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A Graph Game Model for Software Tamper Protection

A Graph Game Model for Software Tamper Protection. Information Hiding ‘07 June 11-13, 2007. Mariusz Jakubowski Ramarathnam Venkatesan Microsoft Research. Nenad Dedić Boston University. Overview. Introduction Past work on software protection Definitions of tamper-resistance

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A Graph Game Model for Software Tamper Protection

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  1. A Graph Game Model for Software Tamper Protection Information Hiding ‘07 June 11-13, 2007 MariuszJakubowski RamarathnamVenkatesan Microsoft Research NenadDedić Boston University

  2. Overview • Introduction • Past work on software protection • Definitions of tamper-resistance • Anti-tampering transformations • Security analysis • Conclusion Modeling of software tamper-resistance

  3. Software Protection • Obfuscation • Making programs “hard to understand” • Tamper-resistance • Making programs “hard to modify” • Obfuscation  tamper-resistance • Tamper-resistance  obfuscation?

  4. Formal Obfuscation • Impossible in general • Black-box model (Barak et al.): • “Source code” doesn’t help adversary who can examine input-output behavior. • Worst-case programs and poly-time attackers • Possible in specific limited scenarios • Secret hiding by hashing (Lynn et al.) • Point functions (Wee, Kalai et al.) • Results difficult to use in practice.

  5. Tamper-resistance • Many techniques used in practice – e.g.: • Code-integrity checksums • Anti-debugging and anti-disassembly methods • Virtual machines and interpreters • Polymorphic and metamorphic code • Never-ending battle on a very active field • Targets: DRM, CD/DVD protection, games, dongles, licensing, etc. • Defenses: Binary packers and “cryptors,” special compilers, transformation tools, programming strategies, etc. • Current techniques tend to be “ad hoc:” • No provable security • No analysis of time required to crack protected instances

  6. Problem Definition We would like an algorithm Protect roughly with following properties: • For any program P, Protect(P) outputs a new program Q: • Q uses almost same resources as P. • For any attacker A, if A(Q) outputs Q’, then either: • For any input x, Q’(x) = Q(x). • Q’ “crashes.” • Informally, tamper-protected P either works exactly like P or fails.

  7. Problems with the Definition • For any program P, Protect(P) outputs a new program Q: • Q uses almost same resources as P • For any attacker A, if A(Q) outputs Q’, then either: • For any input x, Q’(x) = Q(x). • Q’ “crashes.” Definition imprecise, but there is a bigger problem: It is unattainable. Example “attack:” A(Q) = “run Q; append 0 to output”. “Attack” is harmless, but breaks the definition. No easy way out!

  8. Towards a Realistic Model • Give up on complete protection of P. • Protect mainly some critical code portion L. • Protect other parts to deflect attention away from L. • Model restricted (but realistic) attackers. • Make engineering assumptions about security: • Code transformations • Tamper detection • Dataflow • Control flow

  9. Known Techniques and Attacks • Main scenario: • Program P contains some security-critical code L. • For example: • L verifies that P is licensed software. • L verifies that P has a license for rendering content. • L contains important data (e.g., keys and credentials). • … Next : Survey of known techniques and attacks to motivate the model and analysis.

  10. Single-Point Check P L L is called from P: if (L returns 1) then proceed; else terminate; Attack: Control-flow analysis can help identify L. Calls to L can then be patched.

  11. Distributed Check L is broken up into pieces, and/or individualized copies are replicated. P L is called from P: if (L returns 1) then proceed; else terminate; • Attacks – based on flow graph: • L is typically weakly connected to rest of P. • Guess position of one copy of L. Use graph-diffing tofind other copies (subgraph matching).

  12. Code Checksums To prevent tampering, compute checksums C1,…,Ck of code segments. P C1 During execution, compare checksums of loaded code segments with pre-computed values. Ck C2 Attack: Reading code segment can be trapped (some hardware or VM support may be needed). Correct code segment can then be supplied by cracked program or VM.

  13. Oblivious Hashing • Main idea of OH: • Compute hashes H1,…,Hkof execution traces. • Update hashes with values of assigned variables and identifiers based on control flow. • Correct hashes can be precomputed and used to encrypt some data. • Individualized code replicas can be created; OH values from each replica should be equal. P Hk H2 H1 Attacks: Precomputed hash values could be discovered. Code-replica scheme could be attacked using program analysis (addressed in this work).

