Table of Contents Exhibits of Northwest Airlines, Inc.

1. Table of Contents Exhibits of Northwest Airlines, Inc. Exhibit No. Commerce Affected – Exhibits 1-7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 London Is Almost 3 Times Larger Than the Next Largest U.S. – Transatlantic Market, and Is Bigger Than the Next 3 Largest Markets Combined The U.S. – London (LHR/LGW) Market Is Larger Than the Entire U.S. – Germany Market and the Entire U.S. – France Market The Seven Nonstop Overlap U.S. – London Heathrow (LHR) Markets Represent 60.7% of U.S. – Heathrow Annual Passengers The Seven Nonstop Overlap U.S. – London Heathrow (LHR) Markets Account for Almost $3.9 Billion and Represent 74.7% Total Annual U.S. – Heathrow Revenues Per Year The Seven Overlap U.S. – Heathrow Markets Are 12 Times Larger Than The Overlap Routes Analyzed in the United (UA)/Lufthansa (LH) Antitrust Immunity Application The Seven Overlap U.S. – Heathrow Routes Are Twice As Large As the United (UA)/ US Airways (US) Nonstop Overlap Routes That Prompted a DOJ Announced Court Challenge The Seven Overlap U.S. – Heathrow Routes Are Over Ten Times Larger Than the Northwest (NW)/Continental (CO) Routes That Prompted a DOJ Court Challenge Heathrow Preference – Exhibits 8-11 8 9 10 11 Based on DOT Data, Different Passenger Mix at LHR versus LGW Results in Average Round Trip Fares Between the U.S. and London That Are 31% Higher at Heathrow Than at Gatwick According to British Airways, Its Unit Revenues for London Heathrow (LHR) Services Are 15% Higher Than Unit Revenues at Gatwick (LGW) Virtually No U.S. – London Traffic Connects Over Other European Gateways Connecting Service to London Heathrow (LHR) via Other European Gateways Imposes a Substantial Time Penalty on U.S. – Heathrow Passengers (i)

2. Table of Contents Exhibits of Northwest Airlines, Inc. Exhibit No. Market Power – Exhibits 12-24 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 The Overall U.S. – London (LHR/LGW) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 12 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power The Overall U.S. – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 17 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power The New York (JFK) – London (LHR/LGW) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 21 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power The New York (JFK) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 20 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power The New York (JFK/EWR) – London (LHR/LGW) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 16 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power The New York (JFK/EWR) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration Almost 20 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power The Boston (BOS) – London (LHR/LGW) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 18 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power The Boston (BOS) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 33 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power The Chicago (ORD) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 15 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power The Miami (MIA) – London (LHR/LGW) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 25 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power (ii)

3. Table of Contents Exhibits of Northwest Airlines, Inc. Exhibit No. 22 23 24 The Miami (MIA) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 44 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power The Dallas/Ft. Worth (DFW) – London Gatwick (LGW) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 44 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power The Los Angeles (LAX) – London Heathrow (LHR) Market Is Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 6 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power Heathrow Slots – Exhibits 25-39 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 New Entrant Heathrow Carriers Will Be Unable to Obtain Slots Even If a New Entrant Heathrow Carrier Could Obtain a “Runway Slot,” It Would Face Severe Obstacles in Obtaining a Suitable “Stand” at Which to Load and Unload Its Passengers There Are Virtually No Additional Stands Available at Heathrow That Are Suitable for Wide Body Operations Even If Runway Slots and Stands Were Available for New Entrant Wide Body Operations, the Scarcity of SEVEN Other Essential Heathrow Facilities and the Unlikelihood of Assembling All Seven at the Same Time and Same Terminal Make New Entry at Heathrow a Practical Impossibility Frozen Entry Conditions at Heathrow Are Likely to Persist for at Least the Next Six Years  To Be Commercially Viable in the U.S. – London Market, U.S. Carriers Require Access to Slots Within Specified Time Windows After the Merger, American Airlines/British Airways Would Control 41.5% of Heathrow’s Commercially Viable Slots London Heathrow’s (LHR) Commercially Viable Slots are Already Highly Concentrated. The AA/BA Alliance Would Produce an Increase in Concentration 2 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power (iii)

