1 / 31

The Chilean Strategy for Assessing the Nuclear Power Option. 2006 / 2010

The Chilean Strategy for Assessing the Nuclear Power Option. 2006 / 2010. Juan José Rivas MINISTERIAL COORDINATOR OF NUCLEAR CONSULTIVE GROUP AND CHNEC. International Atomic Energy Agency TM/ WS on Topical Issues on Infrastructure Development:

lawrencia
Télécharger la présentation

The Chilean Strategy for Assessing the Nuclear Power Option. 2006 / 2010

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. The Chilean Strategy for Assessing the Nuclear Power Option. 2006 / 2010 Juan José Rivas MINISTERIAL COORDINATOR OF NUCLEAR CONSULTIVE GROUPAND CHNEC International Atomic Energy Agency TM/WS on Topical Issues on Infrastructure Development: Managing the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power VIENNA, FEBRUARY 9TH .2010

  2. December 2005: Chagual Agreement: 25 environmental NGOs signed an agreement with M. Bachelet, who was running for the Presidency : “nuclear option will not be included in the national energy policy ". This was consistent with her personal anti-nuclear stand. January 2010: The NPP , is necessary for Chile starting 2024. NPP is: convenient competitive sustainable At the same time we have important gaps to close Nuclear Infrastructure , long term public support to NPP. The next government will be responsible to decide to invest in closing gaps, even if the decision is delayed to the following government Establishing National Statements Regarding a NPP 2006 to 2010

  3. “Ya sea para empezar un programa nuclear o para descartarlo, es necesario conocer lo que significa y evaluarlo rigurosamente en toda su complejidad”. “ Either for starting a nuclear power program, or for dismissing it, it is necessary to fully understand what it means and thoroughly evaluate all its implications”. President Michelle Bachelet November , 2007

  4. What triggered the Government decision to start the current process? • The Perfect Storm:Energy crisis2006 - 2008 • Significant decrease of Natural Gas supply from Argentina. • Severe drought had a strong impact over hydro plants generation capacity • Increasing and volatile prices of fossils fuels • An earthquake in the north that shut down some electrical generation plants • Concerns about the current electrical grid and the projection for the next decades • High dependency on external providers • Projected shortage of fossils fuels availability • Projected increase of marginal generation cost • Political and natural limits to build hydro power plants • Climate Change Challenge and the national and international responsibility • Increasing GHG emissions: • CO2 footprint taxes • Environmentally irresponsible Need for a Long-Term Energy Strategy and Public Policy

  5. What triggered the current process (2) • We must discuss about what kind of grid will ensure our policy objectives and which role could the NPP play. • Nuclear Power assessment process needs to be performed within a framework, considering the main objectives of our energy policy: • Secure Supply • Efficiency • Sustainability

  6. GRUPO de TRABAJO en NUCLEOELECTRICIDAD LA OPCIÓN NUCLEOELÉCTRICA EN CHILE Septiembre 2007 Gobierno de Chile National Approach • In march 2007, President Bachelet established a working group (Zanelli’s Comission) to assess whether nuclear energy would be a possibility for Chile. Main conclusions of the group: • By the end of 2007, President Bachelet put the Minister of Energy in charge of conducting the studies identified as necessary for the next stage. • Minister of Energy established a Work Group to deliver the presidential mandate • There are no reasons to discard the nuclear option for Chile. • Before making any decision, further studies need to be performed.

  7. National Approach (2) Working Group for Nuclear Assessment • NCG Role: Advise to minister and lead the work. Include independent experts from different fields: • Physics • Economics • Environmental Sciences • NCG include representatives from key governmental institutions: • Foreign Affairs Ministry • Defense Ministry • National Environmental Commission (CONAMA) • Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN) • National Energy Commission (CNE)

  8. National Approach (3) Work definitions: • Clear mandate: “To advance in every necessary front, so in 2-3 years the country may be in conditions to make a decision on whether to proceed or not with a nuclear program”. • Clear and specific Objectives: • To produce a public government document with the assessment results. • To involve public stakeholders in the assessment process. • To start a public debate about the role of NPP in our future electric grid, avoiding extreme positions (“Yes, of course”. “No, no way”). • To ensure continuity of the process during the next administration • Direct and Clear coordination with the minister through a Minister Senior Adviser

  9. National Approach (4) Work Strategy: • Work closely with IAEA: • Followed Self Assessment methodology • Workshop attendance • Requesting specific technical support (WS in Chile) • IAEA missions • Running energy models (MAED and MESSAGE provided and supported by IAEA), with different scenarios. • To hire studies calling for international bids. • Scientific Visits (France, USA, Argentina and Brazil) • Starting a public debate • Seminars • Reports • Media

  10. Strategic Decisions • To install Nuclear Power as an “energy policy strategy” discussion, not as a “nuclear” discussion. • Permanent concern about transparency, public information, and building international and national trust. • To keep it as simple as possible : • Will not consider uranium extraction (even when we have it). • Will not consider fuel elements production (even when we can do it). • Will follow the turn-key approach (even when we are able to participate in several areas). • Not seeking agreements with any particular country, keeping our independence and avoiding commitments with a specific provider. • To include CCHEN in the evaluation process as support. • To work closely with IAEA. Using IAEA’s guidelines but adapting them to our local situation.

