The Vice President and Foreign Policy: From the most insignificant office to Gore as Russia Czar

1. The Vice President and Foreign Policy:From �the most insignificant office� to Gore as Russia Czar Aaron Mannes Researcher - University of Maryland�s Institute for Advanced Computer Studies Ph.D. student - University of Maryland School of Public Policy www.aaronmannes.com amannes@umd.edu

2. Introduction: Two Themes Vice President�s role in national security Is a Vice Presidential role needed? What should it be? Challenges of stabilizing and encouraging reform abroad These two themes meet in analyzing Gore�s role in the Clinton administration�s Russia policy

3. Key Sources Paul Light, Vice Presidential Power: Advice and Influence in the White House Paul Kengor, Wreath Layer or Policy Player? The Vice President�s Role in Foreign Policy Marie Natoli, American Prince, American Pauper: The Contemporary Vice Presidency in Perspective Senate Historical Office, Vice Presidents of the United States, 1789-1993 James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul: Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War Strobe Talbott�s The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy

4. Overview of the Vice Presidency:The First 150 Years Minimal Constitutional authority Marginalized by the Senate Often perceived by Presidents as rivals

5. FDR & The Vice Presidency Henry A. Wallace, 1941-45 Ran the Bureau of Economic Warfare (BEW), a 3000 person agency charged with stockpiling crucial war supplies Got into turf wars with the Commerce and State FDR dissolved BEW in 1943 and dropped Wallace from the ticket in 1944 Harry S. Truman, 1945 On taking office after FDR�s death was unaware of the atomic bomb project or the status of talks with Stalin on post-war Europe To ensure this never happened again the VP was included as a statutory member of the National Security Council

6. Nixon & The Vice Presidency Established the role of the political vice president under Eisenhower Active at NSC, but denied line authority Although Nixon did not include his VP in the policy process there were enormous changes to the office VP�s office received its own budget line item in 1969 Watergate, Agnew�s resignation, and the unelected Ford Presidency placed the VP in a new light

7. Short Unhappy Vice Presidency of Nelson Rockefeller Selected to strengthen the unelected Ford presidency Hoped to run domestic policy by chairing Domestic Policy Council Frozen out of policy-making when Ford moved in other directions Demonstrated two principles of VP influence Without the President�s support the VP has no influence Line assignments can enmesh VPs in turf wars and make them lightning rods for opposition

8. Mondale: VP as Senior Advisor Carter was the first true outsider VP and he selected an insider VP Carter agreed to give Mondale all the tools he needed for the position Mondale rejected line authority, preferring a role as Senior Advisor Mondale had key allies on the President�s staff Adopted a low-key, non-public role in the policy process

9. George H. W. Bush:Low Profile Continuity Adopted Mondale�s model Took on some line assignments, chaired the crisis management unit of the NSC Bush�s restrained response when Reagan was shot won praise As President, Bush did not rely heavily on his VP - changes to the VP�s status are not permanent

10. Clinton-Gore:The Vice President as Partner Experience in Washington and internationally complemented Clinton Personal compatibility National security process innovations reflected this relationship Gore�s National Security Advisor had seats on the Principals and Deputies Committees at the NSC NSC deputies had an arrangement ensuring that Gore was in the loop and did not derail the process

11. Russia Policy: From Stability to Transformation Post-Soviet Russia risked, in the words of Clinton�s top Russia advisor Strobe Talbott, becoming �a nuclear Yugoslavia� Bush 41 focused on �what we do not want to happen there� Talbott sought to �nurture the best that might happen in the former Soviet Union� Three tracked process: Security Economic Liberalization Political Liberalization

12. Establishing the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC) Proposed by Russian FM Kozyrev to Talbott in March 1993 Intended to be an extended working group that would help build Russian governance capabilities with a focus on Russia�s inter-agency process Mechanism for institutionalizing bi-national partnerships

13. Growth of the GCC GCC met 10 times, first meeting on September 1-2, 1993 After Chernomyrdin was fired in March 1998, meetings were held with several Chernomyrdin successors GCC included hundreds of officials from Energy, Defense, Commerce, HHS, Agriculture, NASA and others Signed over 200 agreements from major energy and space deals to nuts and bolts technical exchanges

15. Early Mandate: Space & Energy Focus on preventing proliferation of missile & nuclear technologies Implemented Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar) First meeting dealt with Russian rocket sales that could have triggered US sanctions under MCTR Sought to establish a broad space and energy partnership worth billions making smaller deals from proliferation unappealing

16. Security Track Assessment Worst case scenarios were avoided while NATO expanded eastward Political and technical levels reinforced one another Iranian exception Despite a 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement arms sales to Iran did not stop Russia continued to sell nuclear technology to Iran July 1998 administration sanctioned seven Russian entities that were transferring technology to Iran - forestalling more severe congressional sanctions The administration was concerned that congressional sanctions would have damaged overall relations

17. Transformation Track:OVP & State vs. Treasury US sought to foster economic and political reform 1993 rise of ultra-nationalists raised concerns about Russia�s stability Gore criticized ultra-nationalists, but also IMF conditions Talbott called for �less shock and more therapy� Treasury officials felt their efforts undermined 1996 flawed Russian privatization led to the rise of the oligarchs Chernomyrdin, former Gazprom chief, a suspected beneficiary US government did not criticize for fear of undermining Yeltsin 1998 Russian economy collapses, Russians assume US linked to oligarchs

18. Committed to Yeltsin Transformation agenda focused on supporting Yeltsin Skeptics did not develop alternatives Gore and Talbott�s combined influence dominated policy process

19. Micro-Issues Some agencies resisted GCC initiatives while others were pre-empted by GCC activity VP staff may have been too small to manage the process Accusations that GCC was a PR exercise that distracted from real work and the established inter-agency process

20. Transformation Track Assessment Efforts to build civil society, rule of law, and democracy were not successful Russian economic growth has been driven by resources, not economic liberalization Demographic and public health trends are abysmal Engagement fostered suspicion of US motives among Russian Transformation efforts may have been essential to the security track

21. Analyzing the VP�s Role VP�s engagement brings prestige Preparation for the Presidency VP may not have necessary staff VP may not have time Can burnish a VP�s reputation, but can also harm it