Britain and the EU

1. Britain and the EU

4. The Background • PM David Cameron’s in/out referendum pledge (23 January 2013) • The growth of UKIP – supporters of “Brexit” • Referendum announced for June 23 2016 • Last year was fortieth anniversary of Britain’s 1975 referendum on EEC membership

5. Support for a Brexit Referendum Source: Chatham House/YouGov 2015

6. Overview of the argument • Debate in 1975 strikingly similar to that of today • Reason why EU membership remains controversial in mainstream parties is combination of British exceptionalism and politicization of immigration • On the radical Left the neoliberal basis of the EU is the problem • “Brexit” would leave huge amount of unfinished EU business • Regardless of the outcome, a referendum won’t magically heal divisions over EU in British politics

7. The 1975 EEC Referendum Debate • Criticisms of European integration back then sound familiar today • UK pays too much for too few benefits • Europe is too inward-looking • Britain must stay aloof from federal blueprints for monetary integration (EU and EMU already on the agenda!) • In 1970 all 3 major parties (Conservatives, Labour, Liberals) support joining EEC without a referendum • But 1974 Labour party wins election with manifesto pledge to • renegotiate terms of membership • “restore to the British people the right to decide the final issue of British membership of the Common Market” • Cameron’s strategy for 2015 election is identical: renegotiation followed by a referendum (2017)

8. Why is Cameron offering a referendum? • Logic of party politics • rise of UKIP • internal party dynamics within Conservatives (candidate selection) • Logic of British exceptionalism • “we are in Europe, but not of it” (Churchill) • “in Europe, but not run by it” (William Hague) • exceptionalism sees EU as utilitarian arrangement, “excludes a normative commitment to the European ideal … and evokes British superiority” (Gifford, 2010: 329) • Change in the nature of the EU? • glaring differences between today’s EU and 1975 EEC • but UK pushed for significant changes (e.g. enlargement) and has bespoke policy participation (opt-outs) • nevertheless same concerns about democratic legitimacy and terms of EU membership

9. Why did the 1975 referendum not settle the Europe question? • The 1975 Verdict • clear result: 67% majority (65% turnout) • Britain today not so different from other EU countries • far-from-unique context of fragmenting party system and decline of trust in elites and political institutions • politically seductive, populist instrumentalization of EU immigration from lower income member states • top of David Cameron’s renegotiation agenda is the idea of restraining the fundamental EU principle of free movement of people

11. Rise of Immigration as Most Important Issue

13. UKIP anti-imigration poster

14. Conservative arguments againstmembership of the European Union • Toomuchregulation • Toomuch money spentsupportingEuropean agriculture • Immigration from EU isseen as a ‘problem’

18. Leftwing arguments againstmembership of the EU • The Greek crisis has shownthat the EU leadership does not work in the interests of ordinaryworkers • The EU is not democratic • The EU iswedded to a neoliberalpolicy of encouragingprivatization and the centrality of profit in public services.

21. What are the prospects for renegotiation ? • The 1974/75 precedent • scale of renegotiation ambition and the ability to forge partnerships with foreign capitals are decisive factors • Labour government settles for non-treaty-based changes (budget, food from Commonwealth) • Government is able to recommend to voters “a better deal for Britain” • 2015 and beyond • review of balance of competences did not find “smoking gun” • low UK political capital (veto fiasco, attacks on Juncker) • hardline eurosceptics insist on unilateral action (e.g. British parliamentary veto) • negotiating treaty change with new Greek government at the helm!

22. Voting on EU membership without treaty change

23. The unfinished business Brexit entails • Participation in single market • negotiating outsider access politically fraught and intertwined with key interest groups • e.g. financial sector (ability to offer banking services), British pensioners abroad, access to EU graduate labour • bilateral deals dependent on reciprocity (unilateral moves by UK would lead to retaliation, as in Swiss labour movement case) • A Generous Exit? • UK product market and labour regulations already lowest in EU (OECD) • EEA/bilateral access requires financial contributions • domestic alternative to CAP necessary • costs of joining CSDP (military/civilian missions) on ad hoc basis • Reopening of Scottish independence question • veto for constituent nations?

24. The Regional Dimension

25. Conclusion: Catharsis by referendum? • In the event of a Yes to EU membership • terms of membership will not have improved significantly • Eurosceptics will remain a potent force (EP elections, opposition to euro) • split in Conservative party mirroring Labour/SDP divide after 1975? • In the event of Brexit • vote to withdraw won’t really clarify future of the UK • more uncertainty than ever by virtue of the need to craft a hugely politicized and highly complex new settlement • party conflict over European policy will remain • Getting a better deal, cementing democratic legitimacy, and resolving relationship with EU all a mirage • In any case, longer-term demographics are pro-EU • 69% 18-34 want to stay vs only 43% 65+ (IPSOS/Mori)