Amparo González-Ferrer (CSIC, Spain ) Laura Morales ( Univ. of Manchester, UK)

1. Does the citizenship regime matter? Turnout of immigrants and their children in local & national elections in Europe Amparo González-Ferrer (CSIC, Spain) Laura Morales (Univ. of Manchester, UK)

2. Research Question(s) • Do citizenship regimes matter for electoral participation? • If so... • Does its effect vary across generations? • Does its effect vary across electoral arenas?

3. Introduction • Citizenship regimes have been assumed to have significant effects on immigrants’ integration… • These effects have been demonstrated for some aspects of political integration (claims-making & collective mobilization)… • … but very little cross-national research for turnout, especially of children of immigrants

4. Previous Evidence on Immigrant Turnout • Substantial gaps in electoral turnout between immigrants and natives • Smaller gaps if immigrants are naturalized • Substantial cross-national variation… maybe related to effects of citizenship regimes???

5. Conceptual Problems • Citizenship regimes are multifaceted , not completely coherent & not completely immutable • However, some of their basic dimensions are expected to be crucial on immigrants’ turnout: • rules for citizenship acquisition • (sub-national) voting rights • antidiscrimination policies

6. In addition to citizenship regimes… Otherfactors are expectedtoshapethe electoral behaviour of immigrant-originvoters: • Place of birth, age at migration & citizenship (i.e. GENERATION) • Electoral arena & mobilization: • Local vs. nationalissues • Electoral systems (candidates’ selection and voting rules) • Local Context (decentralization, immigration-relatedconflict, etc.)

7. Hypotheses • Turnout gap betw. 1st & 2nd Gen vs Natives will be largest in societies with more restrictive citizenship regimes • Turnout gap betw. 2nd Gen vs Natives will be smaller than betw. 1st Gen vs Natives , especially in countries that recognize ethnic identities and develop anti-discrimination policies • Immigrant turnout gaps will be largest for national than for local elections, especially in restrictive citizenship regimes • Immigrant turnout gaps in local elections will decline with higher decentralization, party arrangements to include ethnic minority members & preferential voting • Turnout will increase with education, interest in politics, length of residence, language proficiency, and associational engagement

8. Data • LocalmultidemInvidualSurvey, enlargedversion (includingtwinprojects in othercities) • Sub-sample of citieswithsubstantialsecondgenerationpopulations: Geneva, Zurich, Oslo, Lyon, London & Stockholm (diff. citizenshipregimes) • Largeinformationon socio-demogcharacteristics, group and contextual-level variables

9. Dependent & Independent Variables • DV: turnout in national & local elections • IV: • Generation (1st, 2nd ornative) • Citizenship (foreignornot) • Controlsfor socio-ec, migrationexperience & politicalattitudes (interest in politics) & behaviour (associat. Involvement) • Methods: logisticregressionbycity & type of election

10. Samples of EligiblePeople in Nationalor Local Elections, bycity & group

11. Turnout Ratios in NationalElections

12. Turnout Ratios in Local Elections

13. Multivariate results

14. Turnout Gaps in NationalElections, bycity & generation (ref. autocht.) All controls included

15. Results in National Elections • Two extremes: eithersubstantial gaps forboth 1st & 2nd generations (in exclusionistregimeslike SWITZ & NOR) or no gap at all (in bothassimilationist & multicultural regimeslike FR & SE, respectively) • But… • Heterogeneitywithin Multicultural regime (London vs Stockholm) • Remarkablecross-cityvariation (Zurich vs. Geneva)

16. Turnout Gaps in Local Elections, bycity & generation (ref. autocht.)

17. Results in Local Elections • Smaller gaps than in national elections • Systematically larger & significant gaps for foreigners than for naturalized and native-born immigrants • Relatively ‘better performance’ of exclusionist cities, which eliminate gaps for 2nd generation (Oslo) or 1st & 2nd (Zurich)

18. Conclusions H1: SUPPORTED: Turnout gap is larger societies with more restrictive citizenship regimes, which are not necessarily completely defined at the national level (Switzerland) H2. Partially supported: Turnout gap of 2nd Gen is smaller than for their parents (YES) BUT NOT especially in countries that recognize ethnic identities and develop anti-discrimination policies (BECAUSE ALSO IN LYON & GEN) H3: SUPPORTED: Immigrant turnout gaps will be largest for national than for local elections, especially in restrictive citizenship regimes (HOWEVER 1ST GEN IN OSLO STILL LARGE GAP IN LOCAL ELECTIONS) H4. Partially supported: Immigrant turnout gaps in local elections will decline with higher decentralization, party arrangements to include ethnic minority members & preferential voting (YET, LARGE GAP IN OSLO FOR 1ST GEN: maybe because of 1.5 generation) H5: Partially Supported: Turnout increases with interest in politics & associational engagement, but not necessarily with education or length of residence (INTERACTIONS NEEDED).