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NLE 2011 Response

NLE 2011 Response. Where have we been so far?. Game called on account of real world events. Presidential Disaster Declarations in four of FEMA Region IV States. 10 across 7 states within 2 weeks and many other states beyond Region IV. Alabama Kentucky

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NLE 2011 Response

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  1. NLE 2011 Response

  2. Where have we been so far?

  3. Game called on account of real world events Presidential Disaster Declarations in four of FEMA Region IV States. 10 across 7 states within 2 weeks and many other states beyond Region IV. Alabama Kentucky Mississippi Tennessee

  4. Review following Response Phase After Action Conference (AAC) was held in Arlington, VA, on July 20–21, 2011. The conference was designed and conducted by FEMA to: Give participants a chance to confirm the lessons (strengths and areas for improvement) highlighted in Exercise; Suggest missing observations to the evaluation team; and  Recommend a responsible agency or agencies to address areas for improvement.

  5. Using a Federal “push” strategy 1. Participants reviewed two strengths and three areas for improvement (AFI): Strength. Crafting and activating pre-scripted mission assignments (PSMAs) reduced the administrative burden on the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and on those who would receive support. Strength. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) promptly addressed an insufficient balance in the Disaster Relief Fund. AFI. The resource request and fulfillment process does not support a push environment. AFI. The State Incident Support Bases (ISBs) became overcrowded, as the Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs) could not release resources for distribution.  AFI. While advances have been made, many Department of Defense (DoD) standard operating procedures (SOPs), requirements, and training sessions are not conducive to a push environment.

  6. Role and responsibility of the NRCC Participants reviewed one strength and three areas for improvement: Strength. The National Advanced Operational Plan (N-AOP) developed during the exercise provides a good template for future response. AFI. Players have not yet been socialized to the National Incident Support Manual (NISM) and the differences between incident support and incident management. AFI. The Situational Awareness Section did not provide enough information or analysis to support FEMA leadership during the initial operational periods. AFI. The interdependencies and coordination between the NRCC sections was unclear to NLE 11 players.

  7. Acquiring and maintaining a common operating picture (COP) Participants reviewed one strength and three areas for improvement: Strength. Several D/As successfully compiled information from a wide range of sources to develop situational awareness and anticipate requests. AFI. Federal D/As did not utilize the situational awareness acquired by the private sector. AFI. The RFI process was executed in a reactive manner, creating delays in the delivery of critical information to decision makers. AFI. The combination of e-mail and the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) was an incomplete solution for information management and dissemination.

  8. Communications Participants reviewed three strength and three areas for improvement: Strength. States and FEMA regions were able to establish alternate forms of communication in a degraded environment. Strength. The Federal Government provided tactical communications support and analysis. Strength. Government and private sector coordination improved communications capability in the impacted area. AFI. The process for prioritization and allocation of communications resources was not fully explored. AFI. There are gaps in Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) enabled wire-line assets and Wireless Priority Service (WPS)-enabled cellular communications assets. AFI. There were issues with reporting telecommunications information between key stakeholders in the communications community.

  9. Mass Care Participants reviewed two strengths and four areas for improvement: Strength. Missouri and the American Red Cross successfully integrated AmeriCorp staff into a mission to train and management shelter volunteers. Strength. A pets multiagency coordination (MAC) was successfully activated and operated. AFI. The gap in personnel to perform prompt assessment of shelter sites and private housing will compound the size and complexity of the Mass Care mission. AFI. Functional Needs Support Services (FNSS) guidelines were not actively exercised. AFI. There are inadequate available, trained personnel for staffing mass care services. AFI. There are gaps in planning for the transition to post-72 hour Mass Care.

  10. Medical Surge Participants reviewed four strengths and Focused on one area for improvement: Strength. HHS quickly initiated response efforts per the Federal strategy to lean forward and push resources to the impacted area. Strength. The American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) Task Force, HHS, DoD, and the ARC quickly coordinated their response to blood supply issues. Strength. HHS rapidly initiated coordination efforts with DoD and VA to activate Federal Coordinating Centers (FCCs) and Disaster Aeromedical Staging Facilities (DASFs) to evacuate patients from the impacted area. Strength. HHS and FEMA coordinated with private sector partners to promote ensure shared situational awareness and incorporated private sector support into ESF #8 response efforts. AFI. Some common medical surge assets have limitations when applied to the NLE 11 scenario.

  11. Emergency Public Information and Warning Participants reviewed two strengths and three areas for improvement: Strength. Social media tools, and the information gained from them, were successfully leveraged at the regional level. Strength. There was a high level of coordination between the Federal, regional, and State public information officers (PIOs). AFI. The interactive capabilities of social media tools were not fully exploited at the national level. AFI. The process for communicating information learned from social media from the national level to field personnel is not currently defined. AFI. There were missed opportunities for ESF #15 to anticipate potential public affairs challenges and pre-script positive messaging for FEMA leadership.

  12. Other Key Areas Covered Whole of Community Response Critical Resourse Distribution and Logistics Emergency Evacuation and Shelter In Place Unified Area Coordination Group Process

  13. Where Do We Go Next (Post 72 Hrs) There are still 10 Key Evaluation and Report items being considered at the White House following the Response portion of the NLE 2011 Exercise. The next process will be the NLE 2011 RECOVERY Exercise the 3rd week of September in the Washington DC area.

  14. Many of YOU saw even more Please let your colleagues know what did and did not happen in your Agency or Department during the National Level Exercise period

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