Resilient Power Pilot Project ( RESPO)

Resilient Power Pilot Project(RESPO) Research project 2A-1TP1/065 " Increasing the resilience of the distribution system against long-term transmission grid blackout in order to enhance public safety”, supported by Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade Ivan Benes, CityPlanspol. s r.o.. 34th IAEE International Conference Stockholm, June 21-23, 2011

Presentation outline • Global risks • Why should city be more resilient • Power distribution resilient against blackout • RESPO pilot project • Economy of resilience

Economic expert’s view

7 greatest risks in next decade Environmental: Climate change Economic: Fiscal crisis Extreme energy price volatility Societal: Economic disparity Water security Global: Global governance failure Geopolitical conflict Source: 2011 World Economic Forum

3 essential risk nexus • Macro-economic imbalances  • Illegal economy nexus  • Water – food – energy nexus Source: 2011 World Economic Forum

Water – food – energy nexus Biogas from sewage disposal plant could provide electricity for water supply Source: 2011 World Economic Forum

Two thirds of the world's population will live in cities by 2030 • Question: Why should we provide disaster risk reduction? • Answer: Why not if the community can break down in 5 days? • To be or not to be (prepared)?

Maintenance of basic needs is not at all commonplace in coming decades Smart solution can reduce the risk Human needs by Maslow Human safety approach Basic needs to survive

Blackout is sword of Damocles over our cities Coincidence of weaknesses Climate change Intentional attack BLACKOUT Maslow's hierarchy of needs Due to our dependency we are not able to ensure basic human needs as warmth, drink, food, protection, … without electricity

Objective resilience of critical infrastructure: maintenance of basic needs in all cases Critical infrastructure resiliency Fast recovery regardless of economic damages T > 5 days

Blackout can be caused (and more frequently) by windstorm 2007: Kyrill 2008: Emma Emma 2008: Emma – V415 Fortunately criterion N-1 was not exceed

RESPO is one of several R&D critical infrastructure resilience projects Preparedness of population on CBRN threats (MI, 2006-2010) Analysisofhumansafety Analysis of human safety Shared information Shared information Dependency of population protection on Challenges for Critical Infrastructure Challenges for Critical Infrastructure critical infrastructure (M I , 2004 - 2005) Unacceptable risk MI Ministry of Interior MIT Ministry of Industry and Trade Powerdistribution resilience against Critical Infrastructure Resilience Critical Infrastructure Resilience poweroutage (M IT , 2006 - 2011) Shared information Shared information Black starts (M IT , 2007 - 2009) Risk mitigation Risk mitigation What utilities can do? Residual risk Public sector Private sector Dialogue Emergency Power Supply Emergency Power Supply Systemic solution of emergency power supply in crisis situation (M I , 2007 - 2008) Shared information Shared information Population & Property Protection Population & Property Protection Distribution of responsibility

Resilient Power Project (RESPO) Functions: Islanding on the distribution level and crisis demand side managementLocal distribution grid operates like insulated island system Key issue is interoperability between utility and municipal crisis planning Priorities SCADA ~ Crisis plan Transmission grid interoperability Available output Prioritization Dispatching Site generation e.g. sewage plant ~ Distribution grid Local plant ~ District heat smart meter Demand side management Inessentialconsumption necessary

3 questions during the workshop forallstakeholders • Can long term blackout occur? • All stakeholders answered YES! • Is it consequential crisis situation manageable only by Integrated Rescue Services? • All stakeholders answered NO! • Can utilities enhance municipal infrastructure if there will be political and legislative framework? • All stakeholders answered YES!

post-disaster recovery should lead to greater resilience to the next disaster Society is willing to improve prevention rather after severe disasters Renewal of sewage disposal plant Flood 2002

Water supply during flood in Ceske Budejovice (Budweis), August 2002 • City water supply was threatened by damage pipelinein its intersection with the river Malse • Municipal sewage disposal plant was flooded and damaged • Renewal of the sewage disposal plant has included biogas and cogeneration unit (2003-4) • Emergency source of drinking water was built in the neighborhood (2010) • It can be supplied with electricity from sewage disposal plant independently on the power grid (2011) Able to work as an island

Pre-disaster conditionand its following resilience Backup power Main water supply Water treatment Diesel Resilience after flood Ceske Budejovice (Budweis) Resilience after flood Emergency water supply independent on the power grid or diesel

Economy of resilience • Security R&D is necessary (5year program, 130mEUR) • Risk should be shared by all • Security must be internalized into business • Investment into infrastructure resiliency should be covered by customers (power, water, …) Customers CHP DSO CZK/MWh CZK/a CZK/a MWh/a Profit Costs Profit Costs

Costs of Black Start and Power Islanding are reasonable to compare other ancillary services 23 (2011) Including Smart Meter Just functionality

CityPlanspol. s r.o. Contact: Ivan Benes Address: Jindrisska 17, 110 00 Praha 1 ph.: 420 - 277 005 520 mobile: 420 - 603 261 470 fax: 420 - 224 922 072 e-mail: ivan.benes@cityplan.cz www: http://www.cityplan.cz

Resilient Power Pilot Project ( RESPO)