of concentration.

18. CASE 1: COLLISION AT THE BEGINNING OF STS PROCEDURE Lessons learnt • It is of upmost importance to use persons with special qualifications when difficult operations are conducted including “run-in” or mooring procedures. • The fatigue of the personnel must be taken under serious consideration. • It is preferred that STS transfer operations are conducted with day light. • Bridge instrumentation must be inspected and remedy measures must be taken.

19. CASE 2: COLLISION AT THE END OF STS PROCEDURE Narrative After STS operation completed the ships started procedure so to separate. While moving with 2.5 knots, the last lines slipped, causing movement of the stern of one vessel close towards the other. To correct movement superintendent used propulsion and steering orders. However, the engine did not start. Efforts of the superintendent to avoid collision between the ships using consecutive steering orders were ineffectual; the ships collided Engine fail to start

20. CASE 2: COLLISION AT THE END OF STS PROCEDURE Investigation analysis • Main cause of the collision was the engines failure. • The personnel of the engine room were not aware of the emergency procedures when the engine fails to start. • Internal poor communications led to the delay of the relay of the engines problem from the officer on bridge to the superintendent; • Superintendent had conducted 8 consecutive STS operations. Fatigue may have affected him adversely.

21. CASE 2: COLLISION AT THE END OF STS PROCEDURE Lessons learnt • Unmooring procedure has many navigational hazards that must be very carefully examined. • Communication between MCR-Bridge, and Bridge-superintendent is vital to avoid difficult situations. • Training of crew for emergency procedures is very important. Exercises should be conducted prior STS. • The long-time duration of STS transfer procedures in combination with the consecutive operations may adverse superintendent’s ability and alertness (human fatigue).

22. CONCLUSIONS • IMO resolution MEPC 186(59)/2009 gives to tanker vessels the full operational responsibility of an STS transfer operation. • amendment of the respective IMO resolution so to conclude gas and chemical products. • The law allows masters to perform as superintendents. It seems appropriate to keep the two roles separated and not to cause additional problems with aforementioned combination. • The factor of human fatigue seems to be determinant in the occurrence and escalation of accidents. 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

23. CONCLUSIONS • Use of tugs; if tugs are not available then mooring and unmooring is better to happen underway. • The success of an STS transfer operation is based on the experience of the POAC/superintendent and the masters as well as on the good training of the personnel involved. • Guides and practices are to be revised and amended taking into account the lessons learned from the recorded accidents. 4th Int. Symposium of MASSEP.

24. THANK U!! D.I. Stavrou, N. P. Ventikos. STS transfer operation between three ships underway at Skagen reef in Denmark