Soft Governance Promoting Policy Coordination: the Case of PSB

1. Soft Governance Promoting Policy Coordination: the Case of PSB Dr. Maria Michalis University of Westminster M.Michalis@westminster.ac.uk University of Exeter, July 1st workshop: ‘Public Service Broadcasting in Europe in the Digital Age.’

2. Outline • Questions: • 1) are soft policy measures attempts to close the gap between negative & positive integration? • 2) can such voluntary measures promote policy transfer and harmonisation? • Case study: • 2009 Broadcasting Communication of the European Commission : application of State aid rules to PSB

3. EU approach towards PSB • Challenge: • How to reconcile the long established national PSB institutions with the predominantly economic provisions the EU Treaty • Solution: division of responsibilities • E.g. 2007 [1989] Audiovisual Media Services Directive • EU: economic policy • Member States: public service objectives

4. Prominence of competition decisions • EU regulatory framework = minimal • Subsidiarity as bulwark against pro-liberal intrusions • But minimal EU regulatory framework has left PSB exposed to competition law arguments • Series of State aid investigations • The Commission, though often critical, has generally supported PSBs in its decisions • Market failure has progressively become a key concept

5. But gradual In tandem... • Gradual recognition of public interest and democratic considerations, e.g. • 1997: public services = core shared value • 1997 Amsterdam Protocol: PSB = national responsibility • 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights • 2001 Broadcasting Communication : clarifying application of State aid rules to PSB

6. 2009 Broadcasting Communication • Strengthens the 3 main criteria set by its predecessor that make State aid admissible: 1) definition of the remit 2) entrustment and monitoring 3) proportionality • Ex ante test of major additions to or changes in remit • Public value vs market impact • Strengthens subsidiarity. Member states to determine • What ‘significant new services’ are • Details of ex ante test • Regulatory institutional structures

7. Soft policy used to close regulatory gap • EU policy: more about liberalisation (negative integration) than harmonisation (positive integration) • Still, markets are predominantly national • Liberalisation: vertical and coercive Europeanisation mechanisms • Content and cultural issues: national level • Harmonisation has become less-directive driven; emphasis on soft instruments, socialisation (e.g. Audience share – media ownership), reputational enforcement (e.g. Quotas)

8. Public Value Test: Policy Transfer • Argument: • Soft policy measure (2009 Broadcasting Communication) has contributed to policy transfer (PVT is being introduced throughout the EU) and has promoted harmonisation in the governing structures of PSB • Indirectly coercive policy transfer • Impact upon • 1) public policy • 2) cognitive and normative structures • But national variations • In terms of processes, institutional structures, actors ... • Policy adapted to domestic conditions (new institutionalism)

9. National Variations • Germany: • ‘three-step’ approach (PVT test) explicitly incorporates qualitative criteria (e.g. Pluralism) • Carried out by internal broadcasting councils of PSBs • Market impact: external consultants • Concerns existing as well as future activities • No opportunity for direct audience involvement • UK: • Carried out by BBC Trust • BBC Trust: public value. Ofcom: market impact • Concerns significant changes in remit • Extensive public consultation

10. Conclusion and Observations • Paper suggests that soft policy measures may trigger domestic policy adjustment and promote harmonisation • this proposition rests on a single case study • The potential of a soft measure to trigger policy change was conditioned upon its strong association with the EU’s competition powers • indirectly coercive transfer • ‘shadow of hierarchy’

11. Thank you! Dr. Maria MichalisUniversity of Westminsterm.michalis@westminster.ac.uk