EOA 18 : THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1973

1. EOA 18: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1973 • Strategic context: The Arab-Israeli War (Yom Kippur War) is significant as after the quick success of the 1967 Six Days War, the Israelis made fundamental mistakes while evaluating their success. • The IDF AAR from the Six-Day War states that • “The IDF took the initiative and obtained a decisive surprise-in time, and in method of operation…it succeeded in severely damaging the air forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, while they were still on the ground, and obtained complete air superiority…[which] aided the land effort of the IDF…. In this way the IDG succeeded in concentrating forces at vital point of decision, schwerpunkt, and obtained victory there.” • Israel's take away from the 1967 war was with their superior intelligence, air force, and armored forces (tanks) they were superior to any Arabic army. • 1967 validated IDF plans and organization • IDF trusted that their intelligence network was almost infallible • 5 tenets of Israeli junior leadership: High initiative, high military proficiency, close office/soldier relationships, lead from the front, no “spit and polish” • The Egyptianslearned that the IDF was better at maneuver warfare, that to be successful they would need to neutralize IDF armor and IAF forces, that their system and culture did not lend itself to initiative and that to be successful they would have to surprise the Israeli's and then force the IDF into a battle of attrition under an umbrella of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons before their reserves could enter the battle. • Egyptians re-armed and re-trained, and though remaining fundamentally non-aligned received material and training from USSR • War Minister Isma’il ‘Ali understood shortcomings of his culture and that detailed planning and repetitive training could overcome lack of initiative and enable combined arms operations • Sadat’s strategy was designed to achieve political success without a military victory; would include Arab partners to force Israel to fight on two fronts

2. EOA 18: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1973 Israeli side IDF BLUF: Three phase operation in which PH1 and 2 can run partially concurrently. PH1. Mobilization of the full reserves of the IDF, PH2. Defense in depth using strong points with armor reinforcements to slow Egyptian advance into the Sinai peninsula, coordinate local CATK to prevent any major penetration of the BAR LEV line. PH3, Offensive Operations, seize and exploit the initiative against Egyptian forces along the Sinai, eliminate their LOCs and destroy their bridges. Strategic OBJ: Humiliate any force that attack Israel IOT prevent them from ever doing it again, re-establish the 1967 war boundaries if attacked. OP OBJ: prevention of major enemy breakthroughs, trading space for time IOT defeat Syrian forces before the Egyptians if necessary. Loose operational planning for the CATK phase due to the initiative based planning (seizure of opportunities by lower level leaders). Depend on leaders like Sharon, to figure out the problem at the tactical level, and develop the situation while finding a way to exploit the weaknesses in Egyptian defenses. Use strengths of Armor, Air and Intel to over power enemy. Had to develop more integrated combined arms teams with INF and ENG accompanying ARMOR forces IOT defeat Egyptian AT threat with increased GBAD (Ground Bases Air Defense) systems SA2/3 and SA6/7.

