300 likes | 535 Vues
The IRSN’s Reactor Safety Division and its Contribution to the Reactor Safety Assessment. Giovanni Bruna - Jean-Luc Chambon (IRSN / DSR) 2010 November, 26. Current French Reactor Development Strategy. 900 MWe Series CP0 6 units. 900 MWe Series CP1 18 units. French NPP’s Fleet.
E N D
The IRSN’s Reactor Safety Divisionand its Contribution to the Reactor Safety Assessment Giovanni Bruna - Jean-Luc Chambon (IRSN / DSR)2010 November, 26
900 MWe Series CP0 6 units 900 MWe Series CP1 18 units French NPP’s Fleet 1450 MWe Series N4 4 units 99 98 97 96 95 Chooz BCivaux 94 900 MWe Series CP2 10 units 1300 MWe Series P4 & P’4 8 + 12 93 92 91 90 89 Cattenom Belleville Nogent, PenlyGolfech 88 87 86 85 84 PaluelSt AlbanFlamanville 83 St LaurentChinonCruas 82 81 80 79 Tricastin, GravelinesDampierre, Blayais 78 77 76 Bugey Fessenheim 75 74 73 72 71 1970
Research Reactors and Mock-up Experiment Facilities • Reactors for material irradiation : • OSIRIS (70 MW), RJH (100 MW) • Reactors for fundamental Research : • ORPHEE (14 MW), RHF (58,3 MW) • Reactors dedicated to safety studies : • CABRI (14 MW), PHEBUS (38 MW) • Reactors Physics Mock-ups : • EOLE (10 kW), ISIS (700 kW), MINERVE (100 W), MASURCA (5 kW)
Reactor Safety Demonstration • Radiological targets and protection against radiation • Safety principles • Defence in depth • 3 barriers • Safety functions • Design concept • Deterministic analysis • Postulated initiating events • Plant conditions category (PCC) used for design • Risk reduction category (RRC) used to complete the design • Probabilistic analysis • Internal and external hazards analysis Excluded Accounted for
DBA ACCIDENTS PROTECTION INCIDENTS CONTROL OPERATION BDBA ACCIDENTS SEVERE ACCIDENTS MITIGATION Reactor Safety Demonstration : Defense in Depth During the whole Plant Life (From Construction to Decommissioning)
RISK FORBIDDEN RANGE • Control of nuclear chain- reaction(Reactivity – Criticality) • Fuel and Core-cooling-down (Coolability) • Confinement • of radioactive contaminants ALLOWED RANGE LIKELYHOOD SAFETY FUNCTIONS BARRIERS Reactor Safety Demonstration : Principles SAFETY APPROACH AND TOOLS
Safety Assessment 1/2 • The major aim of the Safety Assessment of Nuclear Power Plants is the evaluation (and when possible, the quantification) of all potential risks, including those originated by either voluntary changes in design and operation (refurbishment, fuel loading) or involuntary ones (ageing, degradation of materials and fuel …).
Safety Assessment 2/2 • To achieve such an ambitious objective it is worth to: • - Identifying all the potential risk-sources through suitable probabilistic approaches (PSA), • - Understanding the physical phenomena generating such risks, • - Mastering the component and system design and operating features and their failure modes; • That is done, accounting for • The capitalization and increase of knowledge through operating experience, studies and R&D, • The change in the rules • The evolution of the socio-economical context
DSR : 7 Services • Safety of Operating Power Reactors, • Safety of Experimental and Future Reactors, • Fuel, Core Design, Control & Operation, Plant Simulator (SIPA), • Materials, Components Equipment & I&C, • Severe Accidents, • Aggressions & Hazards, & International Affairs, • Human and Organizational Factors. SIPA Team & Int. Aff. Coordination DSR > 250 people • IRSN : 6 Divisions • - Reactor Safety Division (DSR), • Cycle and Transport Safety Div., • Armament safety Division, • R&D (S.A. oriented) Division, • Environment Protection Div., • Man Protection Division Secretariat Administration And Finance Technical Divisions IRSN > 1500 people
Two main activities, for reactors and plants in France and abroad: Expertise and Studies in Reactor Safety for Power Reactors Research Reactors and Mock-up Experiment Facilities Research and Development activities in fields such as: Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA levels 1 & 2), Accident Modeling (LOCA, RIA, SGTR …), Human factors, Fuel, Materials and Components … DSR - Reactor Safety Division
CONSTRUCTION, TESTS SHUTDOWN DESIGN OPERATION DISMANTLING DSR - Reactor Safety Division • Safety Assessment • Internal events (breaks, loss of grid, …) • Internal and external hazards • Probabilistic Safety Analysis • Severe Accidents • Reactor control and operation • Main skills • Reactor, Core & Fuel Physics and Fuel Management • Materials • Systems • Containment and reactor vessel Structures (concrete, component supports, …) • Ageing of reactor Components (Vessel, cables …)
Martial Jorel Giovanni Bruna, Jean Couturier, Pascal Quentin, Jean-Luc Chambon Two multi-functional Services Five specialists’ Services About 300 people including : - 250 IRSN’s - 50 externals (students, subsidiary workers) DSR - Reactor Safety Division
Five Specialists’ Services SAMS : Mechanics, electricity and electrical network, devices, cables and structures, (50) SESPRI : Design, control systems, Probabilistic Safety Analysis, external and internal aggressions (45) ST3C : Process (neutronics, thermal-hydraulics), fuel, reactor operation, SIPA (plant simulator) (45) SAGR : Major accident and radioactive releases (35) SEFH : Human factors / organizations (15) DSR - Reactor Safety Division
Two multi-functional Services Licensing Reactor operation Safety examination and re-examinations SEREP : Service for PWR Safety Evaluation (50) SEGRE : Service for the Safety Evaluation of Gas-Cooled, Fast and Experimental Reactors (25) DSR - Reactor Safety Division
