Minority Languages and Language Minorities : International Context II

1. Anna von Sury, Viviane Heubi, Michael Isler MinorityLanguagesand Language Minorities: International Context II Middle East, AfricaandAsia

2. From: joshberer.wordpress.com

4. The State of Israel Population: ~8,000,000 (75% Jewish, 20% Arab) Official Languages: Hebrew & Arabic Non-officiallanguages: Russian & English Independency in 1948 Source: yourmiddleeast.com

5. The Revival ofHebrew "The difficulty […] lies in the archaic structure of the language. Metaphorically speaking, the task amounts to the transformation of a Phoenician chariot by fitting it out with borrowed spare parts into a racing motor car." The language "is admirably suited for producing prophetic thunder, but you cannot play a scherzo on a ram's horn.“ (Koestler 1949:312 in Blanc 1957:397)

6. Semitic Language Family Source:mathildasanthropologyblog.wordpress.com

7. Source: danshort.com

8. According to Nahir, 4 factors need to be present, for speech revival to be successful: • Communicative factor : Need for the use of a particular, unifying language • Political factor: Status of language, goal for language planning • Religious factor: Status through common religion and tradition • Literary factor: Literary body to draw from

9. Shift from Yiddish to Hebrew • Four Steps: • Instill children with language attitudes favorable to Hebrew. • Acquiring Hebrew language. • Transfer of Hebrew language out of the schools. • Hebrew as a first language

12. HistoryoftheKibbutz Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PZVvqc78lFM

13. DAM, “Born here” Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zIo6lyP9tTE

14. REFERENCES: • Nahir, Moshe. 1998.Micro Language Planning and the Revival of Hebrew: A Schematic Framework.Language in Society, Vol. 27, No. 3, 335-357. Cambridge University Press http://www.jstor.org/stable/4168849 (Accessed 27 April 2013) • Blanc,Haim. 1957. Hebrew in Israel: Trends and Problems. Middle East Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4, 397-409. Middle East Institute. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4322951 (Accessed 27 April 2013) • - Safran, William. 1992. Language, Ideology, and State-Building: A Comparison of Policies in France, Israel, and the Soviet Union. International Political Science Review,Vol.13, No. 4, Resolving Ethnic Conflicts, 397-414. Sage Publications Ltd.. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601246 (Accessed 27 April 2013) • - Koplewitz, Immanuel. 1990. The use and integration of Hebrewlexemes in Israeli • spokenArabic. In Durk Gorter, Jarich F. Hoekstra, Lammert G. JansmaandJehannesYtsma (eds.)FourthInternational Conference on MinorityLanguages,VolII: Western and Eastern European Papers, 181-195. Multilingual Matters Ltd • Online Sources: • - wikipedia.com (Accessed 28 April 2013)

15. MinorityLanguages in Africa

16. Linguistichistory of Africa • Languages in Africa • Differences to previousexamples • West Africa: • Main categories of languages • Linguisticscenario • Language-attitudepatterns • Nigeria: Therole of theex-coloniallanguage • Linguisticimperialism • Contra linguisticimperialism

17. Africaisnot a country... https://i.chzbgr.com/maxW500/1291224320/hE63B53B3/

18. Linguistichistory of Africa http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Minority_Languages_Africa.htm#_C._LINGUISTIC_SITUATION http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/IDEP/UNPAN003347.pdf

19. Languages in Africa: Languagefamilies http://www.worldgeodatasets.com/language/samples/

20. Languagesspoken in Africa • ___________ languages • ________ African languagesareofficiallanguages 2000-2500 29 http://qed.princeton.edu/main/Image:Linguistic_Map_of_Africa,_circa_2000 http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Minority_Languages_Africa.htm#_C._LINGUISTIC_SITUATION

21. Differences to previousexamples 1. Themajorityspeaks a minoritylanguage 2. No connectionbetweenofficiallanguage and respective native language 3. Official (ex-colonial) languagenotseen as a directthreatforminoritylanguages 4. (Official/recognised) locallanguages as threat to minoritylanguages

22. http://www.gowestafrica.org/images/wamap_web_large.jpg

23. 3 maincategories of languages in West Africa • Exoglossiclanguages(English, French, Portuguese) • Endoglossiclanguages(Indigenouslanguages) • „Exoendoglossic“ languages(Pidgins) (Adegbija 2000: 75)

24. Linguisticscenario in West Africa • Densemultilingualism • Officialdominance of ex-coloniallanguages • Officialneglect of indigenouslanguages • Theunseveredcolonialumbilicalcord • Sociopoliticallyinterwovenlanguage-relatedproblems (Adegbija 2000: 80)

