How to change managers’ attitudes toward Process Safety

1. HSE in Oil & Gas Russia & CIS Moscow, March 13-15, 2012 Christian Jochum, EPSC Director of Centre How to change managers’ attitudes toward Process Safety

2. European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) Network funded 1992 by 40+ mainly European based (petro)chemical multinationals to develop best practice in major accident prevention/process safety Objectives: Information/know how exchange Legislation (esp. Seveso II & ATEX) participation & co-ordination of EU funded projects Outputs: Internal reports & books User groups & public conferences EU projects & working groups Major topics 2012: Process Safety Scenarios Process Safety Indicators Process Safety Auditing Process Safety Competence Ageing Assets and Facilities Safety Critical Equipment www.epsc.org

3. How to control process safety risks Equipment, which is fit for purpose (hardware, control systems) Design Maintenance Safe operations (Safety Management System) Rules (Government, Trade Associations, Company) Operating Procedures Compliance  operating discipline  human factors safety culture

4. How to achieve sustainable compliance Compliance to operating procedures may lead to “additional” work and therefore needs Training Supervision Sanctions Sustainable compliance can only be achieved by Understanding, why “shortcuts” may be dangerous (competence) Clear message by all management levels that safety has highest priority (safety culture)

5. The problem: Failure of all process safety barriers have low probability, but high consequences DeepwaterHorizon, April 20, 2010 Ifluckasthe last barrierfails ...

6. Compliance requires Process Safety Culture – and this has to start from the top Clear commitment from senior management is needed Policy Statement Priority for safety investments (money!) Timely response to safety issues and concerns Continuous monitoring of performance Behave as “role model” in day-to-day activities and especially at site visits However, this needs understanding of process safety issues first Awareness for the risk of (low probability) process safety incidents cannot be presumed for senior management The shock of a major incident at a “similar” company has to be used, but fades away quickly Threat of (even criminal) litigation may help, but does not change culture Therefore other ways have to be found to enhance the commitment of senior management for process safety

7. EPSC/EFCE project “Process Safety Awareness for Business Leaders” DVD “Process Safety Pays” with video and template for PowerPoint presentation To be presented by senior process safety person at e.g. Management Board meeting, duration 30-60 minutes Video as “opener” or “teaser” to achieve positive emotions for process safety for non-technical senior management 7 minutes Process safety correlated to flying as an activity with positive connotation Followed by PowerPoint presentation focussing on the special issues of the company For more information visit www.epsc.org and click on “Process Safety Pays” 7

8. Changing the mind of middle management/supervisor level Demonstrate clear commitment Timely response to safety issues and concerns Continuous monitoring of performance Behave as “role model” Don´t tolerate breaching/bending procedures Analyze critically any breaching/bending of procedures Don’t turn a blind eye to rule breaking (bypassing, overriding, workarounds) even if it has no immediate consequences (which may be down to sheer luck) Encourage reporting of deviations, near misses etc. (“no-blame culture”) What was the real reason (laziness or inadequate procedure)? Take clear and visible action if procedures are not followed Disciplinary action or update of procedure Cover abnormal situations as much as possible by procedures, too Start up, shut down, maintenance “foreseeable” emergencies

9. Case Study: Buncefield/GB Explosion and Fire 2005

11. What went wrong in Buncefield? Failures leading to massive overfilling of a gasoline storage tank Level control instrumentation failed during filling process Only 1 screen to control 4 filling operations (different windows) Overfill protection was not in operating mode None of these failures had been new Problems with the level control instrumentation had been tolerated since months Some operators used a cooking timer as independent control for filling operations Overload of operator´s capacity when monitoring multiple operations was evident, but ignored Overfill protection device was not checked after maintenance

12. What Buncefield tells us about Process Safety Culture Management systems had been in place but not fully complied with Management and operators accepted serious deviations for a long period Consequently, management and not the operators had been hold legally responsible for the incident A stable process safety culture would have prevented these failures of the safety management system It can also be said that an effective safety management system is an indicator for a good safety culture – a ”chicken and egg – problem”)

13. Improved Plants / Hardware Accident Rate Safety Management Systems Process Safety Culture can drive accident rates further down Human Factors Culture Time

14. Conclusion and outlook Safety Culture is not rocket science, but common sense There are no new systems needed, but rather a change in thinking and attitudes Clear commitment of all management levels is a prerequisite This is more difficult in process safety, as serious incidents are rare events Process Safety Performance Indicators, including all loss of containment events, have been developed in U.S.A. (American Petroleum Institute, Centre of Chemical Process Safety) and Europe (European Chemical Industry Council Cefic, EPSC) and will improve this process

15. Thank you for your attention!