A Scientific Approach to Consistent Functional Analysis: The System Capabilities Analytic Process (SCAP)

1. Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited A Scientific Approach to Consistent Functional Analysis: The System Capabilities Analytic Process (SCAP) 2011 Oct 24 Approved for Public Release – Distribution Unlimited

2. Outline • Functional Analysis • SCAP for Functional Analysis • SCAP Constructs • Applications: • System of Systems (SOS) • Truck Convoy • Networked and Antagonistic SOS • Sources of Dysfunction • Reliability Analysis • Existing Impact for SCAP • SLAD’s Next Steps 2

3. Functional Analysis • Issues: • Multiple “Right” answers: • Each organization has their own way to execute Functional Analysis • Few standard practices and methodologies (i.e.: Functional Analysis Systems Technique) • No standard format for output • Mandated with Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 • Transposition of efforts into other technical endeavors (e.g.: reliability, test, human factors) • Contribution of human-in-the-system performance not included in analysis. (i.e.: person driving truck) • Key process of Systems Engineering, of which many subsequent analysis activities will either reference or utilize. • Functional Analysis is the process that is used to decompose and correlate system requirements to the design of a system. The general process is: • “Translating operational objectives into functions that must be performed.” 1 • “Allocating functions to subsystems by defining functional interactions and organizing them into a modular configuration.” 1 Sources: 1) Kossiakoff, A.; Sweet, W. N.; “Systems Engineering Principles and Practice”; pg 124; John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; Hoboken, NJ; 2003. 3

4. The System Capabilities Analytic Process (SCAP) as Used inFunctional Analysis • The System Capabilities Analytic Process (SCAP) is a methodology that is used to create a map between a systems components and its capabilities. • The map is known as a Functional Skeleton (FS). • Determines what functions and capabilities are achievable when components are functional. • The FS is both a mathematical and graphical construct. • The capabilities of multiple systems can be aggregated to form a rigorous map for an interacting system of systems (SOS). • The foundations of SCAP are in direct correlation with the principles of functional analysis: • Decompose operational objectives into required functions; and • Allocate these functions to the physical entities of the system. • Developed by the Army Research Laboratory for correlating modeling and simulation (M&S) of ground combat vehicle vulnerability and live fire tests (LFT) to the remaining capabilities of a system when components are dysfunctional. 4

5. Benefits and Advantages of SCAP • Because SCAP and the FS are quantitative and scientific constructs of the system and its performance, it is possible to utilize this methodology in efforts such as test and evaluation, reliability analysis, human factors studies, and verification of system requirements. • Reports ability to complete tasks, missions and requirements. • Quantitatively define what the system and personnel can accomplish. • Quantitatively define what components are required to accomplish specified tasks. • Focus of analysis is remaining capability. • Maintain terminology familiar to the military user: • Attainable Speed • Send/Receive Communications • Execute Fire Missions 5

6. The SCAP Functional Skeleton Mission Task System Capabilities System Functions Sub-Systems Components Engine Block Engine System Generate Power Operate in Daytime Conditions Provide Fuel Engine Heads Obtain Location TTP Doctrine Valve Covers Accelerate Travel on Roads Steering System Crankshaft Decelerate 50 mph Camshaft Driver (Incapacitation) Maintain Traction Conduct a Raid 10 mph Support Weight NOT Possible Commander’s Intent Maintain Directional Control Maintain Internal Communications Send/Receive Short-Range Communications Passenger (Injury) Protect Crew Protect Crew from Ballistic Threats Driver (Injury) Prevent Catastrophic Loss 6

7. Determining Availability within Activation Trees Aggregation for Series: Aggregation for Parallel: 7

8. SCAP Can Be Applied to System of System, Time Dependent, and Live Fire Vulnerability Analyses Two trucks are operating in a convoy mission. By the commander’s intent, the speed of the convoy is limited to the speed of the slowest vehicle. t 10min 0 30s Travel on Roads Travel on Roads Conduct A Convoy 70 mph 70 mph 30 mph 30 mph Generate Power Generate Power 10 mph 10 mph Provide Fuel Provide Fuel Maintain Temp NOT Possible NOT Possible Maintain Temp Commander’s Intent Accelerate Accelerate Engage Enemies Engage Enemies Decelerate Decelerate Protect Crew Protect Crew Prevent Catastrophic Loss Prevent Catastrophic Loss 8

