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Responsibility & Free Will. Section 4 The Future is Open. Three Stances. In matters of determinism & free will, three stances are possible : (1) compatibilism (often held in the form of soft determinism) (2) hard determinism (3) indeterminism.
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Responsibility & Free Will Section 4 The Future is Open
Three Stances In matters of determinism & free will, three stances are possible: (1) compatibilism (often held in the form of soft determinism) (2) hard determinism (3) indeterminism. Note: (2) & (3) are contrary forms of incompatibilism.
Compatibilism • The most cogent form of compatibilism represents actions as being caused by the agent’s character. • But this theory turns on the agent’s choices & thus fails to serve any determinism-friendly purpose. • For these reasons, & for others (see, for example, Sec. 3, this Chapter), compatibilism should be abandoned.
Hard Determinism • Counter-intuitive. • Encounters general problems of determinism such as implying that we can discover what we’re going to do inferentially (rather than by decision). • As a form of determinism, it precludes its own rational adoption; hence there can be no case for adopting it.
To Consider • Consider the way in which determinism precludes its own rational adoption. • If it is true, then it cannot be adopted. What are the reasons for this?
Indeterminism • Forms of indeterminism involving unconstrained freedom are implausible. • Forms recognizing that free actions have necessary causal conditions but denying that they have sufficient causal conditions are more plausible.
Free Will & Evolution • Mary Midgley well argues that the emergence of powers of free agency can be facilitated by the evolution of social creatures with plural drives needing to integrate them into coherent actions, as in the Darwinism of Darwin.
Human Agents • While the behaviour of some animals may be voluntary, the development of self-awareness & language allows human agents to envisage options for action, together with diverse values or reasons for adopting them.
Free Agency & Darwinism • Thus the kind of inheritance ascribed to human beings by Darwin supplies a precondition of free agency, as it also does for the emergence of morality.
Conclusion • Affirming indeterminism on this basis doesn’t require us to choose between versions that explain free action by agents’ reasons (Lucas, Ward) & versions that appeal to agent-causation (Reid). • Indeed, these versions seem compatible. • Aristotle’s view of voluntary action requires qualification, but a qualified form of it is also compatible with these kinds of indeterminism.
To Consider • Appraise Midgley’s account of how Darwin’s understanding of our evolutionary heritage helps explain the emergence of free agency.
Finally… • Let’s return to the exercise from Sec. 3 (this Chapter, slide 16): Consider whether to adopt • compatibilism, or… • kinds of determinism that reject belief in free action, or… • kinds of indeterminism that accept this belief.