  14. Anti-disassembly P Disassembling can be made difficult by virtualization and individualization. Idea is to convert P into instances I=(VI,PI). VI - virtual machine. PI - implementation of P for VI. Different instances I, J can have VI VJ . So disassembling I is of little help to disassemble J. Pn P1 Vn V1 P2 V2 Attack: Vulnerable to attacks which do not use low-level details. E.g. “copy-attack”: To find out if branch B is causing crash, save state before B and try multiple paths.

  15. Defense Against Copy Attack 1. Crash only after multiple tampering changes detected. 2. Have many possible crash locations. 3. Delay the crash. 4. Randomize execution paths. • Somewhat achievable using known techniques, e.g.: • Use redundant copies of encrypted data. • Make many code fragments dependent on checks. • Overlap code sections for context-dependent semantics. • Create multiple individualized copies of code.

  16. Defense Against Program Analysis • Basic notion: “local indistinguishability” • Ideally, local observations of code/data/execution should give no useful information to attacker. • In practice, try to satisfy this as much as possible. • Small code fragments all look alike.(E.g., use semantics-preserving peephole transformations.) • Control-flow graph looks like a complete graph.(E.g., use computed jumps and opaque predicates.) • Dataflow graph looks like a complete graph.(E.g., use lightweight encryption and temporary variable corruption.)

  17. Detecting Unusual Data/Code Security-related data/code can look unusual and rare (e.g., XOR used for encryption and random data used for crypto keys both stand out and can be detected). To mitigate, can use peephole transformations, near-clear encryption, data scattering, etc.

  18. Assortment of tools are available. How to combine them effectively? How much security can we get? How to quantify security?

  19. Basic Model Abstraction of software tamper-resistance • Program: • A graph G • Execution: • A “random” walk on G • Integrity check: • Group of nodes in G responsible for monitoring a set of code fragments (probabilistically) • Check failure: • Tampering flagged on all code fragments in a check’s set • Tamper response • An action taken when a “sufficient” number of checks have failed

  20. Elements of Model • Local tamper check: • C=InsertCheck(F1,…,Fs) • Check C of size s specified by s code fragments F1, …, Fs . • Each Fi detects tampering with probability p. • Check fails if each Fidetects tampering. • ( Can have many checks C1,…,Ck .) • Tamper response: • InsertResponse(P, (C1,…,Ck), f ) • P “crashes” if at least f checks fail (f is the threshold). • (“Crash” could be any other form of response: slowdown, graceful degradation, • loss of features, self-correction, etc.)

  21. Elements of Model • Graph transformations: • (V,E)=GraphTransform(P, n) • P is transformed into an equivalent program Q • with flow graph G=(V,E) containing n nodes. • G is random-looking.(rapid mixing of random walks). • Execution of Q induces a random-looking walk on G. • Critical-code embedding: • F’=CodeEntangle(F, L) • Critical code L is embedded into code fragment F, yielding F’. • F’ is equivalent to “ if L returns 1 then execute F ”. • Desirable to make embedded code hard to remove.

  22. The Algorithm Main ideas: 1. Transform the flow graph into a “random” one. 2. Replicate critical code in l random nodes. 3. Randomly insert k checks of size s. 4. Create check response with threshold f. Harden(P, L, l, n, k, s, f): let G = (V,E) = GraphTransform(P, n) for i = 1 to l do select at random vV v = CodeEntangle(L, v) for i= 1 to k do select at random (v1,…,vs)V Ci = InsertCheck(v1,…,vs) InsertResponse(G, (C1,…,Ck), f )

  23. The Algorithm • Programmer assistance can help in algorithm: • Choose places to embed critical code L. • Identify code/data suitable for checking. • Identify code/data suitable for tamper response.

  24. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on the program graph G. Goal: Run the program and avoid executing critical code L. • Game moves • Make a step on G: • either followuntampered execution of P • or tamper to change execution • (tampering detected by checks…) • Guessa check D=(u1,…,us). • If D=Ci, then Ciis disabled. • If P crashes, restart.

  25. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G

  26. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G Check = set of nodes.