25. Language-attitudepatterns in West Africa • Similarattitudinalpatterns (relative to thecolonizingcountry) • Mainlycharacterizedby 2 influences: • Centripetal force: integrative and identificational • Centrifugal force: instrumental (Adegbija 2000: 86)

26. Ex-coloniallanguageIndigenouslanguage • High esteem • Used in formal and officialsettings • Non-Western-educated and nonliteratehave an ambivalent attitudetowardEuropenlanguages • Young peoplemorefavorablydisposedtoward European languages • Low esteem • Userestricted to informal contexts • High degree of mother-tongueloyalty (Adegbija 2000: 87-90)

27. Nigeria • ~ 163 millionpeople • ~ 450-500 languages • Officiallanguage: English • Major languages: Hausa, Ibo, Yoruba • Multilingualism, multiculturalism (Bisong 1995: 123) http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria https://maps.google.ch/maps?client=firefox-a&hl=de&q=nigeria+google+map&ie=UTF-8&ei=HBt9UbK8FM7UPKCQgOAC&ved=0CAgQ_AUoAg

28. Therole of theex-coloniallanguage in Nigeria • Two different views: • Linguisticimperialism (Phillipson) • Joseph Bisong: LanguageChoice and LanguageImperialism. A NigerianPerspective.

29. Linguisticimperialism • One dimension of culturalimperialism • Centre - Periphery • Dominant and dominatedlanguages • Displacement and replacement of indigenouslanguages • Imposition of Anglo-Saxonculture (Phillipson 1988: 351; Bisong 1995: 123)

30. Joseph Bisong (1995): LanguageChoice and LanguageImperialism. A NigerianPerspective. • Discourse • Pragmaticuse of English in the „periphery“ • Promotion of English notthesolution to encounter English linguisticimperialism • Nigerianculturemade up from different elements Perpetuation of thedominant-dominateddichotomy

31. References • Adegbija, Efurosibina 2000, Languageattitudes in West Africa. International Journal of theSociology of Language141, 75-100. • Adegbija, Efurosibina 1997, Theidentity, survival, and promotion of minoritylanguages in Nigeria. International Journal of theSociology of Language125, 5-27. • Bisong, Joseph 1995: LanguageChoice and CulturalImperialism. A NigerianPerspective. ELT Journal 49(2), 122-132. • Makoni, Sinfree 2011, A criticalanalysis of thehistorical and contemporarystatus of minoritylanguages in Zimbabwe. CurrentIssues in LanguagePlanning12(4), 437-455. • Phillipson, Robert 1988, Linguicism: structures and ideologies in linguisticimperialism. In Skutnabb-Kangas, T. and J. Cummis (ed.), MinorityEducation: FromShame to Struggle. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. • Trudell, Barbara 2008, Practice in Search of a Paradigm: Language Rights, LinguisticCitizenship and MinorityLanguageCommunities in Senegal. CurrentIssues in LanguagePlanning9(2), 395-412. • Ufomata, Titi 1999, Major and minorlanguages in complexlinguisticecologies: theNigerianexperience. International Journal of EducationalDevelopment19(4-5), 315-322. • http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Minority_Languages_Africa.htm#_C._LINGUISTIC_SITUATION (25.04.13) • https://i.chzbgr.com/maxW500/1291224320/hE63B53B3 (25.04.13) • http://www.worldgeodatasets.com/language/samples/ (25.04.13) • http://qed.princeton.edu/main/Image:Linguistic_Map_of_Africa,_circa_2000 (25.04.13) • https://maps.google.ch/maps?client=firefox-a&hl=de&q=nigeria+google+map&ie=UTF-8&ei=HBt9UbK8FM7UPKCQgOAC&ved=0CAgQ_AUoAg (28.04.13) • http://www.gowestafrica.org/images/wamap_web_large.jpg (28.04.13) • http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria (28.04.13) • http://www.ethnologue.com/ (25.04.13) • http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/IDEP/UNPAN003347.pdf (30.04.13)

32. Thailand: Malay Thais- howassimilationpoliciescanleadtomajorconflicts-

33. 1. Overview: Thailand‘s Southern Provinces • Songkhla, Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat From: http://www.economist.com/node/21554246

34. 2. Historical Overview • Insurgency in Southern provinces, peak in 2004 • Peace talks 2013 • 70 – 90% Muslim, Malay-speaking, ethnic Malays in 4 southernmost provinces • Pattani Malay language From: Albritton 2005: 166; Minority Rights Group International 2008; Pereltsvaig2012: 143 – 148

