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Can the United Nations do anything about global terrorism?

0. Can the United Nations do anything about global terrorism?. Should it do anything? Presentation_00. (2) The Problems and Debates when talking about the United Nations. 0. The debate about what the UN is and what it is not – the creature of the nation states.

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Can the United Nations do anything about global terrorism?

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  1. 0 Can the United Nations do anything about global terrorism? Should it do anything? Presentation_00

  2. (2) The Problems and Debates when talking about the United Nations 0 • The debate about what the UN is and what it is not – the creature of the nation states. • The debate about the purpose of the UN being able to preserve peace and security and enhance the human condition – not join a war offered by a few states. • The problem that the UN structurally is a number of varied bodies, some of which are more autonomous than others: General Assembly (GA), Security Council (SC), Secretary General (SG), many agencies (WHO, UNESCO, WB) and ‘programs’ (UNHCR, UNDP) and funds (UNICEF; UNFPA)

  3. (3) Historically… 0 • The UN has a bad track record in dealing with terrorism – definitional impasse, Israeli- Palestinian issues, etc. • The UN-US rift (UNAUSA; Bennis; Malone) • The contemporary dilemma of UN ‘scandals’ of leadership, the Oil-for-Food program (UN; Inquiry Report; Oil-for-Food Facts; UNAUSA), and sex scandals (Congo; Bosnia; Liberia)

  4. (4) First, what are the aims of global counter-terrorist policies? 0 • Destroy networks, cells, leadership thru • Law enforcement, military means, legal and diplomatic • Deny assets and resources thru • Law enforcement, legal, diplomatic and economic means • Diminish underlying causes & conditions thru • Economic, legal, political and social means

  5. (5) How has the UN responded to the aims of counter-terror policies: 0 Security Council in the Lead • Security Council and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) addressing air piracy, hijacking and air security treaties and codes, (1968–1990). • SC leads UN support for Vienna Conventions on the Protection of Diplomats (1977). • In the 1990s, strong Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) imposing sanctions on Libya (1992; 1993), Sudan (1996: 1044; 1054; 1070) and Afghanistan (1999; 2000) for their direct support of terrorism. Resource: Anti-Terrorism Conventions

  6. (6) Security Council Resolutions 0 • SCR 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999) • the ‘Taliban’ resolution which demands extradition of Osama bin Laden • Imposes strict, smart sanctions on assets, travel of leaders; has major humanitarian provisions • Creates the 1267 Committee

  7. (7) Effects of UNSC sanctions 0 • By 2003, Libya and Sudan are considered ‘success stories’ as they renounce terrorist ties and improve other behaviors related to terrorism (weapons issues, etc). • But it is clear that such changed behavior results when the ‘sticks’ used by the SC are enhanced by the ‘carrots’ provided by single member states.

  8. (8) UN’s Response to 9-11 0 • SCR 1373 (9/28) – unprecedented in its scope of demands on states (see list) • 1373 creates the UN Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC), with British Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock as its 1st chair. • Organizations such as the Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation have helped with research and policy development • In its first 27 months great success in getting nations to sign on to eleven key counter-terrorism treaties and in:

  9. (9) Universal counter-terrorism treaties 0 • State self-reporting with regard to compliance… • 1 report: 196 nations • 2 reports: 161 nations • 3 reports: 107 nations • 4 reports: 26 nations • Convention and treaty ratification improves • Counter-Terror Legislative Assistance: • 52 receive general assistance; • 27 specific

  10. (10) 0 • 147 nations request some assistance and/or training in one or more of these areas: • Police and law enforcement • Immigration and border control • Banking issues and supervision • Fraud documentation and control in various areas from immigration, travel, finances

  11. (11) What does all of this mean? 0 • The CTC and the UN are at their most effective when they • (1) form and hold up to all states what the standards of behavior need to be; • (2) provide a ‘switchboard’ role in connecting those in need of service with the ones who can provide the expertise for that service; • (3) report, counsel and hold compliant those states not meeting the standards

  12. (12) The surprises in the system 0 • The pervasive need for technical assistance in varied areas • The tensions between advanced states and regional organizations in identifying recalcitrant states and the work of the CTC, thus SCRs 1456 (Jan 03), 1526 (Jan 04) • The progress of existing organizations and their capacity as underused….thus the CTC as a ‘switchboard’

  13. (13) 0 • Further the human rights agenda of the CT efforts • Work to sponsor new international meetings on smaller critical issues on which states can make progress – most especially at the regional level (i.e. Asia). • Work with various actors on enhancing ‘compliance’ – especially the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODOC)

  14. (14) To ‘reinvigorate’ the CTC 0 • SCR 1535 (March 2004): establishes the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), with a real staff and a mandate • Establishes a ‘plenary’ of all SC members as members of CTC • SG Annan chooses Spanish Ambassador Ruperez as Exective Director of CTED • But from June 2004-2006, staff still only temporary • Missions are undertaken to three states in March

  15. (15) UN and Big World Politics at CTC 0 • Dilemma of Russian Chair of CTC in autumn of 2004 • The weight of the rift between the US and the UN, Iraq, etc • The emergence of the Danes as CTC chair, April 1, 2005 • How to deal with the malaise that has set in, and the view that the CTC has been by-passed by events

  16. (16) What events and trends? 0 • The strength and commitment of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations to counter-terror operations • The emergence of the OECD’s Financial Action Task Force (1989: FATF) in itself and as a model for revamping the CTC • membership: 31 states & territories, 2 regional organizations (European Commission & Gulf Co-operation Council) and relations with another 50 (2007) • Some other models – like an ‘IAEA’ for finances and immigration suggested

  17. (17) What is then left for the CTC & the UN? 0 • Define the mission of a CTC/CTED • Develop proactive coordination and really institutionalize the ‘switchboard’ function, thus conducting through the CTED credible needs assessments and effective assistance missions. (Check our Matrix) • Spark inter-agency coordination, linking development with such assistance - CTAG

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