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RPKI implementation experiences in the LAC Region

RPKI implementation experiences in the LAC Region. Carlos M. Martínez – Arturo Servín LACSEC 2012 – LACNIC XVIII. What is RPKI?. RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) allows the validation of an organization right to use of a certain resource (IPv4, IPv6, ASN)

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RPKI implementation experiences in the LAC Region

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  1. RPKI implementation experiences in the LAC Region Carlos M. Martínez – Arturo Servín LACSEC 2012 – LACNIC XVIII

  2. What is RPKI? • RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure) allows the validation of an organization right to use of a certain resource (IPv4, IPv6, ASN) • RPKI combines the hierarchy of the Internet resource assignment model through RIRs with the use of digital certificates based on standard X.509 • RPKI is standardized in the IETF through the SIDR WG. It has produced RFCs 6480 – 6492

  3. Application of RPKI • One of the threats to the routing system is the forging of the origin autonomous system in BGP. • To reduce monkey-in-the-middle attacks and misconfiguration errors in BGP we use RPKI to validate the autonomous system that originates a prefix

  4. RPKI Architecture and Origin Validation RPKI Management System Cache Repository

  5. Types of users • Prefix holder • You want to certify your prefixes and create ROAs • Router operator • You want to validate prefixes using RPKI and origin-validation • You are both

  6. Prefix Holder • You need to create and publish your resource certificate and your ROAs • One way is to use RIRs systems already deployed • Run your own CA and repository

  7. Router Operator • You need an origin-validation capable router, an RPKI cache and at least one trust anchor • Cisco, Juniper and Quagga (srx-module) are capable routers • RIPE NCC and others have cache implementations • Each RIR is the trust anchor of the resources (IPv6 and IPv4) that they have allocated

  8. Router Operator (2) • Configure your cache to pull the TALs from RIRs • Configure your router and cache to speak RTR • Configure policies in your router • Check your BGP routes

  9. Validation Cache • RIPE NCC • Java, runs almost anywhere, supports (RPKI routing protocol • Download: http://labs.ripe.net/Members/agowland/ripencc-rpki-validator.zip/view • Rcynic • Runs in unix like systems • Download: http://rpki.net • BBN • Written in C++, tested in linux but it may run in other unix like systems

  10. Routers • Cisco • Production software for ASR1000, 7600, ASR903 and ASR901 – releases 15.2(1)S or XE 3.5 • Juniper • Beta versions in JunOS • Production version sometime in 2012 • Quagga • Quagga SRX, developed by NIST US • 3rd-party patch, merge into mainline Quagga planned for later in 2012

  11. RPKI in the LAC Region • This segment of the talk is biased • It covers operational experience from our service region only (LACNIC) • I assume people should know what their network is actually doing • So take all this with a grain of salt • It is not meant to be hard on early adopters • Early adopters always get burnt, but they gather and provide extremely valuable experience

  12. RPKI in the LACNIC Service Region • Where are we? • Slowly getting there • There is a lot of interest in the community • A bit of disappointment due to lack of router software • This should change later this year • Noticeable increments in usage after our conferences • ~200** prefixes, 6% of announced IPv4 covered by ROAs • 2nd place among all regions behind RIPE-NCC by some measurements

  13. RPKI Evolution Prefixes Signed IPv4 Space Covered by ROAs (in % of total)

  14. Nice, right? Or... • … perhaps not • Statistics show that the quality of the ROAs created tends to be not-very-good • Quality in this context means 'first do no harm' • Your ROAs should not create 'artificial' invalids, otherwise trust in the system will be quickly undermined once BGP speakers start validating • Our region was creating almost ~1500 invalids

  15. How we figured it out? • http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/

  16. Why ? What is Going On ? • Network-related issues • Lack of awareness on how a 'complex' network is actually, well, 'networking' with its peers • 'Complex' as in 'I use more than one AS' • Failure to properly identify correct originating AS • Flabbergasting levels of de-aggregation • Sometimes for TE needs, sometimes hard-to-explain • Make creation of proper ROAs impractical with currently available tools • System-related

  17. Why ? What is Going On ? (ii) • System-related • Lack of 'previewing' or 'prototyping' tools • Leading to 'blind' ROA creation and lots of trial & error • Lack of awareness of tools like RIS

  18. What Now? What Should We Do? • Act now: • We contacted our worst offenders and reduced our count of invalids by 75% while keeping them using the system • Plan for the future: • Provide better tools • Ways of 'previewing' the effect of a ROA • RIS data invaluable for this purpose • Batch-creation of ROAs • Up/Down • Integrate them with the hosted system • BGP Training • Remember the BGP BoF later today

  19. Thank you ! carlos @ lacnic.net aservin @ lacnic.net

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