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Wireless Security

Wireless Security. Agenda. Basics of an Attack 802.11b Overview WEP Other security measures Future of Wireless Security. Step 1: War Driving. Materials needed: Laptop w/ 802.11b card and GPS, Netstumbler, Airsnort, Ethereal, and the car of your choice

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Wireless Security

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  1. Wireless Security

  2. Agenda • Basics of an Attack • 802.11b Overview • WEP • Other security measures • Future of Wireless Security ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  3. Step 1: War Driving • Materials needed: Laptop w/ 802.11b card and GPS, Netstumbler, Airsnort, Ethereal, and the car of your choice • An attacker would first use Netstumbler to drive around and map out active wireless networks • Netstumbler not only has the ability to monitor all active networks in the area, but it also integrates with a GPS to map AP’s ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  4. Step 2: Cracking Using Airsnort • At this point, the attacker has chosen his target; most likely a business • Netstumbler can tell you whether or not the network is encrypted • If encrypted, park the car, start up Airsnort, and leave it be for a few hours • Airsnort, given enough time, will passively listen to traffic and figure out the encryption key ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  5. Step 3: Listening to the Network • Once the encryption key is compromised, it is a trivial process to connect to the network, and if there wasn’t an encryption key at all, well then …. • An attacker would next use Ethereal to listen to the network traffic, analyze, and plan further attacks ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  6. That’s it…the network is compromised • Most wireless networks are no more secure than this, many are less secure • Hundreds of business’s, schools, airports, and residences use wireless technology as a major point of access to their networks • Growth of demand for Wireless LANs (WLAN) is increasing dramatically ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  7. Basic 802.11b Overview • 802.11b was IEEE approved in 1999 • Infrastructure Mode or Ad Hoc • Utilizes 2.4GHz band on 15 different channels (only 11 in US) • 11mbit shared among all users on access point • Cheap!!! ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  8. Built in Security Features • Service Set Identifier (SSID) • Differentiates one access point from another • SSID is sent in ‘beacon frames’ every few seconds. • Beacon frames are in plain text! ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  9. Do’s and Don'ts for SSID’s • Default SSID’s are well known (Linksys AP’s default to linksys, CISCO defaults to tsunami, etc) so change them immediately. • Don’t set your SSID to something that will give away information. • Do change the settings on your AP so that it does not broadcast the SSID in the beacon frame. ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  10. Associating with the AP • Access points have two ways of initiating communication with a client • Shared Key or Open Key authentication • Open key allows anyone to start a conversation with the AP • Shared Key is supposed to add an extra layer of security by requiring authentication info as soon as one associates ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  11. How Shared Key Auth. works • Client begins by sending an association request to the AP • AP responds with a challenge text (unencrypted) • Client, using the proper WEP key, encrypts text and sends it back to the AP • If properly encrypted, AP allows communication with the client ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  12. Is Open or Shared Key more secure? • Ironically enough, Open key is the answer in short • Using passive sniffing, one can gather 2 of the three variables needed in Shared Key authentication: challenge text and the encrypted challenge text • Simply plugging these two values into the RC4 equations will yield the WEP key! ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  13. Wired Equivalent Protocol (WEP) • Primary built security for 802.11 protocol • Uses 40bit RC4 encryption • Intended to make wireless as secure as a wired network • Unfortunately, since ratification of the 802.11 standard, RC4 has been proven insecure, leaving the 802.11 protocol wide open for attack ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  14. A closer look at WEP • Weakness in RC4 lies within the Initialization Vector (IV) • The IV is a random 24bit number (2^24) • Packets sent over the network contain the IV followed by the encrypted data • RC4 combines the IV and the 40bit key to encrypt the data • Two known attacks against this! ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  15. Numerical Limitation Attack • IV’s are only 24bit, and thus there are only 16,777,216 possible IV’s • A busy network will repeat IV’s often • By listening to the encrypted traffic and picking out the duplicate IV’s, it is possible to infer what parts of the WEP key are • Enough duplicate IV’s and you can figure out the whole WEP key ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  16. The Weak IV attack • Some IV’s do not work well with RC4 • Using a formula, one can take a weak IV and infer part of the WEP key • Once again, passively monitoring the network for a few hours can be enough time to gather enough weak IV’s to figure out the WEP key ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  17. Taking a look back on WEP • WEP is flawed by a technology weakness, and there is no simple solution to fix it • Increasing key length will only help against a brute force attack (trying to guess the key). The IV is the weakness in this protocol, so increasing key length is pointless • Attacks against WEP are passive and extremely difficult to detect ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  18. Security beyond 802.11 specifications • For a secure wireless network, you MUST go above and beyond the 802.11b security measures. • At this point, there are many measures you can take to secure a wireless network. All have their pro’s and con’s, and of course some work better than others • The Goal: a secure network that is easy to deploy and maintain. ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  19. Hiding the SSID • As stated earlier, the SSID is by default broadcast every few seconds. • Turning it off makes it harder to figure out a wireless connection is there • Reading raw packets will reveal the SSID since even when using WEP, the SSID is in plain text • Increases deployment difficulty ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  20. MAC address filtering • MAC address filtering works by only allowing specific hardware to connect to the AP • Management on large networks unfeasible • Using a packet sniffer, one can very easily find a valid MAC address and modify their OS to use it, even if the data is encrypted • May be good for small networks ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  21. Counter measures that could have prevented this! • Only allow users to connect to servers on the wired LAN with secure protocols. If that is not an option, use a firewall to block insecure connections to servers on the wired LAN • Use of 802.1X and a secure EAP if possible • If convenient, a VPN would greatly increases security of data ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  22. Things to keep in mind when securing a WLAN • All WLAN should be considered insecure, and thus should be treated that way • Never put a WLAN within the perimeter of your wired LAN’s firewall • Use WEP, it will deter most would be trespassers • Do not leave default WEP key • Implement 802.1X with key rotation every 5 to 10 minutes • Combine security mechanisms. ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  23. Future of wireless security • 802.11i is in progress, and addresses security issues in 802.11b • 802.11i will in essence be a standardized way for 802.11b and 802.1X to be coupled, and introduce new ciphers • TKIP cipher should be able to be used on existing hardware with new firmware • New ciphers based on AES encryption will require new hardware ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  24. Lab Goals • Examine Unencrypted Wireless Traffic • Circumventing MAC Address Filtering • Cracking WEP using AirSnort ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  25. D-Link Wireless AP 192.168.1(2).144 Evil RedHat Linux 8.0 Sniffer 192.168.1(2).50 WindowsXP2 FTP Server 192.168.1(2).150 WindowsXP1 FTP Client 192.168.1(2).100 Network Layout ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  26. Unencrypted Wireless Traffic(kismet) ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  27. MAC Address Filtering • Use Kismet to find a valid MAC Address • Spoof your MAC address • With no encryption, full access should be granted ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  28. Cracking WEP Cracking using AirSnort can take a considerable amount of time, so you will be provided with a nearly complete log file ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  29. Links to the tools used: • Airsnorthttp://airsnort.shmoo.com • Netstumblerhttp://www.netstumbler.com • Etherealhttp://www.ethereal.com ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  30. Papers and Wireless Security Web Pages • Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4 • The Unofficial 802.11 Security Web Page • Wireless Security Blackpaper • The IEEE 802.11 specifications (includes WEP spec) • Paper on detecting Netstumbler and similar programs • Further reading on upcoming 802.11 variations • Assorted 802.11 related crypto algorithms written in ANSI C ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

  31. Acknowledgements Brian Lee authored most of these slides. ECE 4112 - Internetwork Security

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