1 / 11

FHCT SEB cross-section measurements at H4IRRAD and consequences for MKD reliability

FHCT SEB cross-section measurements at H4IRRAD and consequences for MKD reliability. Viliam Senaj LIBD meeting 24/01/2012. Motivation. Crucial importance of reliable operation of the beam abort system for LHC security

rigel-head
Télécharger la présentation

FHCT SEB cross-section measurements at H4IRRAD and consequences for MKD reliability

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. FHCT SEB cross-section measurements at H4IRRAD and consequences for MKD reliability Viliam Senaj LIBD meeting 24/01/2012

  2. Motivation • Crucial importance of reliable operation of the beam abort system for LHC security • Generators are installed in UA63/67 and will see up to 106 HEH.cm-2.year-1 in axis of cable ducts according to simulations • 30 MKD and 8 MKBH generators operate up to maximum voltage of ~ 29 kV at 7 TeV; 12 MKBV up to 16 kV at 7 TeV • 680 FHCTs in MKD and MKBH exposed to an average voltage od 2.9 kV; up to ~ 3 kV on several devices expected (due to spread of voltage sharing resistors value and FHCT leakage currents) • FHCT producers (Dynex & ABB) provide only basic SEB failure rate due to cosmic rays at sea level to be 100 FITat 2.8 kV (1 FIT = 1 failure in 109 device hours); failure rate at 2.9 kV and 3 kV is unknown • Failure of a FHCT will provoke an asynchronous dump with associated beam loses and machine down time necessary for generator replacement and system re-calibration (~ 1 day)

  3. FHCTs used • ABB - 5STH20H4502 • DYNEX - DG648BH45-185 • Similar specifications from both producers: • Umax: 4.5 kV • Udc: 2.8 kV (100 FIT) • Imax: 80 kA • dI/dt: 20 kA/µs • Ileak: 10 µA @3kV • Load integral ~1.106 A2s • wafer diameter ~ 60 mm

  4. SEB failure rate estimation • 680 FHCT with up to 6000 hours per year at maximum average voltage of 2.9 kV • According to simulations the maximum fluence of 106HEH.cm-2.year-1in cable duct axis • Estimation of number of failures per year for 1/3rd of FHCT at 3 kV, 1/3rd at 2.9 kV and 1/3rd at 2.8 kV and an average HEH fluence equivalent to ¼ of the maximum simulated value gives 4 failures per year • Cost estimation of hardware modification (adding 2 FHCT into a stack) : • 160 pcs of additional FHCTs ~150 kCHF • 80 pcs new trigger transformers with 12 secondaries ~300 kCHF • Up-grade of stack mechanical and electrical parts (snubber capacitors, voltage sharing resistors, longer stack return rods) ~150 kCHF • 160 pcs of PTU and 72 pcs of HV PS with increased voltage (if improvement with new trigger transformer is insufficient) ~500 kCHF • Total ~1.1MCHF • More accurate failure rate evaluation is needed in order to decide if hardware modifications are necessary

  5. SEB measurement results slot 3 • H4IRRAD test done with 2 setups of 5 FHCT each: • External zone: 3 FHCTs Dynex + 2 FHCTs ABB type I (production batch- KV.xxx) • Measurement within 2.7 kV- 2.9 kV; cumulated fluence of 2.67e9 HEH/cm2; 294 SEBs for Dynex; 0 SEBs for ABB I: • 2.7 kV: 7.45e8 HEH/cm2 – 198 SEBs Dynex; • 2.8 kV: 1.82e8 HEH/cm2 – 93 SEBs Dynex; • 2.9 kV: 1.6e6 HEH/cm2 – 3 SEB Dynex • Internal zone: 3FHCTs ABB type II (batch GV.xxx) + 2 FHCTs ABBI (batch KV.XXX) • Measurement within 2.7 kV- 3.1 kV; cumulated fluence of 1.32e10 HEH/cm2, 110 SEBs for ABB I, 30 SEBs for ABB II: • 2.7 kV: 1.51e9 HEH/cm2 – 0 SEBs ABB I, 0 SEBs ABB II; • 2.8 kV: 8.36e9 HEH/cm2 – 18 SEBs ABB I; 3 SEBs ABB II; • 2.9 kV: 2.74e9 HEH/cm2 – 42 SEBs ABB I, 7 SEBs ABB II; • 3 kV : 4.7e8 HEH/cm2 – 35 SEBs ABB I, 8 SEBs ABB II; • 3.1 kV: 1.2e8 HEH/cm2 – 15 SEBs ABB I, 12 SEBs ABB II; • In total: • 294 SEBs for 3 Dynex – leakage current increased significantly • 140 SEBs for 4 ABB I and 3 ABB II – no damage

  6. SEB cross-section slot 1 + slot 3 + cosmic Insufficient statistics

  7. Radiation levels measured last year • Efficiency of cable duct shielding surprisingly high: ratio RA/gen = 2E+5 (fluence in RA/fluence on generator); • HEH fluence in front of duct (UA67 only): 3E+4 HEH/cm2 • Estimation for full intensity and energy: 3E+5 HEH/cm2 • !Duct next to shielded one has 2.6E+6 HEH/cm2 (in duct UA side); at generator level fluence is unknown; TLDs reqested to be installed; necessity of adding the shielding might result from measurement • Estimation of average fluence of 2.5E+5 HEH/cm2 kept

  8. Abort system MTBF re-evaluation • Due to insufficient statistics of Dynex SEB data at 2.9 kV and non – existing data at 3 kV cross-section values are extrapolated to 5x10-7 cm2 at 2.9 kV and to 1x10-6 cm2 at 3 kV; • In present, 300 Dynex and 300 ABB made FHCT are installed (ratio of type II/type I is unknown; type II is old technology so the estimation is > 50 % for type II); • Number of SEB related failures estimated under the same conditions as before (1/3rd of FHCTs at 2.8, 2.9 and 3 kV), with an average HEHfluence of 2.5x105 HEH.cm-2.year-1 (¼ of the simulated maximum) and with 300 Dynex, 150 ABB type I and 150 ABB type II is 25.6 per year (25 Dynex) • If Dynex are replaced by ABB type I (the only produced in present) the number of failures will be 1.6 per year. • Placing of generators populated by ABB type II in front of ducts with the highest fluence should reduce number of failures down to less than 1 per year

  9. Conclusions - Recommendations • Dynex cross-section much higher than expected • ABB type I cross section measured in internal zone ~ 3x higher compared to results obtained during slot1 (external zone) • ABB type II – confirmed lower cross-section compared to type I (at least 5x). Producer claims the only difference in passivation process. • FHCT SEB C-S sufficiently low to not require modyfication of the number of FHCT in a stack • Real neutron fluence in UA galleries close to non shielded ducts to be evaluated • Generators at positions with higher radiation to be populated with ABB FHCT type II • Shielding of other ducts if necessary

  10. New MKD trigger transformer • ABB recommendation for reliable FHCT gate triggering: 2 kA peak, 5 kA/us commutation speed • In time of MKD design the recommendations were ~ 10x lower • PTU operational voltage limited to 3 kV; higher voltage would require new design • New trigger transformer with co-axial design (reduced stray inductance) was developed • Mechanical and electrical contacts compatible with present design • Increasing of FHCT gate current (2x) and its commutation speed (3x) without need to modify PTU voltage • Further improvement possible (replacement of triax by multiwire twisted shielded cables)

  11. Comparison old vs. new transformer

More Related