9. Vehicle 2 has been damaged, but mobility has not yet been affected t 10min 0 30s Vehicle not damaged Vehicle damaged Travel on Roads Travel on Roads Conduct A Convoy 70 mph 70 mph 30 mph 30 mph Generate Power Generate Power 10 mph 10 mph Provide Fuel Provide Fuel Maintain Temp NOT Possible NOT Possible Maintain Temp Commander’s Intent Accelerate Accelerate Engage Enemies Engage Enemies Decelerate Decelerate Protect Crew Protect Crew Prevent Catastrophic Loss Prevent Catastrophic Loss 9

10. The Mission is Affected as Vehicle Performance Degrades t 10min 0 30s Vehicle not damaged Vehicle damaged Travel on Roads Travel on Roads Conduct A Convoy 70 mph 70 mph 30 mph 30 mph Generate Power Generate Power 10 mph 10 mph Provide Fuel Provide Fuel Maintain Temp NOT Possible NOT Possible Maintain Temp Commander’s Intent Accelerate Accelerate Engage Enemies Engage Enemies Decelerate Decelerate Protect Crew Protect Crew Prevent Catastrophic Loss Prevent Catastrophic Loss 10

11. The mission impact is updated as vehicle performance continues to degrade t 10min 0 30s Vehicle not damaged Vehicle damaged Travel on Roads Travel on Roads Conduct A Convoy 70 mph 70 mph 30 mph 30 mph Generate Power Generate Power 10 mph 10 mph Provide Fuel Provide Fuel Maintain Temp NOT Possible NOT Possible Maintain Temp Commander’s Intent Accelerate Accelerate Engage Enemies Engage Enemies Decelerate Decelerate Protect Crew Protect Crew Prevent Catastrophic Loss Prevent Catastrophic Loss 11

12. Application of SCAP to Networked and Antagonistic SOS Provide Overwatch Observe for Indirect Fires Communicate Fire Missions Detect Target Send Communications Occupy an Area Fire Munition Conduct a Tactical Road March and Execute Indirect Fires Storyboard inspired by the SOS example of the UAV and Ground Combat Vehicle in the book: Deitz, et.al.; “Fundamentals of Ground Combat System Ballistic Vulnerability / Lethality”; pgs 121-126; American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc.; Reston, VA; 2009. 12

13. Using the Functional Skeleton to Link Systems of Systems Connect systems by mutual system capabilities. • If the UAV detects the target, it can send information to the SPH. • If the SPH is able to receive communications, it can fire on the target. Conduct Indirect Fires Observe for Artillery Fires Operate in Day Conditions Operate in Day Conditions Open breechblock Maintain Powered Flight Aim on Target, Indirect Fires Retrieve Munition Maintain Electrical Power Maintain Navigation Fire Muniton Load / Ram Muniton Energize Sensor Detect Target Retrieve Propellant Maintain Internal Communications Detect Signature Load / Ram Propellant Observe Target (Video) Close breechblock Compare to signature library Send/Receive Long- Range Communications Designate Target Retrieve primer Designate signature as Target Install primer Send/Receive Long-Range Communications Protect Crew Attach firing lanyard Prevent Catastrophic Loss Prevent Catastrophic Loss Gunner pulls lanyard 13

14. SCAP can be applied to assess any type of dysfunction If a component is assessed as dysfunctional, then the remaining system capabilities can be determined using the functional skeleton. Reliability Failure Ballistic “killed” Electronic Warfare Dysfunction CBRN Environmental … Abuse 14

15. Process for using the Functional Skeleton in a Numerical Reliability Simulation • Build use cases using the Mission Tasks. Determine the frequency each use case will be applied relative to the whole set. Assign time duration for each use case. • Decompose the Mission Tasks with the appropriate System Capabilities. • Determine the life-consuming load on each System Capability, System Function, Sub System, and Component for each use case. • Define use case failure conditions and repair times. • Run a time analysis: • Randomly pick a use case • Run through the time of the use case, evaluating component reliability as the simulation runs. • If a component fails, use the Functional Skeleton to determine the impact to all the use cases and determine if the current use case continues. • Initiate repairs if needed. • Continue looping time and use cases until either a system abort condition exists or the expected system life is achieved. • Analyze the data and determine if the system has met the requirements. 15