  27. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G Check = set of nodes. = critical code

  28. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G Check = set of nodes. Execution = walk on G. = critical code

  29. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G Check = set of nodes. Execution = walk on G. • In each (random) step A can either: • observe • models untampered execution = critical code

  30. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G Check = set of nodes. Execution = walk on G. • In each (random) step A can either: • observe • models untampered execution • - tamper current node = critical code

  31. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G Check = set of nodes. Execution = walk on G. • In each (random) step A can either: • observe • models untampered execution • - tamper current node Check is activatedwhen all its nodes are tampered. = critical code

  32. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G Check = set of nodes. Execution = walk on G. • In each (random) step A can either: • observe • models untampered execution • - tamper current node Check is activated when all its nodes are tampered. P crashes when f checks are activated. = critical code

  33. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G Check = set of nodes. Execution = walk on G. • In each (random) step A can either: • observe • models untampered execution • - tamper current node Check is activated when all its nodes are tampered. P crashes when f checks are activated. = critical code A tries to guess a check.

  34. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G Check = set of nodes. Execution = walk on G. • In each (random) step A can either: • observe • models untampered execution • - tamper current node Check is activated when all its nodes are tampered. P crashes when f checks are activated. = critical code A tries to guess a check. If guess is correct, the check is disabled (can’t be activated).

  35. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G Check = set of nodes. Execution = walk on G. • In each (random) step A can either: • observe • models untampered execution • - tamper current node Check is activated when all its nodes are tampered. P crashes when f checks are activated. = critical code A tries to guess a check. If guess is correct, the check is disabled (can’t be activated).

  36. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G Check = set of nodes. Execution = walk on G. Game moves: observe, tamper, guess = critical code

  37. Attack Model Attacker plays a game on flow-graph G=(V,E). G Check = set of nodes. Execution = walk on G. Game moves: observe, tamper, guess . • Attacker wins if: • P runs for >N steps without crashing. • Each step in critical code is tampered. = critical code

  38. Security Estimates Security analysis in graph model. Parameters: k = cn (# of checks proportional to # of nodes) f = cn/2 (response threshold is half of the checks) p = 1 (tamper detection is perfect) l = n (critical code replicated in every node) N = n1+ (required running time before crash) Analyzed attacks take (ns) time! (s = check size) No proof yet for arbitrary attacks. More work needed…

  39. Security Arguments Claim 1: As long as no check is disabled, A wins with exp. small prob. (Enough to have “not too many” checks disabled.) P runs for >N steps  “Long” rapidly mixing random walk  Critical code encountered “many” times  A must tamper “many” nodes  Program crashes

  40. Security Arguments Claim 1: As long as no check is disabled, A wins with exp. small prob. (Enough to have “not too many” checks disabled.) Desired claim 2: Any O(ncs) attacker learns a check location with exp. small prob. So far we only analyzed some specific attacks. No complete proof of above claim yet. Claim 1 + Claim 2  No O(ncs) attacker can win.

  41. Attack 1: Voting Attack • Let V={1,…,n}. • Each check is an s-tuple of integers (v1,…,vs). • Main idea: • Suppose A tampers with P, which subsequently crashes. • Let WV denote the tampered nodes. • Then any s-tuple (v1,…,vs)Wsis more likely to be a check than not. • So “vote” for all (v1,…vs) Ws . • Do this D times and output k candidates with most votes.

  42. Attack 1: Voting Attack • Let V={1,…,n}. • Each check is an s-tuple of integers (v1,…,vs). • Fill an s-dimensional nn…n array B with zeros. • for i=1 to D do • run P and tamper with it arbitrarily until it crashes(let W be the set of tampered nodes) • for each (v1,…,vs)Ws do • B[v1,…,vs] = B[v1,…,vs] + 1 • Find the k entries of B with highest valuesand output their indices as guesses for check nodes. Can prove: Updating the table of votes takes ns steps. (Hence ns is lower bound on attack time.)

  43. Attack 2: Intersection Attack Let V={1,…,n}. Each check is an s-tuple of integers (v1,…,vs). Main idea: Suppose A considers m tampered runs of P, with W1,…,Wmdenoting sets of tampered nodes in each run. If some check C= (v1,…,vs) is activated in all m runs, then C  B = (W1 W2  …  Wm)s . For large enough m, B could be of tractable size, and A could search all of it. But small |B| are unlikely to contain any checks. Can prove: Expected time to find a check is still >ncs.

  44. Summary and Further Work • Main goals of work • Modeling of software tamper-resistance • Algorithms for tamper-resistance with analyzable security • Extensions • More realistic model: • Allow some adversarial steps in walk. • More realistic parameters: • p<1 – tamper detection unreliable • l<n – critical code replicated only in fraction of P • Other parameters: number of checks, threshold, etc. • Implementation

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