Global overview in France on : EDF current Plants Research reactors and Mock-up Experiment facilities New Reactors (EPR, RJH, …) Consistent Approach to Reactor Safety Tight relationship among major topics Exploitation of operating experience both in normal and incidental conditions Synergy among Expertise Studies Research and Development DSR - Reactor Safety Division
Permanently monitoring and assessing of the safety of each reactor. Making an annual global assessment of the development of the in-service safety level of the EDF reactors to detect trends and deviations an increase in unanticipated events and operating difficulties IRSN has developed tools, based on the utilization of the information contained in the significant events reports provided by the operator. RECUPERARE software Follow-up of French plant operation
SIPA : a PWR Plant-Simulator • A high-performance tool in support for safety • Capable of representing the behaviour of a PWR in all situations • Integrates description of fluid circuits, I&C, protection systems, electric power, containment… • User-friendly interface • Teaching display station • First operation in 1992 (with EDF), presently under renovation (with AREVA NP)
for TRAINING Target : AuSN - IRSN – CEA From newcomers to experts (More than 400 participants since 2000) Training Objectives: - Understanding PWR Design and Operation Principles Mastering Physical Situation both in Normal Operation, Incidental & Accidental Conditions Presently / 9 One-Week Courses per Year for STUDIES VALIDATION of computation Tool for Crisis PREPARATION of National Crisis Exercises ASSESSMENT of Operation Procedures STUDY of Accidental Sequences SUPPORT to the PSA STUDIES of Accidental Transients and Non-Conformities PWR Plant-Simulator : a Precious Tool
1990 : beginning of cooperationwithEasterneurope in the field of nuclearsafety The French ReactorSafety Division started to support Easternnuclearsafetyauthorities as a TSO withinRiskaudit through participation to IAEA activities Safetyanalysis of WWER plants Safety Recommandations Modernisation programs Review of improvementmeasures Assistance to East European safety authorities
Safetyanalysis Consultancy services funded by European Commission Riskaudit reports IAEA (missions, meetings, training, …) Safety issues and theirranking for WWER-440 model 213, 1000 model 320 Modernisation programs Russia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Armenia, CzechRepublic Assesment of modernisation programs IAEA reviews (Kozloduy, Rovno, Temelin) Riskauditprojects Rovno 1,2,3 + Balakovo + Khmelnitski 2 / Rovno 4 + Kalinin 3 DSR activity in the frame of safety analysis of VVERs
Report n°366 on modernisation status of K2/R4 Items 19121/13111/13611 : to resolve the problems of boron dilution before start-up (studies, instructions, measurements) Item 30211 : elaboration of symtom based accidental procedures after installation of the Safety Parameter Display System Item 12111 : to implement one solution against cold overpressure (ECCS or pressurizer valves) Item 13411 : to modernize the pressurizer safety valves Item 24411 : to implement additional diesel generator Examples of Riskaudit recommendations WWER 1000
Various areas : review of safetyanalysis reports assessment of physicalstudies analysis of modifications PSA guidance and review Averageinvolvment : At least 5 assistance projectsat the same time About ten experts fromReactorSafety Division DSR efforts
In progress : Russia : review of safetyimprovements Ukraine : analysis of modernisation programs, licensing of new plants, PSA guidance Arménie : review of safety upgrades New type of support : TACIS replaced by INSC « technical support projects » « soft assistance projects » Consultancy services directlyfunded by East Europeansafetyauthorities Current DSR assistance to Eastern countries
The Belene Project 2-VVER 1000 NPPs are to be built on the BELENE site in Bulgaria GEN-3+ generation, designed for 60 years of operation Provided with A core catcher, as part of the third barrier, An advanced control system supplied by AREVA, Fully redundant Safety Active – Passive Protection Systems. IRSN/DSR services to foreign countries
Agreement signed between Riskaudit (IRSN-GRS) and BNRA, the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Authority Aimed at Assessing the BELENE’s ISAR (Intermediate Safety Analysis Report) One-year work : November 2008 to November 2009 Several phases : Assessment of the ISAR in compliance with international guide-lines (IAEA), Bulgarian requirements best European safety practices In-depth analysis, Issuance of a Final Synthesis Report The BELENE Project
Conclusions The Reviewers has provided BNRA with recommendations (more than 250), classified in class 1 “must do”, class 2 “should do” and class 3 “nice to have”. No substantial design flaws have been identified and no major issues are found as missing. However, the ISAR should be significantly improved before issuing the construction permit. In conclusion, RISKAUDIT asked for elaboration of a revised version of the ISAR The BELENE Project
After release of the revised version of the ISAR (Belene ISAR REV2), RISKAUDIT has been asked by BNRA, through a new contract (Phase 2): To verify whether and how the RISKAUDIT’s Recommendations have been addressed and fulfilled, To provide assessment for the new material included in the Belene ISAR REV2 (about 1 000 more pages). The new contract (Mid 2010 – mid 2011) includes an expertise phase and an in-depth analysis phase as well The expertise phase is planned ending on November 30, 2010 with issuance of a Technical Report The in-depth analysis phase is planned January to June 2011 The BELENE Project