16. Probabilistic Evaluation of Reliability in the Functional Skeleton * Mission Task System Capabilities Sub-Systems System Functions Engine System Generate Power 90.4% Operate in Daytime Conditions 90.4% 99.7% Provide Fuel 98.6% Obtain Location TTP Doctrine 99.1% Accelerate 97.4% Travel on Roads 99.3% Decelerate Components 50 mph 86.2% . . . 81.0% Conduct a Raid >99.99% Engine Block 10 mph NOT Possible Engine Heads 99% Commander’s Intent 99% Valve Covers Maintain Internal Communications 99.3% Crankshaft 98% Send/Receive Short-Range Communications PF(t) = 0.02 98.2% 98% Camshaft t = 200 hours Sensor 96% 99.5% Protect Crew PS(t) = 1 – PF(t) PS(t) = 1 – 0.02 = 0.98 . . . Prevent Catastrophic Loss 98.0% * Reliability numbers are notional and do not represent any system 16

17. Existing Impact for SCAP • Written into the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) for both the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) as the methodology for system-level analysis in the Army Test and Evaluation Command's (ATEC) Mission-Based Test and Evaluation (MBT&E). • One of two methodologies that serve as the foundation for ARL’s Human Availability Technique (HAT). • Evaluates both system performance and human cognitive performance simultaneously to determine total system capabilities • Emerging as the Human Availability metric. • Presented at Human Factors and Ergonomics Symposium in Sept 2011; nominated for best paper. • Applied to the Live-Fire Test results of the JLTV to determine remaining capability after a ballistic event. • Undergoing trial as a system analysis tool for the ARL System of Systems Survivability Simulation (S4). • Used to develop evolving methodologies for evaluating effectiveness of smoke and obscurant use in warfare. • Incorporated as the engineering architecture for the ARL Virtual Shot-Line (VSL) Tool. PIM JLTV (A potential variant) 17

18. ARL’s Next Steps for SCAP within Live Fire and Vulnerability Analyses • Apply to production criticality analyses of Red Targets • Trial Reliability methodology on at least one Army fielded system. • Develop methodologies to correlate SCAP to theater events and develop vulnerability reductions based on analyses. • Further exploration and integration of crew metrics in ARL deliverables. • Trial time-dependent degradation  for example, a leaking cooling system. • Conduct SCAP-based analyses for the MBT&E pilots (JLTV, PIM, JAGM) • Trial in S4 and MUVES 3. 18

19. Publications • Significant Briefings: • “A Process for Mapping Component Function to Mission Completion”; NDIA 26th Annual National Test and Evaluation (T&E) Conference, Mar 2010 • 2010 August JLTV LF Integrated Product Team (IPT) Meeting • “An Emerging Methodology for Mapping Between a System’s Components and Capabilities: The System Capabilities Analytic Process (SCAP)”; 49th Annual Army Operations Research Symposium, Oct 2010 • “An Emerging Methodology for Mapping Between a System’s Components and Capabilities: The System Capabilities Analytic Process (SCAP)”; NDIA 27th Annual National T&E Conference, Mar 2011 • 2011 Human Factors and Ergonomics Symposium (Human Availability Technique) • “SCAP Application to Battlefield Obscuration”; Obscurant Symposium, 2011 May 11 • Technical Publications: • Agan, K.; “An Emerging Methodology: The System Capabilities Analytic Process”; ARL-TR-5415; Army Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Dec 2010 • Agan, K.; Landis, W.; “A First Review of an Emerging Methodology: The System Capabilities Analytic Process (SCAP), as Presented at the Mission-Based Test & Evaluation (MBT&E) Workshop on January 20”; ARL-SR-0218; Army Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Dec 2010 • Landis, W.; “Applying the System Capabilities Analytic Process (SCAP) to the Mission-Based Testing and Evaluation (MBT&E) of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)”; ARL-SR-206; Army Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Sep 2010 • Agan, K.; “The System Capabilities Analytic Process (SCAP) as Presented at the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) 26th Annual National Test and Evaluation (T&E) Conference on March 2, 2010”; ARL-SR-0217; Army Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Dec 2010 • Mitchell, D.; Samms, C.; Agan, K.; “Both Sides of the Coin: Technique for Integrating Human Factors and Systems Engineering in System Development”; to be published in the annual proceedings of the 2011 HFES 19

20. Contact Information Kevin Agan Mechanical Engineer ARL/SLAD (410) 278-4458 kevin.agan@us.army.mil William J. Landis Mechanical Engineer ARL/SLAD (410) 278-2675 william.landis1@us.army.mil 20