35. Annexation of autonomous Sultanate of Pattani – 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty • Buffer state between BR and FR colonies • Colonial threat: reinforcing Thainess through assimilation policies • Buddhism, Thai language, unified state, respect for king and government • Creation of Standard Thai – standard version of many Tai languages  medium of instruction • Nationalist times: resistance in South emerges • 80s: resistance stops, peak in 2004 (PM Thaksin) From: Bajoria and Zissis2008; Ahmed and Akins 2012; Phongpaichit and Baker 2002: 237; McCargo 2007: 39

36. Daily incidents • Schools, teachers, officials, Buddhist monks and civilians From: Albritton 2005: 166

37. 3. Linguistic Situation • Thai - de facto national and official language • about 70 other languages -clearly dominated by Standard Thai • Standard Thai –formal functions • regional varieties of Thai • Standard Thai is unquestioned + unchallenged in domains of education, employment or state services • king is seen as representing this central Thai culture and language • Pattani Malay - a dialect of Malay, Arabic script called Yawi From: UNESCO Bangkok 2005: 101; Morita, Khanittanan and Chirasombutti2007:1; Simpson and Thammasathien 2007: 404; Rappa and Wee 2006: 106- 108; Boonlong 2007: 51-52; Gilquin 2005: 110;Pereltsvaig 2012: 143 – 148

38. Language Attitudes: • Standard Thai: important element of Thainess • Southern people: uneducated, lazy, religious fanatics – negative attitudes • “Based on my own experience, many of them [ethnic Thais] looked down on us. We are perceived as poor and uneducated people. […] We are terrorists to them. I can feel the distrust and unsafety from their eyes many times. This is sad for me who just have a scarf on my head, no weapon. I am also the one who wish[es] to live peacefully in my hometown” (Ding, survey) From: Otto von Feigenblatt 2010: 58; Dorairajoo 2009: 61-62; Joll 2012: 63

39. Linguisticexclusion: • Official languagedecides on participation in a state = accesstosociety, politics, economy • „As a powerful toolforexclusion, languagepolicy in manystatesis fundamental toexploitation“ (Tollefson 1991: 201).

40. 4. Malay Thais & Society Education: • Standard Thai = official medium ofinstruction • Submersion / sink-or-swimsystem • 45% of Southern populationclaimstohavegood ST languageability • Grade 3: 35% ofchildrenilliterate • 70% of Muslims only Primary Education • High drop-out andfailurerates From: Ferguson 2006: 45; Suwilai and Uniansasmita 2012: 86 and 88; McDuncan 2007: 98-99

41. 1997 Constitution • 2005: pilotprojects • “Faced with the dual challenges of learning new concepts and learning to read and write in Thai, a large number of PM [Pattani Malay] speaking children are unable to adequately master either Thai or their school subjects. This leads to pervasive frustration with the educational system among students and parents, and contributes to a growing sense of alienation from mainstream Thai society within PM speaking communities in the south of Thailand” (Suwilai and Uniansasmita 2012). From: UNESCO Bangkok 2005: 101-102

42. Media: • In ST, but certainprograms in South in Malay • Southern topics, participationoflocalpeople Shop transactions • In ST, shop-keepersmostlyfromcentral Thailand • “Many of the shop-keepers are Muslims who have come south from the capital and central Thailand. None of the Buddhist Thai food-providers from whom I purchased had learned any Malay, even the words for their foods and for money, after years – sometimes even decades – in Patani: they made it almost a matter of principle that Malay Muslims could be enabled to conduct economic life only in the language of Bangkok. And indeed that is the ideology that many Thai regimes have instructed them to pursue when they brought them South to change the demographics since World War II” (Walker 2007). From: Puengnetr2013

43. Health Care Services • General services • Linguisticbarrier – reluctancetovisithospitals Street Signs • Supportedbymajorityof Southern population • Lack ofimplementation From: CERD 2012: 13; Parks 2010

44. 5. Malay Thais in Politics Access tolocaland national politicalinstitutions: localinstitutions: • poorcommunicationwithlocaladministration • Monolingual ST officials in Southern provinces – difficultcommunication • “the way the situation is now, because the education is so limited, because you have such a high disenfranchisement with systems like education, […] [because you have] really high dropout rates, really high failure rates, it creates a system in which the population is not able to communicate with the government and vice versa” (Kathleen Rustici, personal interview). From: McCargo2007: 100; Minorites at Risk Project 2003; McCargo 2004: 7