  11. Current Status Adjustments we made to IAEA’s suggestions: • No formal NEPIO, but a working group with the same objectives and enough budget. • Will not discuss possible locations and technology until decision to close our gaps has been taken. • Adjust the work to be performed and the milestones to be reached in each phase according to our national situation. • Working in closing gaps (Phase 2) is worthwhile even if we never decide to build a NPP. • Developing geological information is a good investment for Chile. • Having an independent regulatory body is already required for the correct operation of our nuclear facilities.

  12. Current Status HITO 1 Listos para tomar un compromiso informado sobre un programa nuclear de potencia Opción nuclear de potencia incluida en la estrategia energética nacional HITO 2 Listos para licitar la primera Central Nuclear de Potencia HITO 3 Listos para licenciar y operar la primera Central Nuclear de Potencia Mantenimiento y mejoramiento continuo de la Infraestructura FASE 3 PROGRAMA DE DESARROLLO DE LA INFRAESTRUCTURA NUCLEAR Actividades que se deben implementar para una primera NPP FASE 2 Trabajo preparatorio para la construcción de una NPP después de haber tomado la decisión de un programa nuclear FASE 1 Consideraciones previas antes de tomar la decisión de lanzar un programa nuclear de potencia 1er proyecto de una NPP Ante-proyecto Toma de decisiones del proyecto Construcción Operación/decomisionamiento Estudio de viabilidad Proceso de Licitación Licenciamiento ~ 10 a 15 años Where are we in the IAEA programme?

  13. Current Status (2) Where we are today? • SELF ASSESSMENT PROCESS performedby CNE / CCHEN work group (10 people) • We had a special mission from IAEA on Dec. 2009 to assess our process: • The exercise was well prepared • Good approach • Recommendations • Sources to be used to close the gaps • Work plans to close the Gaps, • Self Assessment Phase 1 to be finished by mid 2010

  14. SUMMARY FORM (STATUS) SUMMARY FORM (STATUS)

  15. SUMMARY FORM (STATUS)

  16. SUMMARY FORM (STATUS)

  17. SUMMARY FORM (STATUS)

  18. Current Status (2) • STUDIES PERFORMED through bids lead by NCG and CNE We’ve identified: • When it would be convenient to have the first NPP operating • General adjustment required for the legal and regulatory framework for nuclear activities and for the electric operation • Natural risks and geological information • Relevant issues about public opinion: • Current knowledge on energy and nuclear • Drivers to build the individual positions about nuclear (clean energy v/s radiation danger )

  19. Studies 2008

  20. Studies 2009

  21. Current Status (2) • There is enough time for closing the gaps until the first reactor would be dispatched

  22. Next Steps • There is a new Government starting on March: • The outgoing Government should: • Make it clear about the cost of stopping the evaluation of the nuclear option. • Help keeping the momentum. • The next Government should: • invest in closing the gaps.

  23. Next Steps • Main gaps to be closed during next Government: • Regulatory body: needs to be independent from CCHEN. • Regulatory and legal framework: changes regarding environmental impact assessment and licensing. • Seismic studies: map of geological faults. • Human Resources for regulatory body, intelligent customer, etc. • Public opinion: education programs about energy options (not only nuclear). • Working in closing the gaps does not mean we`re in a “non-return journey”; is just the responsible approach to follow.

  24. Good Pactices and Lessons Learned • Avoid rush decisions. • NPP should be a public policy discussion.. • Simplify the discussion. Why make it more complicated that it already is? • Cooperation with IAEA is a key point: • Ask for their feedback. • Self-assessment exercises: • Be rigorous in distinguishing assessment (interpretation) from evidences (facts, not opinions) • Evidences should be something always verifiable and eventually measurable. • Consider the local situation when using IAEA’s guidelines and be prepared to adapt them to the particular reality. • Set milestones: technical visits, documents, seminars.

  25. NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE NOVA VITA • For the Countries: Need to assess NPP under their current political and security conditions and environmental concerns. • For the Agency: Need to strengthen the flexibility for supporting countries that have established their own route and needs independently.Very far from being “recipients” countries.

  26. Thank You The Chilean Strategy for Assessing the Nuclear Power Option. 2006 / 2010 Juan José Rivas MINISTERIAL COORDINATOR OF NUCLEAR CONSULTIVE GROUPAND NUCLEAR INSTITUCIONS International Atomic Energy Agency TM/WS on Topical Issues on Infrastructure Development: Managing the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power VIENNA, FEBRUARY 9TH .2010

  27. Riesgo de Precios 810 556 440 Fuente: CNE

  28. OIL: 9% COAL: 16% Hydro: 37% Gas: 36% NCRs: 2% Current Electric Generation Grid: 14 GW (2008) Fossil 61% Renewable 39% Chile imports: 95% of coal 80% of natural gas 98% of oil

  29. Capacidad instalada al 2035 sin opción nuclear • Biomasa • Solar • Geotermia • 1,90% • 0,03% • 5,14% • Eólica • Carbón • 12,25% • 27,91% • Mini Hidro • 2,34% • GNL • 10,84% • Hidro • Petróleo • 32,74% • 6,85% Installed Capacity by 2305 Without NPP: 38 GW

  30. Riesgo de Suministro

  31. Ministry of Energy

More Related