3. EOA 18: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1973 ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND ART - EYGPT End state: A defined a clear endstate was not established nor did it call for defeat of the IDF. Instead Egypt's military actions were geared to setting the conditions for a political and international solution. *Conditions (P/M): End the current military situation, inflict as many losses (bloody nose) as possible on the Israeli’s, and to successively gain more territory east of the Suez *COG: Enemy- The Israeli air and armored forces (O); Friendly- Egyptian Army in being (O/S) *OP Approach: Indirect Approach. Egyptians sought to avoid direct contact with the IDF strengths and exploit their weakness by deception (surprise), fires and seizing key terrain. Defeat Mechanism: The Egyptians planned to destroy and dislocate the IDF along the Suez with a follow-on phase to isolate by seizing the passes.Decisive Points: 1) Establishing a SAM umbrella over Egyptian Ground Forces, 2) Successful crossing of the Suez and breaching the IDF defenses Basing: Egypt *LOO: Three lines of operation. Cross the Suez and establish a foothold/bridgehead, secure more territory as possible and inflict as much damage as possible upon the IDF. OP Reach: Constrained by SAM coverage (20km east of the Suez). Tempo (S/O/T): Directly inked to phasing and setting the conditions for the attack (river crossing and the emplacement/deployment of SAM2 and SAM3s). Egypt maintained the initiative until 11 October. *Arranging Operations (Simultaneity and Depth): The offensives (Egypt and Syria) occurred simultaneouslycommencing with artillery bombardments. Phasing/Transitions: “Operation HIGH MINARETS” PHI: cross the canal and establish a bridgehead in the Sinai. PHII: breakout to the passes. PHIII: reoccupation of eastern Sinai. Culmination. Planned operational pause and/or culminate at the bridgehead(conditions based). Risk (S/O/T):1-Fighting a meeting engagement with the active IDF force and not IDF Reserves (S/O). Mitigated by seizing (attacking) initiative against the Israeli, gaining terrain before Israel could deploy their reserves, and the time (Ramadan/ Yom Kippur). 2-Lack of air supremacy and/or parity (O). Mitigated by an integrated SAM defense plan and maneuvering within the SAMs’ coverage/umbrella. 3-Inabilty to maneuver and fight armor battles. Mitigated by maneuvering and fighting as a combined arms formation, leveraging Egypt's strength (infantry) and fires to attrite IDF armor. Theorist Synthesis: Operational shock (Naveh), war albeit military actions is an extension of politics/policy (Clausewitz) Timeline: Yom Kippur War 06 October 1973: Syria captures most of the southern portion of the Golan Heights.
08 October 1973: Israel Defense Force (IDF) launches its first counterattack against Egypt, 09 October 1973: Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon spearheads second counterattack against Egyptian forces. 11 October 1973: Israel attacks Syria 16 October 1973: IDF cross the Suez Canal. 20 October 1973: IDF reaches the Sarsa line (10 miles outside of Damascus).
21 October 1973: IDF encircle the Egyptian Third Army. 22 October 1973: IDF retakes Mt. Hermon. 23 October 1973: The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 339. 24 October 1973: Second cease-fire is announced 28 October 1973: Israeli and Egyptian military leaders meet to implement the cease-fire at Kilometer 101 marker in the Sinai.

4. EOA 18: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1973 ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND ART - EYGPT BLUF: This is a three phase operation utilizing speed and surprise to gain a quick tactical victory and establish a strong positions with the potential for follow on operations to liberate the entire Sinai peninsula. The Engineers will bridge and break through the SUEZ initial defenses and allow (5 infantry divisions) to cross the canal. The divisions will advance to artillery road and then establish defensive positions. Air power will play a limited role due to the strength of IAF, IADS will prevent the IAF from directly attacking Egyptian ground forces along the canal line. After the initial phase, the national command authority will evaluate the situation for potential opportunities. Operational environment: divided Suez canal in two zones, north and south based on great bitter lake. Open terrain on NW side, allows for maneuver, hills on SW side are restricted to three main passes. Char of FF: limited training for pilots and INF forces, large ADA forces, Prepared deception plan and coalition partner with Syria. Char of ENY: Arrogant, overconfident, Strong Armor, AF and Intel, reliance on reserve forces mobilizing in time to fight. Timeline: Yom Kippur War 06 October 1973: Syria captures most of the southern portion of the Golan Heights.
08 October 1973: Israel Defense Force (IDF) launches its first counterattack against Egypt, 09 October 1973: Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon spearheads second counterattack against Egyptian forces. 11 October 1973: Israel attacks Syria 16 October 1973: IDF cross the Suez Canal. 20 October 1973: IDF reaches the Sarsa line (10 miles outside of Damascus).
21 October 1973: IDF encircle the Egyptian Third Army. 22 October 1973: IDF retakes Mt. Hermon. 23 October 1973: The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 339. 24 October 1973: Second cease-fire is announced 28 October 1973: Israeli and Egyptian military leaders meet to implement the cease-fire at Kilometer 101 marker in the Sinai.

