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Dr Bob Mathews Head, NBC Arms Control Unit, DSTO

The 2007-2010 BWC Intersessional Process Outcomes of the intersessional process: what opportunities were created, and what opportunities were missed?. Dr Bob Mathews Head, NBC Arms Control Unit, DSTO Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne

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Dr Bob Mathews Head, NBC Arms Control Unit, DSTO

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  1. The 2007-2010 BWC Intersessional ProcessOutcomes of the intersessional process: what opportunities were created, and what opportunities were missed? Dr Bob Mathews Head, NBC Arms Control Unit, DSTO Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne Presentation at the BWC Workshop, Beijing, 4-6 November 2010 These views do not necessarily reflect those of the Australian Government, or any other entity, or the author.

  2. Outline of Presentation • The origins of the Intersessional Process • The lead-up to the 6th RevCon in 2006 • Outcomes of the 6th RevCon • Opportunities created between 2007-2010 • Opportunities missed between 2007-2010 • Concluding Comments

  3. Geneva-based BWC Program of Work 2003-2005Agreement by reconvened 5th RevCon in 2002 to discuss, develop common understandings and promote effective action on: • 2003 • adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the BWC, including enactment of penal legislation; • national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins; • 2004 • enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease; • strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants; • 2005 • the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists • The 6th RevCon (in 2006) will consider the work of these meetings and decide on any further action

  4. Intersessional Process 2003-2005 • A “rescue package” for a sick treaty • Prognosis of patient - Low expectations BUT • Meetings were well attended, including NGO involvement • Very useful discussions in harmonious cooperative atmosphere • ‘Common understandings’ developed on the various topics • ‘Effective action’ commenced in many Capitals based on common understandings reached in Geneva • Initiation of BWC Regional Workshops

  5. Sense of cautious optimism in lead-up to 6th BWC RevCon in 2006 A range of new proposals including: • Annual Meetings with decision making function • New topics for 2007-2010: • Including ‘Enhancement of CBMs’ • A BWC Secretariat • Scientific Advisory Panel • An Accountability Framework • Universality Action Plan • National Implementation Action Plan • Article X Action Plan • A Legally binding instrument (as a long term objective)

  6. Outcomes from the 6th BWC RevCon • No decision making function for Annual Meetings • Topics fixed for 2007-2010 • Similar to topics from 2003-2005 • Outcomes not to be reviewed until 7th RevCon • Enhancement of CBMs postponed • CBMs ‘merit further and comprehensive attention at 7th RevCon’. • BWC Implementation Support Unit • 3 persons • Limited functions of ISU • 5 year term - ISU to be reviewed at 7th RevCon • No Scientific Advisory Panel • No Accountability Framework • No Action Plans • No reference to a legally binding instrument

  7. Geneva-based BWC Program of Work 2007-2010Agreement by 6th RevCon to discuss, develop common understandings and promote effective action on: • 2007 • Ways and means to enhance national implementation, including enforcement of national legislation, strengthening of national institutions and coordination among law enforcement institutions. • Regional and sub-regional cooperation on implementation of the Convention. • 2008 • National, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins. • Oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and biotechnology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention. • 2009 • With a view to enhancing international cooperation, assistance, and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, promoting capacity building in the field of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and the containment of infectious diseases: (1) for States Parties in need of assistance, identifying requirements and requests for capacity enhancement; and (2) from States Parties in a position to do so, and international organizations, opportunities for providing assistance related to these fields. • 2010 • Provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organisations upon the request by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, including improved national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public health systems. • The 7th RevCon (in 2011) will consider the work and outcome of these meetings and decide on any further action

  8. Opportunities created between 2007-2010 • Very useful discussions on the agreed topics, including: • Updates by many States Parties in the national measures adopted since 2003-2005 • Lessons learned during implementation of previously developed ‘common understandings’ • Information sharing to new Geneva-based diplomats and recently appointed Capital-based officials • A benefit of some repetition of agreed topics. • The building of useful cooperative working relationships • Greater involvement of relevant Government agencies from outside the “arms control community”, including: • Health officials • Law Enforcement officials • ‘First Responder’ agencies

  9. Opportunities created between 2007-2010 • Greater involvement of, and cooperation with, other relevant international organisations, including: • WHO • OIE • FAO • Interpol • Greater involvement by relevant NGOs, including: • Universities / Academics • Scientific Academies and Associations • More effective support to National Implementation • VERTIC

  10. Opportunities created between 2007-2010 • Improved coordination of BWC-related workshops • Including with support of the ISU • Less ‘workshop fatigue’ (esp. since 2007) • Development of proposals to enhance CBMs • Geneva Forum • Greater opportunity for detailed scientific discussions • Including Review of Advances in Science and Technology • Poster sessions • Lunchtime meetings

  11. Opportunities created between 2007-2010 • Greater recognition of the role of implementation of the BWC, in conjunction with UN SC Res 1540, in raising barriers to bioterrorism • Including broader acceptance of the importance of effective export controls • Greater recognition of the importance of South-South cooperation • With realisation that ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ country labels have become less relevant with the globalisation of biological science and the biotechnology sector

  12. Opportunities missed between 2007-2010 • Lack of Universality of the BWC • Limited resources of ISU for outreach • Limited outreach activities by States Parties

  13. Opportunities missed between 2007-2010 • Exploring potential benefits if there is greater cooperation between BWC States Parties with the OPCW • Overlap of BWC / CWC, including toxins • the convergence of chemistry and biology

  14. Convergence: The Chemical & Biological Threat Spectrum Mustard Nerve Agents HydrogenCyanide Phosgene Toxic industrial, pharmaceutical and agricultural chemicals Peptides Modified / tailored bacteria and viruses Botulinum Saxitoxin Ricin Bacteria Viruses Rikettsia Agents not found in nature Agents of biological origin Genetically manipulated BW Traditional BW Classical CW Emerging CW Bioregulators Toxins Based on G.S.Pearson

  15. Opportunities missed between 2007-2010 • A conceptual discussion about how to improve States Parties compliance with the BWC • For example, how many States Parties have not yet enacted domestic criminal law as required under Article IV? • Submission of CBMs • And how to improve confidence in compliance with the BWC • Are the CBMs from the 1980s sufficient? • Other measures? • Eg. Accountability framework?

  16. Concluding Comments • The 2007-2010 Intersessional Process has worked even better than the 2003-05 process • Geneva meetings an excellent venue for BWC-related discussion and the building of useful cooperative working relationships among States Parties, IGOs, NGOs. • Many effective actions are now in progress, with international cooperation (including bilateral and regional), which may not have been initiated if there had not been the Intersessional Process • Achievement of objectives through creative informal approaches • Very valuable role played by the ISU • But still much to be done beyond 7th RevCon • Universality • Exploring BWC/CWC overlap /convergence issues • Mechanisms to assist compliance • Mechanisms to provide confidence in compliance

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