45. Central politics: • Governmentalwebsitesareonly in ST and EN • Limited provision in Malay Representation: • NoMalay Muslim politician in centralgovernment • Lowerlevelrepresentants: assimilatedtocentral Thai culture + language Political Participation: • Activeparticipation in electionsandvotings From: http://www.thaigov.go.th/; http://www.thai-senate.com/senate_inter/upload-download/language_pdf/show_file.php?id=6; Minorities at Risk Project 2003; Smalley 1994: 165

46. 6. Malay Thais in Economy • ST isimportantforemployment • Only 2% ofMalays in South workforgovernment • Civilservice: ST = officialrequirement, nomentioningofMalay in South • Manual work vs. Ethnic Thais in leadingpositions • Requirement: forhigherjobs – assimilation: „wear Thai uniforms, have Thai names, andspeak Thai“ (Smalley 1994: 165) From: Minority Rights Group International 2008; Boonlong 2007: 52; Herriman 2005: 19

47. 7. Conclusion • Education: submersion - low ST knowledge, highdrop-out rates • Access tosociety, politics, economy: requires ST proficiency •  languagepoliciesareexclusive  conflict

48. 8. References • http://www.economist.com/node/21554246 • Albritton, Robert B. 2005. Thailand in 2004: The “Crisis in the South”. Asian Survey (Volume 45, Number 1). 166 – 173. • Minority Rights Group International. 2008. World directory of minorities: Malays. • http://www.minorityrights.org/5600/thailand/malays.html (accessed 25 February 2013). • Pereletsvaig, Asya. 2012. Languages of the world: An introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. • Bajoria, Jayshree and CarinZissis. The Muslim insurgency in Southern Thailand. Council on Foreign Relations.http://www.cfr.org/thailand/muslim-insurgency-southern-thailand/p12531 (accessed 25 February 2013). • Ahmed, Akbar and Harrison Akins. 27 February 2012. Restoring harmony between Bangkok and the Malay Muslims of South Thailand. Aljazeera. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/201222775730467746.html (accessed 25 February 2013). • Phongpaichit, Pasuk and Chris Baker. 2002. Thailand: Economy and Politics. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Unviersity Press. • McCargo, Duncan. 2007. Thaksin and the resurgence of violence in the Thai south: Network monarchy strikes back? Critical Asian Studies 38 (1). 39-71. • McCargo, Duncan. 2007. Rethinking Thailand’s Southern Violence. Singapore: National University of Singapore. • CERD. 2012. Thailand’s alternative report on racial discrimination towards Malayu in Southern Border Provinces. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/ACARM_Thailand81.doc (accessed 02 April 2013). • UNESCO Bangkok. 2005. First language first: Community-based literacy programmes for minority language contexts in Asia. Bangkok: UNESCO. • Morita, Liang, WilaiwanKhanittanan and VoravudhiChirasombutti. 2007. Introduction. International Journal of the Sociology of Language: Thai Language and Society (No. 186). Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter. • Simpson, Andrew and NoiThammasathien. 2007. Thailand and Laos. In Andrew Simpson (ed.), Language and national identity in Asia, 391- 414.Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. • Rappa, Antonio L. and Lionel Wee. 2006. Language policy and modernity in Southeast Asia: Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. New York: Springer. • Boonlong, FontongRaine. 2007. The language rights of the Malay minority in Thailand. Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 1. 47 – 63. • Gilquin, Michel. 2005. The Muslims of Thailand. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (24:2). Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. 109 – 111. • Von Feigenblatt, Otto. 2010. The Muslim Malay community in Southern Thailand: A ‘small people’ facing existential uncertainty. Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies 27. 53 – 63. • Dorairajoo, Saroja. 2009. Peaceful Thai, violent Malay (Muslim): A case study of the ‘problematic’ Muslim citizens of Southern Thailand. The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies (27:2). 61-83. • Joll, Chris. 2012. Muslim Merit-Making in Thailand’s Far South, Muslims in Global Societies Series (4). Springer Science + Business Media. • Tollefson, James W. 1991. Planning language, planning inequality: Language policy in the community. London and New York: Longman. • http://www.thaigov.go.th/ • http://www.thai-senate.com/senate_inter/upload-download/language_pdf/show_file.php?id=6; • Herriman, Michael. 2005. Language, ethnicity, culture and the conflict in Southern Thailand. NUCB Journal of language, culture and communication (7:1). 15-30. • Smalley, William A. 1994. Linguistic diversity and national unity: Language ecology in Thailand. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. • Minorities at Risk Project. 2003. Assessment for Malay-Muslims in Thailand. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,MARP,,THA,4562d8cf2,469f3adb1e,0.html (accessed 25 February 2013).