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Open Source Web Entry Server

Open Source Web Entry Server. Ivan Bütler: „This talk is about web-application firewalls with pre-authentication, session hiding, content rewriting and filtering capabilities with open-source software.“. Ivan Bütler Ivan.buetler@csnc.ch. About me. Ivan Bütler ¦ E1.

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Open Source Web Entry Server

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  1. Open Source Web Entry Server • Ivan Bütler: „This talk is about web-application firewalls with pre-authentication, session hiding, content rewriting and filtering capabilities with open-source software.“ Ivan Bütler Ivan.buetler@csnc.ch

  2. About me Ivan Bütler ¦ E1 • Founder & Security Researcher for Compass SecuritySince 1999, Switzerland – www.csnc.ch • Speaker @ BlackHat Las Vegas 2008SmartCard (In) Security – APDU Analysis • Speaker @ IT Underground Warsaw 2009Advanced Web Hacking • Speaker @ Swiss IT Leadership ForumNice2009Cyber Underground • Lead Swiss Cyber Storm2011Security Conference12-15. May 2011, Switzerland – www.swisscyberstorm.com • Board member of Information SecuritySociety Switzerland (ISSS) • Lecturing Activities: HSR & HSLU & FHSG

  3. Win a Car! – Wargame!USD 30‘000 main prize • www.swisscyberstorm.com • May 12-15, 2011 • Switzerland, near Zürich • OWASP Trainings planned!

  4. Goal of this Talk • Learn how to turn the Apache web server into a front-end web-application firewall with pre-authentication, session hiding and URL authorization • We will play with Facebook as our backend application • The LiveCD includes all demos www.hacking-lab.com Hacking-Lab LiveCD

  5. PCI DSS Requirement

  6. Without a Web Application Firewall Multiple connections into DMZ Applications directly accessible

  7. Web App Firewall (WAF) Demo with FB Web Application Firewall • Reverse Proxy to FB • Security Checks • Content Rewriting TOOL TIPmod_proxy

  8. DEMO 1 + 2 demo movies shown here availablein Hacking-Lab – OWASP Eventwww.hacking-lab.com

  9. Content Rewriting www.myproxy.com • Relative URL‘s are not a problem! • Content rewriting is not required www.fb.com <link href="/css/mystyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">

  10. Content Rewriting www.myproxy.com • Absolute URLs must be rewritten • Cookie domain must be rewritten • Cookie values must be rewritten (in some cases) www.fb.com <a href="http://www.fb.com/css/01.css" type="text/css"> TOOL TIPmod_replace

  11. Demo 4 Request Header PatchingCookie Value Patching

  12. Web App Firewall www.myproxy.com • @inspectFile operator is simply a type of API that will allow you to inspect file attachments www.fb.com < requestfiltering | e.g. sql injection > < responsefiltering | e.g. stacktraces > < inspectfiles | e.g. pdfexploitanalysis > TOOL TIPmod_security

  13. Demo 5 + 6 ModSecurity

  14. Web Entry Server • Pre-Authentication • Delegated Login Service (DLS) • Session Hiding • URL Access Control • Principal Delegation to Backend App TOOL TIPmod_but

  15. Web Entry Server- Swiss Blueprint - Web Entry Server • Backend requests are always authenticated! • Strong forensic and logging capabilities Central Login Service

  16. Pre-AuthenticationPrincipal Delegation www.myproxy.com www.fb.com PRINCIPAL login.myproxy.com GET /app HTTP/1.0UserID=1234 RequestID=992x9833asr Login=OKSet-Cookie: UserID=1234;

  17. Pre-AuthenticationSingle Sign On IF SERVICES IS SSO ENABLED Server gets initial request with UserID=1234 from WES Server extracts UserID Server creates a new, authenticated session Server authorizes only ALTERNATIVE: User must authenticated twice (SSO disabled) Delegated Login Service (DLS) IMPORTANT Principal ticket should be an encrypted/signed, timestampted value (against replay attacks) instead of plain-text UserID=1234!

  18. Pre-Authetication - DLSDelegated Login Service www.myproxy.com www.fb.com IMPORTANT DLS authenticates on behalf oftheuserintowww.fb.com (knowsthecredentials out oftheuserrepository) -> Non origin cookies are then set to www.myproxy.com DLS login.myproxy.com

  19. Demo 7 - SSO

  20. Web ForensicsNTP is not enough! TOOL TIPmod_unique-id mod_headers

  21. Demo 7 - UniqueID

  22. URL Access Control www.myproxy.com login.myproxy.com AuthorizationRegexp Login=OKSet-Cookie: AUTHORIZATION=(^/app1|^/app2);

  23. Demo 8 Service Level ACL

  24. Session Managementwithout session store Reverse Proxy Without Session Cache

  25. Session Managementwith session hiding Reverse Proxy Session Cache (SHM)

  26. Entry Server ToolKit http://media.hacking-lab.com/largefiles/livecd/ Hacking-Lab LiveCD

  27. Remember (I) • Pre-Authentication reduces the attack surface of unauthenticated users • Unique-ID enables proper forensics • Cookie store hides insecure cookies • Service ACL is a second line of defence for the application authorization scheme

  28. Remember (II) • Hacking-Lab LiveCD includes all tools you need to replay • Win a car! Qualification wargames have started at www.swisscyberstorm.com • All movies of this talk are available online at www.hacking-lab.com

  29. Thank youIvan Bütler, E1

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