Securing a balance in interethnic relations:

1. Securing a balance in interethnic relations: regional autonomies the state integrity and the rights of ethnic minorities Russian Science Foundation (project №15-18-00034) 2015-2017

2. Research team Perm National Research State University (Russia) 15 Bukireva St, Perm, 614990 Russia PetrPanov, project coordinator, panov@petr@gmail.com Oleg Podvintsev Konstantin Sulimov Andrey Semenov LubovFadeeva NadezhdaBorisova EleonoraMinaeva LidiyaBorodina EugeniyaPhilippova Inna Vakina

3. The purpose of the project The project aims at identifying conditions of ethnic autonomy’s effectiveness in achieving and maintaining a balance in interethnic relations, securing the state integrity and the rights of ethnic minorities

4. Research problem • Ethnic regional autonomy is assumed in contemporary world as one of the most common way to prevent, manage and resolve inter-ethnic conflicts. • Nevertheless, as the world experience argues, while in some cases offering ethnic group regional autonomy has a conflict-preventing and conflict-resolution impact, in others it leads to an escalation of the conflict. • Consequently, the effectivenessof ethnic regional autonomy depends on whether it is able to maintain a balance in inter-ethnic relations and to avoid ethnic conflicts.

5. Research problem Two main dimensions of a balance: • State Integrity: Ethnic regional autonomy is a kind of a compromise between the claims of a certain ethnic group to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity of the state. • Ethnic Minorities Rights: Ethnic regional autonomy should maintain a balance between different ethnic groups within the region, since in contrast to “national-cultural autonomy” it is granted to ethnically defined territorial unit of the state, not to ethnic group as such. The main question is what conditions facilitate the effectiveness of regional autonomies in securing a balance in interethnic relations.

6. Theoretical model 1. Ethnic regional autonomy 1) Self-government (self-rule) regime in the sub-national unit: there is a meaningful and active regional executive organ that carries out core competencies of the state 2) Ethnicity: stressing a certain ethnic group(s) that is (are) the “titular” group(s) for the regional unit • Access to power (actual influence on the decision-making) – either naturally or by means of special arrangements • Representation – government positions are perceived in ethnic sense 3) Asymmetry is a special (mostly privileged) position of the unit in comparison to other sub-national units of the same level. • In unitary states: a special autonomous status of the unit (Scotland in the UK, Corse in France, Aland in Finland, etc.) • In ethnofederations: in contrast to classical symmetric federations, ethnically based entities, as a rule, have more self-rule than those units that are not ethnically based (Russia, Canada, India) • Symmetry is possible if all the federation units are ethnically based (Belgium, Ethiopia, B&G)

7. Theoretical model 2. Preferential policies - a set of provisions of special preferences (privileges, quotas, affirmative action, etc.) for both ethnic autonomous region and ethnic groups (D. Horowitz). For example: • In the field of cultural policy - preferences in the use of language in education. • In economic sphere – preferences in the allocation of resources (tax, special rights to use the natural resources of the region). • In politics - some arrangements that guarantee ethnic groups’ representation in governmental bodies (quotas). 3. Institutional approach • From the standpoint of the institutional approach that considers institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (D. North), ethnic regional autonomy is a set of institutional arrangements that regulate the relationship between public authorities and ethnic groups • Preferential policies result in the creation of respective institutional arrangements

8. Theoretical model

9. Theoretical model 4. Dynamic model of ethnic autonomy arrangements (preferential policies) • The content of the institutional arrangements depends on a) actors’ preferences; b) the correlation of resources between them. • Institutional arrangements are supported as long as the preferences of actors and / or the correlation of resources between them are fairly stable (“institutional equilibrium”, K. Shepsle, R. Calvert) • Change the preferences of actors and / or the correlation of resources should result in institutional change. • In order to secure a balance in inter-ethnic relations, preferential policies should be flexible and responsive. • Otherwise, divergent interests and preferences of actors come into collision, which leads to the conflicts 5. The conflict occurs as a consequence of • either inadequate (in terms of maintaining a balance) changes of preferential policies, • or, conversely, the lack of an adequate response to changing preferences and / or the correlation of resources between the main actors.

10. Theoretical model The main hypothesis of the project is that the relevance of preferential policies and, subsequently, the effectiveness of ethnic regional autonomy depend on how preferential policy is formulated (patterns of interaction between public authorities and ethnic groups)

11. Theoretical model

12. Methodology • Selection of the entities which satisfy the concept of “ethnic regional autonomies” - all over the world (universal set) • Combination of quantitative and qualitative research in comparative studies of the ethnic regional autonomies • quantitative dataset of ethnic regional autonomies (in the format of "year - autonomy") • qualitative profiles (thick descriptions) of the regional ethnic autonomies • Dependent variable: the effectiveness of ethnic regional autonomies in maintaining a balance in interethnic relations • dynamic of the interethnic conflict as an indicator of a balance / imbalance in interethnic relations • Intermediate variables: preferential policies and respective institutional arrangements in dynamic

13. Methodology • Independent variables: features of the interactions between actors involved (the state, regional autonomy authorities, ethnic groups) • set of actors (executives, legislators, political parties, leaders of the ethnic groups, etc.) • arenas of interactions (governmental power-sharing institutions, intergovernmental bodies, parliaments, special committees, consultative bodies, advisory bodies, negotiation arenas, etc.) • patterns of interactions (inclusion versus exclusion; the degree of institutionalization and sustainability; significance in decision-making process, etc.) • Control variables: features of the states, regional autonomies, ethnic groups such as for example (not comprehensive list) • ethnic compositions (fractionalization, polarization, etc.) of the country as well as ethnic autonomy • linguistic, religious, etc. peculiarity of ethnic groups, the presence of kin states and / or kin groups in other countries • the nature of the political regime and the features of constitutional design of the country • economic resources of autonomy

14. Sources of the information • Minorities at Risk (MAR) (Ted Gurr) • Ethnic Power Relations Dataset Family & GROWup (Lars-Eric Cederman) • Conflict Barometer and CONIAS Database (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Germany) • Cultural and Territorial Autonomy (CUTE) Project (EURAC, Bolzano, Italy) • Minority Rights Information System (MIRIS) (EURAC, Bolzano, Italy) • Minority Map and Timeline of Europe (MMTE) Project (ECMI, Flensburg, Germany) • Armed Conflict Dataset (Uppsala University and PRIO) • Regional Authority Index (RAI) (Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks)

15. Sources of the information They will be aggregated in a single dataset and added by lacking necessary information from other sources • Qualitative country studies • Expert interviews • Field studies