5. EOA 18: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1973 ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND ART - SYRIA End state: IDF removed the Golan Heights and back across the Jordan River. *Condition (P/M): Destruction of IDF armor, first with fires and then maneuver (P/M). *COG: Enemy- The Israeli air and armored forces (O); Friendly- Syrian Army (O/S) *OP Approach (I/D): Direct Approach. Carefully chosen breakthrough locations and exploitation of gaps/seams (Jordan River)Decisive Points: 1) Seizure of Jordan River bridge (Arik and B’nat Ya’acov) Ground Forces, 2) Successful crossing of the Suez and breaching the IDF defenses Basing: Syria *LOO: Two prong attack along the northern and southern approaches into Golan heights followed by an encirclement of IDF forces inside the Golan Heights OP Reach: Constrained by SAM and Syrian Air Force coverage. Tempo (S/O/T):Created shock and maintained the initiative from 6-9 October (O) *Arranging Operations (Simultaneity and Depth): Integration of SAF and artillery to commence the attack. Phasing/Transitions: After the defeat of the 5th Infantry Division, Syrian Army quickly transition from the offensive to hasty defense. Penetration of the 1967 ceasefire defensive line, Syrian Army transition for a hasty defense to a deliberate defense to hold the Sa’sa line. Culmination. Destruction of the 5th Infantry Division Risk (S/O/T):Conducting very scripted combat operations reduces the ability for junior leaders to be adaptable and flexible (O/T). Focusing on combined arms rehearsal versus individual and crew task and drills (T). Theorist Synthesis: Deep, breakthrough and engagement operations (Isserson), and a plan for continuing the war or peace (Dolman), deliberate vs. emergent strategy (Mintzberg). Timeline: Yom Kippur War 06 October 1973: Syria captures most of the southern portion of the Golan Heights.
08 October 1973: Israel Defense Force (IDF) launches its first counterattack against Egypt, 09 October 1973: Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon spearheads second counterattack against Egyptian forces. 11 October 1973: Israel attacks Syria 16 October 1973: IDF cross the Suez Canal. 20 October 1973: IDF reaches the Sa’sa line (10 miles outside of Damascus).
21 October 1973: IDF encircle the Egyptian Third Army. 22 October 1973: IDF retakes Mt. Hermon. 23 October 1973: The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 339. 24 October 1973: Second cease-fire is announced 28 October 1973: Israeli and Egyptian military leaders meet to implement the cease-fire at Kilometer 101 marker in the Sinai.

6. EOA 18: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, 1973 ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND ART - SYRIA BLUF: This is a two phase operation involving a synchronized, surprise, scripted attack along two major axis. In the north (Golan Heights) ones INF DIV will penetrate the IDF defenses to seize the key terrain of the OPs on the top of the Golan Heights. In the south (ME) two INF DIVs will penetrate the IDF lines and one ARMOR DIV will conduct an FPOL to exploit the attack and continue the momentum to the Jordan river crossing points. The overall OBJ is to seize the Jordan river crossing points and regain political control over territory lost during the 1967 war as well as the west bank of the Jordan river. The Syrian Air Force will support ground operations and strike IDF units in depth allowing the ME to seize the crossing points. Syrian ADA will neutralize the IDF’s air capability and prevent them from attacking the Syrian ground formations in depth. STRAT OBJ: Conduct a limited war to regain prestige, lost territory and place in Islamic world. OP OBJ: Retake Golan Heights, Seize Jordan river crossing points, locally defeat the IDF. Phase 1: Breakthrough IDF defensive lines Phase 2: Exploit the attack to seize the Golan Heights and the Jordan River crossing points for Syria. OE: Rugged terrain of the Golan and the restricted terrain of the Jordan river area will canalize units and limit the frontage that Syrian forces will be able to use, the advantage goes to the IDF defenders. COFF: Syrian are poorly trained and while equipped with newer equipment by the USSR, they are not capable of correctly employing it (especially the AT and SA weapons). COENY: Over confident, reliance on Armor, Air and Intel. Risk: use of Syrian Air forces to defeat local IDF CATKs Opp: ability to mass fires on IDF targets. Did not use commando forces, despite high level of training due to their need to protect the king and prevent a coup in the event of a loss. Timeline: Yom Kippur War 06 October 1973: Syria captures most of the southern portion of the Golan Heights.
08 October 1973: Israel Defense Force (IDF) launches its first counterattack against Egypt, 09 October 1973: Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon spearheads second counterattack against Egyptian forces. 11 October 1973: Israel attacks Syria 16 October 1973: IDF cross the Suez Canal. 20 October 1973: IDF reaches the Sa’sa line (10 miles outside of Damascus).
21 October 1973: IDF encircle the Egyptian Third Army. 22 October 1973: IDF retakes Mt. Hermon. 23 October 1973: The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 339. 24 October 1973: Second cease-fire is announced 28 October 1973: Israeli and Egyptian military leaders meet to implement the cease-fire at Kilometer 101 marker in the Sinai.