4. Table of Contents Exhibits of Northwest Airlines, Inc. Exhibit No. 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 After Both Alliances, American Airlines/British Airways and United Airlines/British Midland Would Control 58.2% of Heathrow’s Commercially Viable Slots American Airlines, British Airways, and United Already Control 83.4% of All U.S. – Heathrow Weekly Frequencies (W.F.) London Heathrow’s (LHR) Commercially Viable Slots are Already Highly Concentrated. Simultaneous Creation of an AA/BA Alliance and a UA/BD Alliance Would Produce a Greater Increase in Concentration – Almost 3 Times Greater Than the DOJ Threshold for the Presumption of Market Power – Than an AA/BA Alliance Alone KLM Cannot and Will Not Make Any of Its Heathrow Slots Available to Northwest Airlines Even If KLM Were Willing and Able to Provide Northwest With Heathrow Slots, It Does Not Possess Sufficient Commercially Viable Slots, Stands and Terminal Areas to Fund Even One Daily Round Trip The Vast Majority of Commercially Viable Heathrow Slots – 77.9% – Are Under the Control of Airlines and Airline Groups That Will Be Unable or Unwilling to Make Them Available to Non-Incumbent U.S. Air Carriers Although 745 Weekly Slots Are Theoretically Available for Acquisition by New Entrant U.S. Airlines, After Oneworld, Star and Virgin Are Removed, Realistically There Are NO Weekly Slots Available for Acquisition by Any U.S. Carrier Public Benefits – Connectivity – Exhibits 40-52 40 41 42 London Heathrow Has Limited Utility as a Connecting Facility. To Fund High Frequency Point-to-Point Service, British Airways Has Deleted Large Numbers of Cities from Its Heathrow Network Even Though Heathrow Has Limited and Shrinking Utility As a Connecting Facility U.S. Passengers Who Can Access Points Beyond London at Heathrow Outnumber U.S. Passengers Who Can Access Points Beyond London at Gatwick by 74 Percent British Airways Actually Serves 27 Fewer Cities from Heathrow With Its Own Aircraft Today Than Six Years Ago, and Six Fewer Cities Than a Year Ago (iv)

5. Table of Contents Exhibits of Northwest Airlines, Inc. Exhibit No. 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 British Airways Has Implemented Commercial Strategies to Discourage Transfer Passengers Because British Airways Does Not Want Passengers to Use Heathrow Airport as a Transfer Station to Its European Network British Airways Has Adjusted Its Schedule to Discourage Transfer Traffic from Using Heathrow Airport American and Its Current Code Share Partners Already Can Create Pervasive “On-line” Access to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East With London’s Limited Utility as a Transfer City, the AA/BA Code Share Plan Provides Virtually No Additional Network Access to Europe, Africa and the Middle East Beyond That Which American Airlines Already Has With Its Existing Code Share Partners The AA/BA Code Share Plan Provides Virtually No Additional Network Access to Europe, Africa and the Middle East Beyond That Which American Airlines Already Has With Its Existing Code Share Partners The 527 O&D City Pair Markets That Are Transaction Specific to the AA/BA Alliance Are Very Small, Producing Only 45,110 Passengers Per Year, an Average of Less Than 0.1 Passenger Per Day Each Way (PDEW) to the 17 Unique BA Points On a Hypothetical Total Network to Total Network Basis, American Airlines Passengers Would Have Much Broader Access to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East on Its Existing Code Share Partners Than They Would Have on British Airways American’s Hypothetical Total Network Access With Its Existing Code Share Partners Is Greater Than a Hypothetical American/British Airways Combined Network Compared to Existing Major Immunized Alliances, AA/BA Provides Virtually No Additional Market Access to Europe, Africa and the Middle East American Airlines’ Commercial Relationships, Many of Which Occur Outside of the Oneworld Brand, Already Make American Airlines the Anchor of the Second Largest Airline Group in the World – Counting British Airways, It Is the World’s Largest (v)