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Balance of Capabilities and War. …or Working without a Net.
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Balance of Capabilities and War …or Working without a Net
Now it is my turn to present what I did on this assignment. First, I’ll talk about what several different models predict about the relationship between the dyadic balance of capabilities and conflict. Then I will describe the data set I constructed for my test. I conclude with my statistical analysis and results.
Why do IR theorists care about this question? • Most stories about this balance concern how the probability of winning a war influence state decisions to go to war. • Confusion about “balance of power” • What about third parties?
Previous Research The Siverson and Sullivan piece reviews early literature on this relationship, which is a mess. Lousy tests with inconsistent results. Power transition theorists claim to have results showing that equality of power is dangerous. • Limited sample typical to such studies • How equal is equal?
Story 1: Bargaining • The probability of victory is a key element in determining a state’s reservation level. • But inability to reach a bargain is the explanation of war according to this argument. • A smaller zone of agreement may make war more likely, but this should not be related to the dyadic balance.
Initiation decisions hinge on the difference between the status quo and expectation of a successful outcome to the crisis. • In the Simple Ultimatum model earlier this week, p(war) = ½(1 - cA/C). Probability of victory plays no role here. • Similar result in Powell’s model • However, neither of these models clearly separates escalation to war from initiation.
Hypothesis 1: There is no relationship between the dyadic distribution of capabilities and the likelihood of war, whether at the level of the initiation of disputes or escalation to war. • In terms of signaling model, this hypothesis follows if the status quo moves closely with the balance of power.
Story 2: Commitment In the commitment model, • B fights if 1 - p - cB min(1 - R,1 - ) • If we set R = 1, meaning A has the ability to take everything by reneging, then B does not fight when p > 1 – cB • B does not fight when A is overwhelmingly stronger.
In the version of the commitment game where A chooses between the status quo worth q and making an offer, A keeps the status quo when p < q + cA • Again, there is no relationship here if p and q move together generally.
Hypothesis 2: There is a nonlinear relationship between the dyadic distribution and war; it rises at first and then falls.
Story 3: Multiple Equilibria In the BdM, Morrow, and Zorick paper, there are multiple equilibria with the following properties: • For extreme values of the observable balance, the weaker side always avoids war by either not making a demand or submitting to one. • For moderate values, the parties always fight if neither side gives in. • Negotiated settlements, as opposed to unilateral concessions, only possible when the sides are relatively equal.
Hypothesis 3: The probability of a demand rises as the observable balance becomes more favorable to the initiator. Hypothesis 4: The probability of the demand being granted rises as the observable balance becomes more favorable to the initiator. Hypothesis 5: The likelihood of mutual violence given a crisis–a demand made and resisted–goes down and then up as the observable balance becomes more favorable to the initiator. The lowest chance of war should be near equality.
Big caveat: The model published in the paper is incorrect, but I believe these properties will occur in a more general and correctly solved model.
A Test of these Hypotheses • Data set: Directed dyads of CoW disputes; only the initiator vs. original target with the following dropped: • Cases that ended with released or unclear outcome • Added roughly equal number of non-events • Variables: Composite capabilities for both sides; initiation, reciprocation, and escalation to mutual violence
